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Research on violence reduction

Report

Prepared for

The Security Industry Authority
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May 2015

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SUMMARY - OVERALL

1. Background

This research was commissioned to explore perceptions and experiences of violence in the night time economy and beyond, and to identify measures which might help reduce it. It comprised three parts:

- a review of existing literature on the topic
- a qualitative study involving interviews and focus groups with 81 people working in, or with a direct interest in, violence
- an online survey of 891 people working in the security industry.

2. Summary of key points from the overall findings

2.1 The landscape

- Violence was widely acknowledged as a significant problem in many social and public environments: in and around venues and services operating in the night time economy; and in public premises and retail environments
- No substantial regional variations emerged: violence, especially in the night time economy, was apparent everywhere, irrespective of location or size of city/town
- Almost all security staff who took part in the online survey and the qualitative interviews had been victims of violence in their work

2.2 The views of different parties

- Those in the security industry had wide-ranging views on the scale and severity of violence:
  - in qualitative interviewing they gave the impression they expected to have to deal with a certain level of violence as part of their work
  - findings from the online survey suggested that violence is seen as more of a problem

- Police officers regarded violence as a serious problem, though some felt it is becoming less prevalent and less severe
- Police officers had a largely positive view of the work done by security staff to manage violence, and generally felt the security industry has become more professional in recent years
- Venue owners and managers were well aware of the problems associated with violence, especially those operating in the night time economy, but some seemed reluctant to confront the issue, and played down the frequency and severity of violent incidents
- The licensing authorities we spoke to felt they had to balance the risk of violence against the financial benefits of the night time economy; they took a proactive approach to managing violence, and used their powers to impose conditions on premises directly related to security measures

2.3 The role of the SIA

- Overall impressions of the SIA were largely positive: most saw it as a force for good, and as having played a part in improving standards in the security industry
- The SIA was most widely known for its licensing of security staff, though most security companies we spoke to were also aware of the Approved Contractor Scheme, and were members
- SIA licensing was believed to have played a major part in improving the quality and standing of security staff, particularly door supervisors
- The general belief was that the SIA could be more involved in promoting measures to reduce violence, though some respondents, especially security staff, were unsure how it could reach them

2.4 Recording of violence

- Recording of violence appeared to be patchy at best: no single source of data giving an accurate picture of how the security industry is affected by violence seemed to be available

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- Gathering data appears to be more a matter of building up a picture from different sources and drawing inferences from records of the incidents for which data exist

- Some police forces, security companies and premises kept information on violent incidents, primarily for their own purposes; there was limited sharing of data

- There were instances of good practice in recording of incidents, particularly by security companies in the ACS

2.5 Training

- Training was regarded as highly important in equipping security staff with the skills to do their work safely, and as an area in which significant improvements could be made

- The requirement to do training to acquire a SIA licence was widely seen as sound in principle, but there were concerns about the breadth of topics covered, about inconsistent standards between providers, and the lack of refresher training

- Security staff generally felt that training is useful, especially in conflict management, restraint and more specialist areas, though many also believed that experience is equally valuable when it comes to dealing with violent incidents

2.6 Measures to prevent violence

- A number measures were suggested as ways of preventing and reducing violence, falling into three broad categories:

  - strategic measures relating to the planning of environments (especially for the night time economy)

  - design and management of venues and premises, including retail and public places

  - tactics and equipment used by security staff and venues

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- Of the suggestions for equipment, there was some interest in breathalysers and ID scanning (both of which had been trialled by people in our sample), though they also prompted reservations and questions

- Other tactical measures which were believed to be helpful included some already in use: taxi marshalling, extended use of CCTV, better venue management, improved relationships between venues and security staff, and better training for security staff and bar staff

2.7 Partnership working

- Multi-agency working came across consistently as a key approach in addressing violence: there were numerous examples of locations where this has had an impact; and many in the security industry and the authorities regarded it as a central component of addressing violence

- There was some support for broadening partnership working, to include security staff to get them involved and share information, and health authorities, particularly local A&E departments, to contribute to learnings about the impact of violence

3. Summary of findings on violence in the night time economy

3.1 The landscape

- Violence in the night time economy is believed to have increased substantially with the liberalisation of the licensing laws and the growth of the leisure industry
- There was widespread agreement that violence in the night time economy is a serious concern, but no consensus on whether it is getting better or worse
- Violence in the night time economy was strongly associated with alcohol, premises which stayed open the latest (ie in the early morning) and men aged 18-24
- There were exceptions: women committing violence; older people being violent, particularly at events; and people becoming violent after taking drugs

3.2 The key players in dealing with violence

- Licensing authorities used licensing laws as a tool in managing violence and controlling the use of security measures in venues
- There were signs that venue owners/managers played down the risk of violence, perhaps because they did not want to acknowledge it as a problem in their own venues
- The police were universally acknowledged as a key player in the problem because they are the last resort when violence occurs, and because they represent the law on the street
- There were concerns about decreasing police resources to deal with night time violence as spending cuts affect their numbers
- Door supervisors played a central role in dealing with violence in the night time economy; their role appears to have grown at the same time as police resources have been stretched
- Attempts to tackle night time violence through schemes such as Pubwatch and Best Bar None were generally welcomed

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3.3 Preparing for and responding to violence

- Security companies planned for violence by carrying out risk assessments where they could, organising door supervisor teams carefully, and familiarising themselves with venues and events
- When incidents of violence occurred, these typically involved attacks by customers who were drunk on door supervisors at the door, attacks on bar staff or attacks on other customers
- Door supervisors' response to violence was fairly well established: the strategy was to de-escalate situations if possible, eject or repel perpetrators quickly, and detain them if trouble persisted, then call the police
- Attitudes to violence among door supervisors were mixed: some regarded it as part of the job; others implied it might prompt them to leave the industry

3.4 Measures to deal with violence

- Security staff and to a lesser extent other sectors of the sample felt that more measures could be made available to them to help deal with violence
- The main measures suggested by security staff were:
  - more security staff at venues
  - better communication between venues and security staff
  - breathalysers
  - ID scanning
  - headcams
- In addition to these specific measures there were many calls for more training, both training to obtain SIA licences and further training after this, to refresh knowledge and to cover a wider range of topics

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4. Summary of findings on violence outside the night time economy

4.1 The landscape

- Outside the night time economy, findings suggested that violence is most prevalent in public premises, particularly Jobcentre Plus offices and hospitals
- Elsewhere violence was experienced in retail settings, at major events (particularly music and sports events), in static guarding and guarding of cash and valuables in transit
- There were some parallels between violence in public places and at events, and violence in the night time economy: unpredictable behaviour, sometimes fuelled by alcohol and drugs
- But there were also differences: in public places perpetrators of violence were from a wider age range; and in these environments mental health problems and location-specific issues were factors
- In the guarding sector violence was less common but if it did occur it was liable to be more severe, and more likely to involve the use of weapons

4.2 The main players

- The range of parties involved in managing violence in other sectors was broader and more disparate than in the night time economy; and in most sectors (except events) licensing authorities played no part
- In all settings the task of dealing with violence and planning for the risk of violence was largely down to the client body and the security staff it employed
- The police had a less high profile role because they did not routinely patrol most of these settings, though they were of course called if an incident occurred

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4.3 Preparing for and responding to violence

- In these other sectors, preparing for violence was largely a matter of being familiar with the layout of premises/venues and knowing how to respond if violence broke out
- In most sectors there was less of a feeling of being in a team than there appeared to be among those working in the night time economy
- Responses to violent incidents were not dissimilar, but there was greater reliance on the police to attend and provide help

4.4 Measures to deal with violence

- There were no measures identified specifically by security staff in sectors outside the night time economy
- But the impression was that they wanted:
  - more support from the premises where they worked (especially in retail, public places, static guarding)
  - more training and guidance in self defence
  - more support following an incident, especially in static guarding

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I

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

B. BACKGROUND: VIOLENCE IN THE NIGHT TIME ECONOMY

1. The context

The night time economy is comprised primarily of pubs, clubs, restaurants, take-aways, and late-night retail outlets such as supermarkets and filling stations. It is an important part of the economic activity of most towns and cities in the UK and can play an important part in attracting people to certain locations.

Violent crime is a significant feature of the night time economy: about 50% of all violent crime occurs at times and in places associated with the night time economy. Evidence for this comes from a variety of sources, including studies of police, A&E, local authority and British Crime Figure studies, all of which point to the greater prevalence of violence during the evening and night, particularly at weekends. Many of the businesses in the night time economy sell alcohol, and much of the violence is linked to alcohol consumption.

The retail sector more generally is also at risk of violence because it attracts attempts at theft, of goods and cash, though it is less likely to suffer from alcohol-related crime.

2. The Security Industry Authority

The Security Industry Authority (SIA) is an independent body that reports to the Home Office. Its role is to regulate the private security industry. It does this through compulsory licensing, which ensures that private security staff are properly trained and qualified; and through its Approved Contractor Scheme, which sets standards for security providers.

The SIA has a particular interest in the issue of violence and the problems it creates because many of its members work in the night time economy, typically as door staff, and because much of the violence committed directly affects them. More than 80% of Door Supervisors are believed to have been subjected to violence, and 67% of companies employing Security Guards have had staff attacked.

3. Reducing violence

The SIA would like to identify more measures to help reduce violence that affects its members and the businesses and environment in which they work.

It is generally acknowledged that reducing violence cannot be achieved by any single party alone: a number of players have a role, including the SIA, central and local government, the police, the businesses involved and their customers. Central government has paid particular attention to the role of alcohol in violence in the night time economy; it uses its alcohol strategy to address the problem and encourages inter-agency working.

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C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

1. Overall aims

This research was commissioned to…

- explore the nature of violence affecting the private security industry
  - to establish the level of violence in the licensable sectors, particularly in the night time economy
  - to understand the frequency and types of violence that door supervisors, security guards and others on the frontline in the licensable sector are likely to encounter
  - to examine how venues, operators, retail premises and security suppliers manage the risk of violence – overall strategies and specific preventative measures
  - to explore and understand the attitude of contractors and security suppliers to workplace violence
- establish how the SIA can take measures to reduce violence
  - to assess the likely effectiveness of its violence reduction strategy
  - to identify any other measures that the SIA could take that might be effective in reducing violence
- create a database of existing violence reduction initiatives
  - to build up a comprehensive list of violence reduction measures that are the result of public (especially crime or health) policy
  - to identify significant local or regional violence reduction measures
  - to identify local groups concerned with the issue that the SIA can participate in

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2. Scope of this research

This study comprised three separate components:

- **Desk research** to review existing learning on the subject
- **A qualitative study** involving face to face interviews and small focus groups with 80 people who work in the security industry or have a direct interest in the issue of violence
- **A quantitative online** survey of 893 people working in the security industry

This document covers the desk research (section II) and the qualitative and quantitative findings together (section III).

The research was conducted between February and April 2015. It was conducted by Tim Porter, Alice Bearn and Ali Percy.

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II

DESK RESEARCH

D. INTRODUCTION

Our review of the literature on violence involved 50 separate sources. This cannot be regarded as an exhaustive review of the material available, but it in the time available it gave us a wide-ranging overview of learning on the issues.

The range of literature available varies widely, from highly theoretical, academic papers in geography, addiction studies and criminology to more practical or policy-oriented pieces targeted towards local authorities, the police, venues and retail environments and other parties with a stake in this area.

While there is a great deal of coverage of problematic alcohol consumption and its connection to violence, specific references to the involvement of/impact on security staff is minimal. Any implications for security staff largely have to be identified by thinking through what is likely to be most relevant for door staff and the situations they face.

The literature that is directly relevant to security staff, mainly appears to focus on training, and the efficacy of the approach taken by the SIA.

Finding recent and up-to-date evidence and interpretation is problematic. Interpretation of crime statistics invariably has a lag of a few years. While there was a burst of analysis and reflection following the 2003 Licensing Act, this appears to have tailed off in recent years.

Indeed, Wickham (2012) makes the point that while many policies have been suggested to target harms occurring in the NTE, evaluation of these is often patchy or poorly executed. Therefore deciding which policies may be most effective is not always clear.

Coverage of violence outside the night-time economy is minimal. The most useful references that we have found to violence in retail environments are in papers by the Health and Safety Executive.

E. CONTEXT: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NIGHT TIME ECONOMY

- *Liberalisation of leisure industries and licensing resulted in rapid growth in the night time economy; public security services, particularly the police, were unprepared for this*
- *The night time economy has had significant benefits, especially for local economies, but these have had to be balanced with investment in measures to control the violence associated with it*

The 1990s and early 2000s saw a push towards liberalisation of the leisure industries, with the night-time economy becoming a key indicator of urban prosperity, attracting investment, creating employment and re-generating civic spaces (Lister, 2009).

This was part of a general increase in 'boosterism' as a means of regenerating inner city areas (Shaw, 2010). The hope was to achieve a 'Continental European' lifestyle which would contain a wider variety of leisure and shopping opportunities than were available in pub-dominated British towns and cities. Arguments were made for the deregulation of licensing and planning laws to create mixed-use city centre developments (Comedia, 1991 and Heath, 1997, cited in Shaw 2010). Local governments saw an active NTE as a way of increasing revenue, and the New Labour government saw the opportunities for an urban renaissance and pushed for de-regulation.

During this period, the alcohol industry was able to make large scale, mono-functional investments in specific localities, largely unregulated, leading to huge surges in the number of night-time visitors. Urban centres were transformed; for example, between 1998 and 2001, there was a 240% increase in the capacity of Manchester city centre's licensed premises (Lister, 2009). Indeed, Hadfield, (2006, cited in Shaw, 2010) shows how local governments of the 1990s were unable to resist the high levels of capital investment involved in the sale of disused public buildings to chain pub companies.

However, evolving regulatory laws meant that local government lost its power to control these areas just as the problems associated with this

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proliferation became apparent. Police resources were also inadequate to deal with the scale of alcohol-related violence and disorder that emerged leading to a regulatory deficit in the City Centre (Edwards 2010). Multi-agency responses have ever since been playing catch-up with these commercial developments (Lister 2009).

> *"Over the last decade the NTE and its regulation, management and policing has emerged as a key focus for urban public policy, reflecting the changing character of urban sites, particularly the rise of a new alcohol-fuelled, consumption-driven, night-time high street. The transformation of many urban centres has been remarkable, with the commercial and civil remnants of past economic eras having morphed into 'themed' pubs and 'designer' bars and clubs"*
> (Hadfield et al 2009)

It should not be forgotten that there are also substantial economic benefits of the NTE. As Edwards (2010) points out, the NTE has had a significant impact on income and employment generation in Cardiff, and this is a point made generally about the NTE by Stuart et al (2009).

The Licensing Act 2003 aimed to support the benefits brought by the NTE, by deregulating opening hours, while also creating new alcohol-related regulations and offences. The Act came into force in November 2005.

"New powers and funding for police and local authorities were made to counterbalance or reconfigure what had been a thoroughly neo-liberal policy agenda" (Hadfield et al 2009).

This regulatory drive was aimed both at the supply and demand-side of alcohol consumption targeting the consumers, as well as the producers of the nightlife. However, Hadfield and Newton (2010) cite a DCMS report published in 2008 and looking at the impact of the Act

> *"The post-2003 Licensing Act context is a complex one in which the art of urban security governance involves attempts to balance the seductions of the market, consumer freedoms and civil liberties, with surveillance, securitization and repression".*
> *"Our main conclusion is that people are using the freedoms but people are not sufficiently using the considerable powers granted by the Act to tackle problems and that there is a need to rebalance action towards enforcement and crack down on irresponsible behaviour".*

F. TYPES AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE EXPERIENCED

- *Violence is strongly associated with alcohol, with concentration of licensed premises in small areas, and with gatherings of people in large numbers*
- *Off-licensed premises also play a part, specifically in enabling pre-loading, which increases the likelihood of violence*
- *Victims and perpetrators are typically men aged 18-24, and most violent incidents occur between 11.00pm and 3.00am*
- *Under-reporting of violence is a significant obstacle to understanding it and responding to it; there are many reasons for this, often linked to a reluctance by security staff and venues to acknowledge violence*
- *Overall, no single source of data gives an accurate picture of how the security industry is affected by violence*
- *Rather it is a matter of building up a picture from different sources and drawing inferences from time of day, location, involvement of alcohol etc. for incidents for which data exists*
- *It is essential to understand what is happening, identify potential interventions and measure the impact of those interventions to help tackle the problem of violence; this can only be done with comprehensive national statistics*
- *Information sources that seem particularly useful are the Crime Survey for England and Wales, HSE stats on violence at work, the Health and Social Care Information Centre and the British Retail Consortium Retail Crime Survey*
- *CSEW figures estimated 1.3m incidents of violence against adults in England and Wales*
- *Alcohol was believed to be a prevalent factor in 64% of violent incidents involving strangers; and combined CSEW figures for 2012/13 and 2013/14 suggest that 70% incidents occurring between 6.00pm and 6.00am were alcohol related*

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1. The risk of violence: the NTE

Violence is only one of a number of alcohol related crimes in the night-time economy. However, government research has found that one in five of all violent incidents now occur in or around pubs or clubs (cited in Lister, 2009).

Three key high-risk crime situations, relevant to venues and security staff, are identified by Wickham (2012) within any typical night-time economy:

1. Circuit drinking: people moving from one premise to another
2. Nodes: high density social interactions where people involved in NTE activities converge (e.g. closing times)
3. Flashpoints: particular sites at particular times where incidents are especially concentrated e.g. taxi ranks, fast-food outlets. Often characterised by people competing for scarce resources in a crowded environment. Wickham (2012) notes how fast-food outlets can break-up drinking and thus reduce the rate of alcohol intake, while also preventing effective dispersal of people from the area and act as flashpoints for alcohol-related crime. Stuart et al (2009) report that taxi ranks could be a source of conflict in their study of Prescot and also discovered that some fast food outlets were closing before 10pm in order to avoid problems occurring.

Other factors also identify high-risk situations:

- An absence of diversity among visitors. Social and cultural diversity can help to 'normalise' the environment. Again Wickham (2012) points out that restaurants can introduce a different group of people to an area and help to normalise behaviour in that area. The presence of residential properties can also improve surveillance of the area. On the other hand the introduction of Alcohol Disorder Zones, which were intended as a useful control measure, can actually be detrimental to the goal of crime and disorder reduction as it may deter law-abiding people from visiting the area, and in turn may attract individuals who have a penchant for engaging in disorderly behaviour

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(Lister, 2009). Stuart et al (2009) report high levels of interest in there being a wider variety of licensed premises to help develop Prescot's NTE.

- Alcohol availability, including factors such as price, hours of sales, numbers of outlets etc.

2. Patterns of violence: the NTE

Wickham notes how areas can become saturated with licensed premises and advocates monitoring the situation closely and imposing limits on issuing further licences when this point is believed to have been reached (Wickham, 2012). The optimal number of licensed premises will vary by area, and possibly over time. Understanding when an area has become saturated with licensed premises depends on good quality data and evidence, and on various agencies working together to keep track of the situation. The need for this kind of monitoring is discussed further in the next section.

A number of papers refer to evidence that violent crimes are happening later in the night (Lister, 2009; Donkin and Burks 2007). This suggests that the Licensing Act 2003, rather than reducing crime, as was intended, has simply displaced the times that crime occurs – so that it is now taking place when there are less resources available to deal with it.

Edwards (2010) identifies the peak incidents of violence and disorder occurring between 11.00 and 03.00hrs and contrasts this with the services deployed by responsible authorities which tend to be concentrated in the day time and early evening.

Donkin and Burks, in their 2007 paper, looked at recorded violent crime data occurring at a licensed premise (LPVOs) in the West Midlands between October 2004 and September 2006. They found that proportionally more incidents occur at nightclubs than pubs, with incidents at pubs over time shifting to later timebands.

Other results of their analysis are also useful. They found that both victims and offenders were predominantly male, with individuals between 17 and 24 most at risk. The majority were males offending

against other males, with 1/5 of cases a female victimised by a male, 15% female on female and 7% women offending against a male.

The evidence suggested there were few repeat victims so that the likelihood of being victimised is relatively uniform and non-discriminatory. However, licensed premises employees did appear to be particularly at risk. The peak age for recurrent victimisation was 32, with a further, less pronounced peak at 42. This was attributed to the fact that recurrent victims are possibly employees of licensed premises. While the occupation of repeat victims was recorded only 20% of the time, of that, almost ¾ were the licensee or security staff.

A study of the night-time economy in Prescot, Knowsley (Stuart et al, 2009) included results from a survey of nightlife patrons. The survey indicated that over one in ten participants had personally been involved in a fight in a pub/bar in Prescot in the last 12 months, and that over half had witnessed a fight in a pub/bar.

Hadfield and Newton (2010) identify other ways of understanding the complexities of the NTE. For example, they looked at the number of licensed premises from figures compiled by DCMS. From 1999-2009 there was an increase of approx 4% in one and off licensed premises.

Off-licensed premises are significant, according to Hadfield and Newton, because of the practice of 'pre-loading' which is associated with high levels of intoxication, greater risk of crime and victimisation, greater control and duty of care burdens for licensed premises, police and emergency health-care. However they explain that this is a difficult area to explore as data concerning the prevalence of pre-loading is not consistently collected in the UK. Wickham (2012) also points to the importance of monitoring the presence of off-licenses and talks, not only about pre-loading, but also 'side-loading' and 'back-loading'.

In Stuart et al's study of Prescot (2009), half of respondents reported drinking at home prior to a night out, at least occasionally, with a fifth saying they always pre-loaded. Pre-loading was significantly more common among females and younger respondents.

Hadfield and Newton also looked at street-based studies such as those conducted by Hughes et al (2007) which surveyed 380 nightlife users

in a city in NW England. These studies suggest that participants in the NTE drink more than the national average and significantly, drink at levels above average for their age group.

"The prolonged presence of visitors who are frequenting licensed premises that have later drinking hours corresponded with higher levels of reported consumption. These outcomes run contrary to the aims of the Licensing Act 2003 which was regarded as ushering in an era in which people drank the same amount as before over a longer period of time and suggest support for the argument that increasing the availability of alcohol gives rise to increased levels of consumption" (Hadfield & Newton, 2010, referring to Hughes et al (2009) and Hadfield et al (2010))

3. Building a national picture of violence in the NTE and other relevant locations

3.1 Under-reporting

A range of papers refer to the challenge of identifying reliable, and nationally-collated, data on the prevalence of violence in the NTE. We discuss below the data that is available and its strengths, weaknesses and potential relevance to this study. Where possible we also identify data relating to retail or general workplace settings.

The HSE (Gore et al 2008) discusses the fact that violence is greatly under-reported in workplace settings. They cite Robson and Teague (2005) who report statistics regarding the under-reporting of crime in the retail and licensed premises categories:

- Retail, wholesale and motor trade – only 3% report assault, 8% report robbery, and 13% report shoplifting
- Hotels and restaurants – 7% report assault, 8% report robbery, and only 2% report shoplifting

Reasons given for this were numerous, but the main issues identified by the HSE (Gore et al 2008) are:

- *Acceptance of a culture of aggression*. Many people mistakenly regard/accept verbal abuse as 'part of the job' (fatalism), especially security workers

- *Fear of being perceived as incompetent and unable to deal with the job*. Employees may think that it reflects badly on them and shows their failure to handle the situation. Studies on the effects of work-related violence find that self-blame is common among victims and so they do not report. This may be especially so for men as they do not like to admit failure

- *Lack of reporting procedures or complicated reporting procedures that are time consuming, onerous or too complicated.* Victims are discouraged due to not knowing how to report. This may also be due to risk management not being part of the work culture. Employees may not feel encouraged by management to report incidents and they may worry that the manager does not treat reports seriously or that no action will be taken

- *Lack of confidence in police response*. There is a belief that the complaint will not be dealt with seriously by the police or that the police can or will not do anything.

We now come on to discuss the various sources of statistics and data relevant for this area. For some we have drawn out key figures and implications. Elsewhere we have signposted where to find out more, or where data may be available in the future.

3.2 The Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly British Crime Survey)

The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) measures the extent of crime in England and Wales by asking people whether they have experienced any crime in the past year. Face to face interviews are conducted by an independent research company on behalf of the Office for National Statistics (34,000 interviews in the 2013/14 survey). The Survey records crimes that may not have been reported to the police and it is unaffected by changes to police recording practices. It is therefore used alongside the police recorded crime figures to show a

more accurate picture of the level of crime in the country (see: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/year-ending-september-2014/stb-crime-in-england-and-wales--year-ending-september-2014.html#tab-Violent-crime).

The Survey records figures for violence with and without injury. In 2013/14 there were an estimated 1.3 million incidents of violence against adults in England and Wales. However, there is no breakdown of these figures by geographical area, by time of day, or by type of location where the violence occurred.

That said, it has been possible, through the Office for National Statistics to access information from the 2012/13 and 2013/14 Crime Surveys on violent incidents where alcohol has been a factor (ONS, 2015). CSEW 'alcohol-related' violent incidents are defined as those violent incidents where the victim perceived the offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. The CSEW also collects information on the location of the incident, which can include locations in or around licensed premises, and on whether the victim was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident.

Findings of particular interest from this report are:

- Alcohol was a particularly prevalent factor in violent incidents between strangers, 64% of which were perceived to be alcohol-related (CSEW 2013/14)
- Victims perceived the offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol in 53% of violent incidents measured by the 2013/14 CSEW. This is equivalent to an estimated 704,000 'alcohol-related' violent incidents. While the volume of incidents has fallen, the proportion of violent incidents that were 'alcohol-related' has remained relatively steady over the last ten years
- In the combined datasets of the 2012/13 and 2013/14 CSEW, 70% of violent incidents occurring at the weekend (from Friday 6pm to Monday 6am), and 70% of violent incidents occurring in the evening or night (6pm to 6am), were alcohol related
- The proportions of violent incidents that were alcohol-related increased as the afternoon and evening progressed, from 23%

of violent incidents occurring between noon and 6pm, to 52% between 6pm and 10pm and 83% between 10pm and midnight and 84% between midnight and 6am (combined 2012/13 and 2013/14)

- 19% of violent incidents (2013/14) were located in or around a pub or club. In the combined datasets, 93% of violent incidents occurring in or around a pub or club location were alcohol-related, as were 51% of incidents occurring in the street. This can be broken down further (see chart below)
- By comparison 40% of incidents that occurred in the home and 43% of incidents that happened in and around the workplace were alcohol-related
- This latter point is of interest, as the proportion of incidents in the workplace seems relatively high. Although this is not commented on in the report, we assume that a proportion of this includes violent incidents experienced by door supervisors at their place of work.



Specific location of violent incidents occurring in or around a 'pub or club', where victim perceived offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol, combined data for 2012/13 and 2013/14 CSEW

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Elsewhere in the literature, some interesting findings emerge from earlier instances of what was then the British Crime Survey. Hadfield and Newton in their paper from 2010 looked at police recorded crime statistics and the British Crime Survey. They identified an overall reduction in crimes of violence and criminal damage since the implementation of the Licensing Act in 2005 although they were unable to say with certainty that the new legislation contributed to these reductions. Between 2003/4 and 2007/8 the instance of violent crimes where victims believed their assailants were under the influence of alcohol dropped from 51% to 45%.

3.2.1 *Violence at work*

See: http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causinj/violence/violence-at-work.pdf.

The CSEW also collects data on incidents of violence at work. It defines violence at work on the basis of type of offence (assaults or threats); what the victim was doing at the time of the incident (at work or working); and the relationship between victim and offender (domestic violence is excluded).

In this part of the survey, violence is used to refer to both physical assaults (including assault with minor injury, assault without injury and wounding), as well as threats (including verbal threats made to or against the respondent). Threats are not usually included in other CSEW measures of violence.

The main findings from the 2013/14 survey are:

- The risk of being a victim of actual or threatened violence at work is similar to the last five years with an estimated 1.1% of working adults (an estimated 257,000 workers) the victims of one or more violent incidents at work (CSEW)
- 0.5% had been physically assaulted (125,000 in total) while they were working; 0.6% had suffered threats (152,000)
- There were an estimated 583,000 incidents of violence at work according to the 2013/14 CSEW, comprising 269,000 assaults and 314,000 threats. This was lower than the estimated 656,000

incidents in the 2012/13 survey but this change is not statistically significant

- It is estimated that 56% of victims reported one incident of work related violence whilst 17% experienced two incidents of work related violence and 27% experienced three or more incidents
- Strangers were the offenders in 56% of the reported incidents of workplace violence. Among the 44% of incidents where the offender was known, the offenders were most likely to be clients or a member of the public known through work
- Respondents suggested that in the incidents in which they experienced a threat or physical assault they considered the offender to be under the influence of alcohol in 35% of instances and drugs in 19% of incidents
- Finally, the survey shows which occupational groups are most at risk of assaults or threats (this data comes from the 2012/13 and 2013/14 surveys to ensure sufficient sample sizes). Respondents in protective service operations faced the highest risk of assaults and threats while working at 9.6% – 8 times the average risk of 1.2%. Additionally, health care professionals and health and social care specialists had higher than average risk at 3.1% and 3.4% respectively. Police officers are given as an example of protective service operations, although we would also expect security guards to fall into this category

3.3 Crime Surveys for Scotland and Northern Ireland

The Scottish Crime and Justice Survey is available here: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-Justice/crime-and-justice-survey.

The Northern Ireland Crime Survey can be accessed here: http://www.dojni.gov.uk/northern-ireland-crime-survey-s-r.

Though there is a report on the Night-Time Economy and related Findings from the 2011/12 and 2012/13 Northern Ireland Crime Surveys (http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/statistics-research/stats-research-publications/northern-ireland-crime-survey-s-r/the-night-time-

economy-findings-from-the-2011-12-and-2012-13-nics.pdf), this largely focuses on usage of the Night Time Economy and perceptions of safety. There is no information in the report about experiences of violence.

3.4 Recorded crime statistics

These include 'notifiable' offences as recorded by each police force and reported to the Home Office. These differ from incidents reported to the police (which may or may not be classified as a crime) – see section below.

Again, violence against the person, with injury and without injury is recorded. However it is known that violent offences are more prone to subjective judgement about whether to record a crime. The 'Crime-recording: making the victim count' report published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 2014) found that violence against the person offences had the highest under-recording rates across police forces in England and Wales. Nationally, an estimated one of three (33%) violent offences that should have been recorded as crimes were not.

Indeed, in February 2014, the UK Statistics Authority, following assessment of police crime records against the Code of Practice for Official Statistics, and accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, found deficiencies substantial enough to withdraw its 'National Statistics' status. Police records underestimate violence levels mainly because of lack of ascertainment reflecting low reporting rates which in turn, reflect fear of reprisals, inability to identify assailants, an unwillingness to have own conduct scrutinised and a perceived lack of benefit for the injured (Sivarajasingam et al, 2013).

Although we assume that this data must be available on a force by force basis, we have not found a way of accessing this data.

Furthermore, there is no definition of alcohol-related violence within the standards used to record crime, so it would be difficult to use this data to understand how recorded violent crimes relate to the NTE.

Donkin and Burk (2007) studied violent crimes at licensed premises in the West Midlands. The description of the steps they took in order to identify relevant data gives an idea of the scale of the challenge here:

1. Recorded crime data was extracted from the West Midlands Police crime recording system
2. It was processed and cleaned
3. All offences defined as violent were selected from this initial dataset
4. The authors then attempted to identify violent offences occurring at, or in, close proximity to licensed premises and assumed this was related to the NTE (each incident has a location description field)

Police data on crimes is available on a street-by-street basis, but there appears to be no way of bringing this together to understand crime statistics at a broader level (http://data.police.uk/).

3.5 Police recorded offences

Hadfield and Newton (2010) refer to the availability of police records of incidents (which includes 999 and other calls and reports to the police). This allows for incidents to be flagged as being alcohol-related. However the Office for National Statistics points out that it is likely that this is interpreted in different ways across police forces and may be used for some offences within a force but not all (see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_394516.pdf for commentary on this). For example, the ONS report states that 22% of police recorded violence against the person offences were flagged as alcohol-related, a significantly lower proportion than shown in the CSEW.

Hadfield and Newton state that this information is available on a force by force basis, and the Office of National Statistics also states that it can be accessed through something called the Home Office Data Hub. However this does not appear to be available at this time.

3.5.1 *New definition of business crime for use by police forces*

See: https://www.businesscrime.org.uk/news/acpo-and-nbcf-definition-of-business-crime-17.

In February 2014 the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the National Business Crime Forum (NBCF) formally agreed a definition of business crime. Once fully adopted, this will allow police forces to collect and analyse business crime data reported to them and to accurately measure the impact of business crime.

ACPO and NBCF hope that a consequence of accurate recording will be to allow police resources to be more appropriately and effectively allocated and deployed. There remains a big task ahead for policing to train all police staff nationally to that definition, and to adapt force crime recording systems to allow for the recording of the crimes. The police service and business sector intend to work collaboratively, to ensure that this system continues to be most effective from the point of view of both victims and investigators.

3.6 The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC)

Data is available for inpatient admissions to hospital in England for a cause code of assault, from April 2013-March 2014 (http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14753/Assaults-April-2013-March-2014/pdf/Assaults_April_2013__March_2014.pdf).

Many types of assault are included in these figures, e.g. 'assault by pesticide', assault by pushing from high place. However, 64% of the assaults are attributed to 'assault by bodily force' with a further 19% caused by assault by a sharp or blunt object. The majority therefore relate to violent incidents of the sort we are interested in for this study.

Moreover, figures are put forward for the percentage of these admissions that occurred at a weekend vs. all non-elective admissions, according to the age group of the patient. This clearly shows a strong peak in weekend admissions for assault among 20-29 year olds in particular, but also among 15-19 year olds and 30-39 year olds.

Again this suggests that a high proportion of these admissions are related to the NTE.

Please note that these figures relate to Finished Admission Episodes – i.e. inpatient care, and are not connected to Accident and Emergency Figures.

A map shows how these admissions are geographically distributed for each Clinical Commissioning Group.



Age and sex directly standardised admission rates (per 100,000 population) with a cause code of assault by Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) of residence, April 2013 - March 2014

A map of CCGs in England is available here: http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ccg-map-Feb2014.pdf.

The 43 CCGs with the highest rates of violence (79-160 per 100,000 population) are listed in Appendix A. They cluster around the North East, the North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, the West Midlands and parts of London. There are also isolated pockets in Luton and Southampton.

A slightly different geographical picture emerges by looking at the actual numbers of admissions by CCG (rather than rate of admissions).

This helps in giving an indication of the areas which are facing the highest volume of assaults. The 26 CCGs which dealt with more than 250 admissions for assault during the period April 2013 – March 2014 are also given in Appendix A.

Finally, in terms of looking at this geographically, the HSCIC looks at the rates of admission for area (i.e. comprising a number of CCGs). Those areas where the rate is above the average for England as a whole are:

- Merseyside
- Lancashire
- Greater Manchester
- West Yorkshire
- Durham, Darlington and Tees
- South Yorkshire and Bassetlaw
- Birmingham and the Black Country
- Cheshire, Warrington and Wirral
- Cumbria, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear

3.7 National Violence Surveillance Network

The National Violence Surveillance Network (NVSN) is referred to by Hadfield and Newton (2010). At the time of their paper, the Network, was gathering information from 44 Accident and Emergency Departments, including figures for alcohol-related violence which showed a sustained drop from 2002-9 despite overall alcohol-related hospital admissions rising over the same period.

The NVSN appears to no longer be in existence, but was part of what is now the Violence Research Group at Cardiff University (http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/research/explore/research-units/violence-research-group). The most recent report from the NVSN (Sivarajasingam et al, 2013) comprised a sample of 117 Emergency Departments (EDs), Minor Injury Units (MIUs) and Walk-in Centres in England and Wales which were certified members of the NVSN. This represents approximately a third of EDs in England and Wales.

From this report those at highest risk of violence-related injury were males and those aged 18 to 30. Violence-related ED attendance was most frequent on Saturday and Sunday and least frequent during the months of February and November.

Overall, the study showed substantial decreases in violence-related attendances of both males and females in 2013 compared to 2012; an estimated 234,509 people reported injury in violence in 2013, down by 32,780 (12%). According to NVSN, serious violence in England and Wales has declined every year since 2008. These trends are supported by figures from the CSEW and police records. The CSEW shows violence has been in decline since the mid 1990s, with a fall of 6% between March 2012 and March 2013. Police records of violent offences show a fall of 8% between 2011/12 and 2012/13.

Although the NVSN report is illuminating, particularly around the extent to which ED-derived information has been shown to be reliable and objective, and less prone to reporting and recording biases than police measures, the data is presented as a whole to paint a national picture, and there appears to be no means of accessing data by participating hospital, or even by region.

3.8 Information sharing for violence prevention in England

Work in Cardiff (see Shepherd, 2007) demonstrated that anonymised data sharing between A&Es and police could reduce violent crime. The importance of A&E data sharing was recognised by the government in "The Coalition: Our programme for government" and a programme of information sharing was initiated.

In 2012, the Centre for Public Innovation and Gecko Social Health Outcomes, were commissioned by Department of Health and the Home Office to conduct an audit of progress on this and found that only 36% of A&E/Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) were sharing information to a standard recommended by the College of Emergency Medicine (CEM) in their "Guideline for information sharing to reduce community violence" (Centre for Public Innovation, 2012).

The survey results indicated that much work needs to take place across the majority of A&Es and CSPs across the country to facilitate

greater data sharing (see also this report from 2014, which indicates that little progress was made in the intervening period: The Guardian, May 2014). It is important to note that for many A&Es and CSPs, anonymous information sharing to tackle violence is a relatively new practice. Evidence from Cardiff (where the model was devised), shows that it took a number of years to achieve reductions in violence (seven years in one study).

A breakdown of this data by individual A&E does not appear to be publicly available.

In September 2014, the HSCIC published a new Standard on Information Sharing to Tackle Violence (ISTV). Under this Standard, major NHS A&E departments in England will collect and share non-confidential data about attendances involving violent crime with Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs).

We would hope and anticipate that once this standard is more consistently adhered to across the country, then more detailed relevant information might be available and we suggest that this data source is worth returning to in the future.

3.9 British Retail Consortium: Retail Crime Survey

See http://www.brc.org.uk/brcshowdocument.asp?id=4486&moid=8312.

The British Retail Consortium (BRC) is the leading trade association representing the whole retail industry, from large multiples and department stores through to independents selling a wide selection of products through centre of town, out of town, rural, and virtual stores.

The Retail Crime Survey found that in 2013-14, there were 32 incidents of violence and abuse per 1,000 employees (a total of 58,014 incidents). Most were cases of non-physical abuse or aggressive behaviour, but 13 incidents per 1,000 staff were violent. In 2012-13, there were 38 incidents of violence and abuse per 1,000 employees. There were 26 incidents per 1,000 staff of non-physical abuse or aggressive behaviour, eight incidents of violence with injury and four incidents of violence without injury per 1,000 staff.

Retailers reported that the majority of violence and abuse occurs when staff challenge customers suspected of theft, when asking for proof of age, in relation to a store ban, or if customers are being detained on suspicion of an offence. Business responses included investing in staff safety through surveillance by CCTV and employing security guards.

3.10 Further information sources

There is a range of information available, which could help to build up a geographical picture of patterns of violence. However the information is dispersed, fragmentary, derived from a variety of sources and frequently still in development. Compiling information from these sources to attempt to build an accurate map of violence is beyond the scope of this current project. However, in Appendix A we reference the additional relevant sources that we have identified.

G. MULTI-AGENCY WORKING

- *The literature suggests strong support for multi-agency working, particularly at local level*
- *To support local initiatives and identify effective policy responses, there is a need for local data mapping, based on good quality data*
- *A&E data is an important element in local information and needs to be accessed by other agencies*
- *The Cardiff model is a useful example of multi-agency working*

1. Strong support for multi-agency working

Across the literature, a number of papers and specific local initiatives indicate the value of multi-agency working in this area.

- At an overall level, Lister (2009) recommends the value of local, micro-level responses which focus on problem-solving and preventative strategies such as improving night-time transport services, in combination with proactive and reactive law enforcement initiatives such as police crackdowns on public drunkenness. He also indicates the value of formulating long-term plans, rather than the development of the night-time economy simply being left to the trends of the market. Lister recommends consideration of strategies that focus on:
  - 'People' (consumers and commercial operators) focusing on supply and demand, both looking to ensure that alcohol is served and drunk responsibly, but also that people behave in a lawful way once alcohol is consumed – strategies therefore target not just people's behaviour but also their attitudes towards alcohol consumption

- ‘Places’ (licensed premises and drinking circuits/entertainment districts) with a focus on managing environments in the NTE by manipulating situational or social factors

- A paper by the BRE (2008) also talks about the need for ‘joined up thinking on a wide range of policies in the management of town centres at night involving a diverse range of representatives with responsibility for lighting, CCTV, planning, health, transport, licensing of premises, street vendors and taxis, police, street maintenance, licensing trade, youth workers etc.’ It recommends a dedicated town centre crime reduction group, led by the LA, with other members potentially including police, probation service, health authority, youth offending team, drug and alcohol team, local residents, transport, fire and rescue, door staff

- The paper also advocates including a representative from the local Pubwatch scheme to ensure that licensed premises managers have a strong and effective voice. The BRE recommends that such a team should be characterised by regular contact, effective and co-ordinated management of the public domain, with agreed policies and measurable goals to reduce crime and disorder

- The GLA (2012) suggests it is important for venues to work together with transport providers. It calls for all applications for licensed premises to consider how patrons will get home by public transport or taxi or walking routes. It also suggests that venue staff should receive training in directing people to the right bus stop, deterring cab touts, and ensuring in-venue minicab operators are working legally. Staff should also be trained in giving safety advice and first aid

- Stuart et al (2009) in their study of Prescot unequivocally recommend a multi-agency partnership to help plan further developments to the NTE and manage the consequences. An NTE co-ordinator is seen as a crucial element in this process. However they report that, in their interviews with representatives from key agencies involved in Prescot’s NTE, problems arose

around sharing intelligence and information because of lack of clarity or understanding around the Data Protection Act

- The HSE (Gore et al, 2008) discusses the value of ShopWatch schemes, which are locally driven initiatives set up to tackle crime and disorder problems in a particular community, involving a communications network between retail and police, and potentially other watch schemes such as pub/clubwatch, hotelwatch or cabwatch

- Where it is well publicised, ShopWatch can be an effective deterrent and benefits include reduced risk of damage and assaults and increased trade if customers feel safe and secure. However, success of the watch depends on the commitment of all watch members

2. **Need for data and mapping of the local situation**

In order to support these kinds of initiatives, good quality data at a very local level is seen as essential.

A paper by the Greater London Authority (2012) indicates the importance of gathering data and understanding what is happening at a local level, in order to draw up a coordinated programme of actions, with measurable goals, and to help secure the engagement and co-ordination of relevant agencies and local stakeholders.

In particular it advocates the sharing of data between health authorities, police and local authorities, to identify the hot spots. It also suggests that there may be value in looking at other forms of data collection to target specific problems e.g. a pedestrian flow survey combined with transport data to identify congested places and times.

The same paper also discusses the importance of monitoring. The impact of any initiative or strategy can only be gauged if there are measurable criteria against which it can be assessed. All programmes should therefore have clearly defined aims, objectives, indicators and measurements of effectiveness. The evaluation of a programme should be an integral part of its formulation and monitoring.

Hadfield and Newton (2010) also talk about the importance of data collection and evaluation by local partnerships in order to understand what is happening around alcohol related crime and disorder. They identify a current 'paucity' of data around the evaluation of crime prevention initiatives for the NTE, as well as a lack of consistent data on the licensing changes introduced as a result of the Licensing Act 2003.

> *"The national agglomeration of licensing statistics, involving, as it does, a conflation of data from contexts as diverse as isolated rural areas and inner cities, tells us little about what is occurring in the key crime 'hotspots' of the NTE"*
> (Hadfield & Newton, 2010).

A Licensing Toolkit produced by Alcohol Concern (cited in Hadfield & Newton, 2010) acknowledges the limited data linking alcohol-related harm to specific licensed premises. Hadfield & Newton identify the core information which is required to aid local decision-making and guide policy enforcement:

- Geo-referenced licensed premises database (location, opening and trading hours, capacity, type of premise, licence conditions)
- Crime and disorder data that is referenced by location and time from police recorded crime; police incident; police intelligence; hospital AED and ambulance data; and other sources
- Local contextual data such as location of late−night taxi ranks, public transport interchanges, land use, socio−demographic characteristics of areas
- Local policy responses, for example, police deployment, education awareness schemes, general conditions imposed on licensed premises, trading standards test purchases, cumulative impact zones, and other relevant policy

3. Role of emergency departments

Accident and Emergency Departments emerge in the literature as a key element in the jigsaw in terms of contributing to an understanding of what is happening in the NTE, and in constructing a multi-agency response.

This is largely due to the 'The Cardiff Model' (Shepherd, 2007):

> *"By working with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and by sharing, electronically wherever possible, simple anonymised data about precise location of violence, weapon use, assailants and day/time of violence, Emergency Departments in Cardiff, and the contributions of consultants in CDRP meetings, have enhanced the effectiveness of targeted policing significantly, reduced licensed premises and street violence, and reduced overall A&E violence related attendances in Cardiff, by 40% since 2002. The city has moved from mid table to safest city in its Home Office family of 15 similar cities now, a position which has been maintained for over three years. In the recent Reform study, Cardiff was 51st out of 55 towns and cities with more than 100,000 population in terms of the incidence of all assault and robbery."*

This approach worked on the premise that large numbers of violent offences which result in Emergency Department treatment are not detected by the police and therefore by accessing A&E data, agencies were able to build a clearer picture of violence in the city and target their interventions much more effectively.

4. Other examples of multi-agency working

Cardiff has also had experience of a Night-Time Economy Co-ordinator (NTEC) – a post which was funded by the Home Office Tackling Violent Crime Programme, in recognition of the particular problems of alcohol-related violence and public disorder that accompanied the rapid expansion of the night-time economy. The post ran from December 2007- March 2009. The aim was to address some of the key deficits of regulation encountered by conventional law enforcement approaches to reducing alcohol-related violence and disorder by enrolling such local authority service areas as waste management, licensing, transport and highways (Edwards 2010).

The post appeared to have an impact on reductions of violence and disorder in one location in Cardiff, but not in another, so it was difficult overall to assess the impact of the post. Unfortunately the post also encountered significant resistance in the form of 'silo mentalities' and the paper by Edwards recommends a neighbourhood management team for the city centre to coordinate the public administration of complex problems like alcohol-related crime and disorder.

In Camden a multi-agency plan enforces licensing rules, with fortnightly meetings with licensing, environmental health, police, fire brigade and community safety and a monthly partnership night with the police, council and health authority (Wickham, 2012).

In Newham the council brought together agencies including HMRC, police, licensing teams, health and safety and noise teams to gather evidence on legal breaches resulting either in corrections to the way venues operated or premise closure.

H. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

- *The literature suggests that the police have three main roles: monitoring and supervising licensing; fostering relationships with relevant parties; and working with other agencies engaged in anticipatory action*
- *In an ideal scenario local police forces would be in a position to build a licensed premises database, recording incidents of disorder and offences, in order to detect patterns and identify premises with recurrent problems; this would allow them to prioritise visits and inspections, and to inform licensing reviews*
- *It is also recommended that partnerships are built between the security industry and police to facilitate information sharing and mutual understanding of the needs and priorities of both parties*
- *Ideally police would be a strong and effective player in any local multi-agency partnership, open to sharing data on local crime and disorder and supporting others in the partnership in the steps that they are taking to reduce violence and disorder*

1. Police roles

From the literature, 3 key roles are identified for the police in managing violence in the NTE and in other settings:

1. Playing an active part in monitoring and supervising local licensing activities (Lister, 2009; Hadfield et al 2009; GLA 2012)
2. Fostering close relationships with relevant parties, including door staff/security companies (Lister, 2009)
3. Working closely with other agencies to monitor the situation, identify hot-spots and engage in greater anticipatory forms of action (Lister 2009; Hadfield et al 2009)

2. **Active part in monitoring and supervising local licensing activities**

The 2003 Licensing Act gave greater responsibilities to the police to monitor and play a role in supervising local licensing activities, particularly as 'potential objectors' to local licensing applications, thus preventing the spatial development of licensed premises (Lister, 2009). Lister, as well as Hadfield et al (2009) suggest that police licensing officers have an important part to play in considering the wider commercial composition of the night-time economy.

The 2012 paper from the GLA discusses the importance of enforcing licensing restrictions through regular intelligence led inspection visits and fines and prosecutions for non-compliance, suggesting that a licensed premises enforcement database can be a very useful tool to monitor licensed premises in the town centre in relation to their record of crime, disorder and public nuisance. A licensee failing to cooperate and comply with conditions on a licence can face fines, temporary suspension or permanent forfeiture of their licence. Licensees who co-operate with the police through reduction of incidents and sharing of intelligence may face fewer restrictions. The paper suggests that such action has led to increased social responsibility amongst licensees and not just those who are subject to additional restrictions. Licensees may be further encouraged to share information, and distribute photographs and details of offenders and criminal activity.

Hadfield and Newton (2010) discuss the low numbers of Reviews of licensed premises. Statistics from the DCMS indicate that while approximately 200,000 Licenses are in force across England and Wales, the figures from April 2008- March 2009 recorded only 1,125 completed Reviews. Of these, Conditions on the licence were 'added or modified' on 738 occasions, 'Operating hours modified' 190 times, Licensable activity partially restricted in 121 cases and Licence revoked 154 times.

"The low uptake of enforcement options has been framed by central government as an indicator of the success rather than the failure of the licensing regime"

The authors show that enforcement action has most prominently targeted the sale of alcohol to under-18s and offences relating to public drinking, and are somewhat critical of this approach:

"These may be conceived as the 'easiest pickings' but also as actions which address the symptoms rather than the causes of the various interlocking problems which give rise to crime and disorder in the night-time economy".

3. **Fostering close relationships with relevant parties, including door staff/security companies**

Lister (2009) recommends the establishment of a formal role such as 'door supervisor liaison officers': police officers working in the night time economy who have a specific role in working with door supervisor teams and their employers to understand their perspective and their concerns. He feels this is particularly important as SIA licensing requirements do not extend to security companies. Liaison officers would be intended to establish relationships to monitor the probity and practices of both the companies themselves and the individuals working in venues. This would improve police understanding of door supervisors' work and of the approach of the companies which employ them.

He suggests the focus should be on developing public-private partnerships with security companies operating at the more professional end of the marketplace. He sees this having knock-on benefits of helping to professionalise the security sector and strengthen the mechanisms of legal accountability they are subject to (Hobbs et al, 2003, cited in Lister, 2009).

Gore et al (2008) identify the value of police developing good relationships with local businesses in a retail setting to signal that they are taking the threat of violence seriously and to create some deterrent value. This also opens up the possibility for police to give crime prevention advice to staff and to encourage them to keep a record of incidents and to report them to the police.

4. Monitoring and engaging in anticipatory forms of action

Lister (2009) puts forward the view that Home Office policy proposals from 2001 envisaged police working with, or even 'steering', the activities of other providers of policing and security. Indeed, legislation in the last 10-15 years has meant that policing tools increasingly operate to a preventative logic, via processes of surveillance, identification and exclusion e.g. the use of Interim Banning Orders against individuals arrested for an 'alcohol-related offence' has become increasingly widespread.

Hadfield et al 2009 also talk about the success of Drinking Banning Orders, especially when used in combination with partnership mechanisms such as Pubwatch. Banning or excluding offenders from their social context was a focal concern and this measure tends to have been seen as more effective than measures such as Penalty Notices for Disorder which were meant to reduce police bureaucracy by enabling the police to issue a swift, summary punishment, but which do not work where the suspect cannot understand what is being offered to them because they are drunk.

More generally, street policing by police directly, by community support officers or by street wardens can help by increasing the number of guardians and by reducing the fear of crime (Wickham, 2012).

However Hadfield and Newton (2010) are critical of the extent to which the police have responded to the challenges of the Licensing Act 2003. They question why stronger enforcement of the legislation around alcohol-related offences are not part of everyday police practice, and feel that insufficient attention has been paid to the development of strong partnership working between police and partner agencies. They believe that data collection and data sharing on local crime and disorder trends is essential for partnerships to mount effective responses to the challenges of nightlife and crime.

I. ROLE OF VENUES AND PREMISES

- *There is a debate over the value of self-regulation and incentive schemes, but on the whole, Pubwatch seems to be regarded positively in the literature*
- *There is felt to be a clear need for greater consistency in the application of the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), especially with regard to clarifying that risk assessments apply to temporary staff including security staff, and that they cover risks and instances of violence , and to ensuring that contractors have carried out their own risk assessments*
- *Involving staff in devising risk management strategies is believed to be essential, as is making clear that violence, in any form, is not to be tolerated, and that management are supportive of any interventions drawn up in response to risk assessments*
- *Venue design, alongside management, can play a significant part in reducing the risk of violence*
- *Some good practice guidelines exist for licensed and retail premises, to help reduce the risk of violence*

1. The context

Edwards (2010) makes the point that much public policy on tackling alcohol related violence is premised on the assumption that order would be possible if only the authorities were equipped with requisite powers and sanctions. Actually the literature indicates a more complex, inter-dependent, relationship amongst regulators and regulated, with self-regulation among licensed premises and consumers, key to effective management of the situation.

Overall, there appears to be a role both for incentive schemes/self-regulation as well as more coercive approaches.

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2. Incentive schemes/self-regulation

Lister (2009) promotes the value of partnerships between the police and private sector, with self-regulation through schemes such as 'Best Bar None' seen as having great value, especially as this places the onus on licensees to adopt responsible managerial practices over admission, serving and pricing policies.

However Wickham (2012) questions whether such schemes have much impact on raising standards as the minimum standard required by the schemes often duplicates existing UK legislation, and tends to award the same premises year after year.

The BRE however, advocate the value of schemes such as Pubwatch, in part because this gives venue owners a channel through which their concerns can be aired, and ensures they are given an opportunity to be part of any multi-agency approach. The development of a Pubwatch scheme is also supported in the conclusions drawn by Stuart et al (2009); in particular they state:

> *"Such a scheme requires commitment from the licensees themselves, who should play a key role in leading the scheme. Due to the high levels of disorder in and around the fast-food outlets, the scheme should also seek to engage with the owners and workers in these venues".*

Overall, there is evidence in the literature of reluctance on the part of local regulators to apply a heavy handed approach to the enforcement of licensing law, preferring instead to foster a spirit of partnership and cooperation (Hadfield and Newton, 2010). However, Hadfield and Newton cite a KPMG study which suggests that self-regulation alone is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the law (citing Hadfield, Nightlife Horizons, 2009).

3. Coercive/legislative approaches

3.1 The Licensing Act and Violent Crime Reduction Act (2006)

The Licensing Act and Violent Crime Reduction Act (2006) allows licensing authorities to review, suspend or revoke a premises license in the event of repeat incidents of violence. Lister claims that the threat of formal action against licensees is often sufficient to motivate to them to comply with police requests for good governance (Lister, 2009).

The value of monitoring incidents that occur around licensed premises has already been discussed in preceding sections. In Cardiff, South Wales Police use a traffic-light system to grade licensed premises, based on incidents of disorder or other indications that a venue is becoming problematic. This feeds into resource deployment strategies and other forms of preventative action (UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, 2006, cited in Lister, 2009). A traffic light system is also recommended in the paper by the BRE.

3.2 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974

Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, venues have a legal duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of their employees. Under the Act an employer has an obligation to ensure any potential risk of violence is eliminated or controlled (HSE, 2008). This includes carrying out a 5 step risk assessment as follows:

1. Identify the hazards
2. Who might be harmed and how?
3. Evaluate the risks and decide on precautions
4. Record your findings and implement them
5. Review your risk assessment and update if necessary.

The Act applies to any individuals that an employer might have in their workplace at any time, including those who do not work regular shifts or work patterns, such as maintenance staff, security staff and other contractors. When employing contractors, owners are responsible for ensuring that contractors are aware of the findings of any risk assessment. While the contractor must assess the risks for contracted work, the contractor and owner must work together to consider the risk from each other's work and to ensure that there is instruction and training available for contractors (see http://www.hse.gov.uk/toolbox/workers/contractors.htm for further details).

The HSE recommend consulting staff about their ideas for controlling the risk of violence as this will encourage them to adopt and own any

arrangements put in place (HSE, 2008). It is also worth bearing in mind that, in some settings, it would be valuable to include the unions in any discussion or development of anti-violence measures (Gore et al, 2008).

3.3 Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSW) 1999

These regulations require employers to consider risks to employees and carry out a risk assessment to protect employees from exposure to reasonably foreseeable violence. A risk assessment is an examination to determine what hazards exist in the workplace, to establish significance of risk, to identify and implement prevention measures and to produce a clear management achievement plan.

Employers also have a requirement to appoint competent people, set up emergency procedures, provide information to employees and work together with employers sharing the same workplace. In addition, employees have a requirement to use the information/training received and to report dangerous situations/shortcomings in health and safety arrangements (Gore et al 2008)

3.4 HSE recommended approaches to the legislation

In their documentation (2008), the HSE suggest the following methods as ideas that have come forward from people working in pubs/clubs, to deal with potential violence:

- Focus on training, particularly on identifying and resolving conflict, as well as dealing with violence when it arises. They also recommend refresher training
- Having approachable and active managers
- Ensuring the employer gathers accurate information to give to the police if necessary
- Banning persistent offenders
- Using CCTV as a deterrent and to identify/prosecute offenders
- Using well-trained security staff

- Working with other pubs/clubs to ban offenders or share security resources
- Providing enough staff to reduce queues and provide effective supervision

An HSE literature review (Gore et al, 2008) looking at the issues of violence in both licensed and retail premises, also makes the point that it is essential to raise awareness among staff that violence is not acceptable, and that violence should be assessed and managed like other hazards. There is also great emphasis in the literature on ensuring that reporting systems are simple, accessible and responsive.

It is worth noting that by focusing on the legal responsibilities of managers under health and safety legislation, this moves the focus away from violence being a crime and security issue to it being a health and safety issue. By addressing workplace violence as a preventable hazard, employers can develop practical and effective strategies to protect their employees from serious health and safety risk (Gore et al, 2008).

Indeed, this report goes on to describe the importance of management committing to violence reduction and showing their support for actions targeted at creating an environment free from violence. This includes: an employer statement that no violence is tolerated, that violence is unacceptable and that it does not show failure; a guarantee of a blame free approach; and a clear statement of responsibilities among all levels of management and staff.

Donkin and Birks (2007) also recommend a zero tolerance approach to verbal and physical violence directed at staff.

4. Design and running of the venues themselves

4.1 Licensed premises

The literature is fairly united on the factors that are more likely to lead to problems of violence in venues, or in turn that will discourage problems emerging.

Premises with high standards, that are clean and tidy and that minimise customer frustration i.e. allow people to move around easily, exit quickly, order drinks easily are less likely to encounter problems (Wickham, 2012).

On the other hand, factors associated with violence in high-risk pubs and clubs include inconvenient access routes, poor ventilation, overcrowding and permissive social environments, communicated through pub/club policies and staff behaviour (Homel et al, cited in Finney 2004).

Staff training e.g. around not serving intoxicated patrons, preventing underage alcohol sales, is only one of a multitude of factors that will affect alcohol-related harms, and may have little impact on its own, especially in a context of high staff turnover, and the commercial imperative to sell more alcohol. (Wickham, 2012)

The paper from the BRE recommends a number of measures including: staggered closing times; discouragement of drinks promotions and Happy Hours (and that venues running them receive focused attention); effective management and control of outside smoking space and entry/exit points; alternatives to glass; records kept of where individuals who are arrested had their last drink; CCTV focused on entrances and exits, cloakroom and entrance to dancefloor.

4.2 Retail premises

Measures for retail premises that impact positively on reducing violence are identified by Gore et al (2008) for the HSE and include:

- Good visibility, including use of mirrors and CCTV, and ensuring that there is good visibility into and out of premises and at areas such as premises entrances or car parks. Employees should be able to see their surroundings and persons outside the store should be able to see into the store. It was noted that ensuring staff can see and be seen and that they know where colleagues are is very important.

- Locating cash tills nearer entrances so that staff can see customers entering and leaving the store and to allow a good visual line across the store

- Better counter design
- Good customer flow management, including clear signage and good queue management
- Elimination of escape routes
- Well maintained premises

J. ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

- *There are several tools available to local authorities in influencing the problems of violence: urban planning policies; public realm design, including CCTV and street lighting; proactive measures to manage the night time economy; and licensing laws*
- *Greater coordination between licensing and planning functions in local authorities is recommended*
- *This can help bring about aims such as diversity in town centres, and introduction of measures/interventions (potentially temporary), such as the use of CCTV lighting, street maintenance, pedestrianisation and co-ordination with traffic authorities*

1. The context

The literature identifies a number of ways in which Local Authorities can play a part in managing the issues arising from the NTE. Lightowlers et al (no date) make the point that Planning and Regeneration Departments have historically been more focused on economic aspects of development, rather than considering the community impact of alcohol and the development of the NTE in their decision making.

> *"For example, Planning and Regeneration policies try to avoid having unoccupied premises in town and city centres to avoid areas becoming run down or encouraging crime. In such circumstances, Planning departments may grant change of use planning permission to allow an empty retail venue to become licensed premise. However, increased numbers of licensed premises can be accompanied by a different range of negative impacts".*

They recommend that Planning Departments become more involved in licensing and consider using licensing conditions to help improve the NTE, especially as licensing conditions are more flexible than planning permissions. They also recommend that Planning Departments are included in local partnerships, wherever possible.

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2. **Urban planning policies**

According to Lister (2009) urban planning policies need to encourage a greater diversity of business use within urban entertainment districts in order to attract a wider demographic profile of people and thus foster greater levels of informal social control.

This point is supported by the experience of the NTEC post in Cardiff, which worked with town planners to cultivate an 'evening economy' to encourage a broader demographic mix of consumers in the City Centre during 16.00-20.00hrs (Edwards 2010).

For Lightowlers et al (no date), this is a key recommendation:

> *"Planning departments should promote a range of culturally diverse activities in the NTE which encourage a range of populations to use town centres at night".*

3. **Public realm design**

Wickham (2012) discusses the role and value of a number of aspects of public street design:

- CCTV and surveillance may help to deter, limit, and monitor alcohol-related crime
- However there is limited evidence to support the use of CCTV as a tool of alcohol-related crime prevention. It is most effective at preventing property crime and least effective at deterring public order offences involving alcohol where rationality is often lost and people are oblivious to the presence of CCTV
- On the other hand, evidence of street lighting as a policy to reduce crime is strong: it can increase surveillance, signal a welcoming environment, and improve safety as a whole

4. **Proactive measures targeted at managing the NTE**

A number of papers talk about the value of introducing certain, temporary measures, to deal with the NTE. These are particularly targeted at managing and dispersing large groups of people in order to minimise the potential for flashpoints to emerge or disruption to occur:

- There is value in pedestrianising some streets in the evening/night so that large numbers of people in a small space can move around without congestion (Wickham, 2012)

- The BRE also recommends the use of temporary pedestrian zones, ensuring that transport is sufficient, not siting fast food outlets near taxi ranks, possibly having mini-cab booking kiosks near licensed premises or even inside. The paper also suggests that taxi marshals could provide information, estimated waiting times for taxis etc

- The BRE advocates the use of street marshals/wardens, ideally SIA licensed

- The NTEC post in Cardiff looked at marshalling taxi ranks, control of taxi services, a programme of road closures and temporary pedestrianisation of popular streets, improved waste management and street cleansing and a radio communications network linking taxi marshals/ambassadors, police officers, door supervisors, the NTEC and those monitoring CCTV. This appeared to lead to a reduction of incidents of alcohol-related violence and disorder (Edwards, 2010). Qualitative interviews with key workers suggested the road closure and taxi marshalling measures were particularly effective

- The study by Stuart et al (2009) in Prescot, found high levels of support for better late night transport, a Pubwatch scheme, CCTV coverage and improved street lighting

5. **Regulation and enforcement of licensing laws**

Alcohol Disorder Zones introduced as part of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 aimed to generate 'improvement' on an area-wide basis through the placing of a mandatory levy on licensed operators by local authorities for the costs of CDRP-initiated crime control measures. However, Hadfield and Newton (2010) reported that at the time of writing no local authority had yet sought to invoke these powers, and suggest there may be an unwillingness on the part of local authorities to resort to these measures.

"This outcome may well have been fostered by the fear of unwelcome publicity and damage to place marketing associated with the labelling of areas as 'disorder zones', but may also have been influenced by the complex nature of the official guidance which frames the use of such powers as an action of 'last resort'."
(Hadfield & Newton, 2010)

K. THE ROLE OF SECURITY STAFF

- *Evidence suggests that security staff believe their working environment is a difficult one, for several reasons*
- *There appear to be additional problems in the retail sector, where the working environment has different features*
- *Training is a cause for concern in a number of ways, particularly in number of providers and inconsistencies in methods taught*
- *Security staff have a number of dissatisfactions and want to see changes in the industry and in attitudes of the police*

1. Scope of literature

The literature around Security Staff tends to fall into 4 categories:

1. Discussion of the context in which security staff operate
2. The value/impact of their training
3. First hand accounts/experiences of working as door staff
4. Potential value of introducing equipment and other means to reduce violence

Overall, concerns are expressed about the range of options available to door security, especially in the light of criticisms, which emerge in the literature, of aspects of the licensing scheme, and of the training required for a door supervisor to obtain a licence.

2. Context in which security staff operate

Perkins (2009) cites a number of studies that describe the challenges facing door staff (Wakefield 2006; Hobbs et al, 2003, Hadfield 2006). Not only do door staff not have the backing of state power, and are subject to the law like any other citizen, but there is also a perception among door staff that if they act in self-defence they will face heavy sanctions and that the police are hostile to them.

"[Door supervisors] operate according to a cocktail of extra-legal maxims, occupational codes and personal discretions, underpinned by an interpretation of what is good and what is bad for business" (Perkins 2009).

Paterson and Stevenson (2014) in their analysis of the CALM system of training, value the approach of a public health model, in order to appreciate that there is a broader context in which staff operate, and that the focus cannot simply be on the skills or training of individuals. According to their paper the public health model involves three preventative elements:

- Primary (before) – looking at the whole system/organisation in order to address root causes at both an individual and systemic level, in order to try to prevent situations of violence arising
- Secondary (during) – preventative efforts focusing on de-escalation
- Tertiary (after) – physical management of crisis, but also ensuring parties receive support and that any learning from the incident is gathered and implemented

> *"We believe that the traditional, reactive, skills based violence management training may be counter productive and often leads to negative outcomes. Its focus on skills 'individualises' the problems of occupational violence. In so doing it promotes a false blaming paradigm and obscures the organisational and wider cultural dynamics which are the actual root of much violence."*
> (Paterson and Stevenson, 2014)

Diston (2014) tends to be supportive of the idea that risk assessment in the workplace is important (which would be part of the Primary element of the model above), citing the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. He wants to see the SIA ensuring that security companies are performing adequate violence risk assessments, reporting incidents correctly and conforming to their duties under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 as part of the SIA Business Licensing model.

Stuart et al in their study of the NTE in Prescot (2009) conducted a survey among nightlife patrons. Just under half of respondents supported the use of additional police resources. It is worth nothing

that in this survey, the use of more door staff gained less support than opposition (43.4% disagreed that this would help compared with 41.1% agreeing). This point of view was not elaborated on further in the study, but perhaps suggests an element of mistrust between nightlife patrons and door staff.

Interestingly, Gore et al (2008) cite Homel et al (2004) in saying that for reduced violence more friendly interactions with door supervisors were needed as well as a trend towards a more cheerful, relaxed and pleasant demeanour.

2.1 Retail settings

Gore et al (2008) writing for the HSE cite research indicating that in retail settings uniformed security is a favourite measure of managers to reduce violence as they regard the high profile visibility as a major deterrent/reassurance. However, employing uniformed security does not guarantee crime free shops and is often a 'knee jerk reaction' rather than a rational thought out solution.

Issues to consider include:

- Ensuring there is clarity on officers' roles and expectations (e.g. managers tasking officers with shelf filling rather than security) and that store managers are clear about what security officers should be doing
- Ensuring support and feedback for security officers from store managers
- Ensuring employers take measures to protect security staff from violence as well, including for example issuing PPE (e.g. safety helmets) where the violence risk cannot be eliminated
- A good risk assessment to see why security are needed and their objectives
- Specify how security will work with other people and other security technology to make the officers work more interesting and boost security commitment

- Ensure key performance indicators are operational and standards exist for 'how' to prevent crime and violence
- Ensure there is integration in retail teams and with external links as store managers are more positive about security officers when they are more closely involved with them.

3. **Value/impact of training for security staff**

A number of concerns emerge around the training for SIA licensed security staff. Much of this draws on the experience of training in the health and social care fields, which has faced many of the issues that the security industry is facing now.

The literature questions the value of any training that has been developed in the absence of good quality data about the kind of incidents that staff are facing, and the response measures that are most effective.

Diston (2014) cites a study by Kaye and Allen of training in healthcare in 2002 that found that the data that first informed the training was flawed, as only the highest severity of incidents are reported. This means that staff were being trained in handling situations that they were not encountering in real life. He suggests that, in the absence of such data for the security industry *"it is sensible to raise the question as to how SIA mandated PI courses are being designed and how their effectiveness or suitability is measured".* He calls for a centralised reporting system for all violence incidents in the security industry to support the development of training and other risk reduction methods.

Diston cites work by Rogers in 2007 which tried to evaluate the training that nurses had received in breakaway techniques. They concluded that staff often couldn't remember what they were meant to be doing and that trying to 'make it work' could be at the expense of resorting to their instincts and protecting themselves more robustly. Diston quotes Stubbs et al (2008):

> *"Very brief courses do not allow adequate skill development and retention… the more individual components there are in any given technique and the more reliant they are on performance in the correct sequence, the harder it is for participants to acquire competence".*

McDonnell et al (2014) also raise questions about how training courses on managing violence in healthcare settings are delivered and the most effective ways of delivering training in this kind of area:

> *"Courses used a wide range of teaching methods including lectures, discussion and classroom based verbal formats, video-modelling and role play… These methods may be effective in giving staff knowledge and improving staff confidence. However there is no data demonstrating that these methods are effective in leading to accurate use of skills in the workplace with clients"*

They recommend behaviour skills training – instruction, modelling, rehearsal and feedback to mastery criterion, ideally in actual workplace settings. Diston recommends that training is unified into a single model.

Diston also discusses the importance of refresher training, which is currently not required as part of the SIA approach. He raises concerns over the number of different training organisations involved in delivering SIA training. He discusses the experience of training development in healthcare which led to a flawed system of training schemes (Rogers et al, 2007 and Stubbs et al, 2008, cited in Diston, 2014), and questions the level of quality control available across so many organisations. Diston also makes the point that having a security team comprising individuals who may have received different training creates additional risks. He would like to see a National Occupational Standard for the teaching of the physical management of violence and aggression to achieve more uniform delivery.

Overall, there has been insufficient evaluation of training courses on violence management in healthcare and the extent to which they are effective or not. Available research on training in this area is poor quality. Paterson and Stevenson (2014) cite the 'seminal' Cochrane overview (Sailas and Fenton 1999) which identified 2,155 evaluative studies, none of which met the required validity criteria.

> *"Surprisingly no studies reported data on skill retention after training. Evidence from other fields would indicate the importance of this variable… it is possible that in many cases staff who are trained in physical interventions will struggle to recall them in situ"*
> (McDonnell et al, 2014)."

Diston, looking at the situation in the security industry, also identifies that the lack of assessment of the training available is problematic.

Paterson and Stevenson (2014) question whether the kind of training offered to staff working in healthcare settings might actually have a negative impact on their ability to deal with violent situations, by focusing on individual actions, rather than locating violence in its broader context. This has implications for the security industry. They quote the following:

> *"Often the focus of training is on the development of individual competence in terms of skills, and in most cases physical skills. This can often increase participant anxiety and suspicions of the need for training and lead to feelings of insecurity and feelings of having to cope alone when it comes to dealing with violence and aggression. All training in this area must be situated within the broader context of the organisation and not just emphasise the development of key skills. It is important that training also communicates and demonstrates the positive and supportive actions and outcomes of the organisation in general."*
> (Zarola and Leather in a report for HSE 2006)

Our understanding is that the SIA has commissioned a report into the evaluation of training, that training has been standardised since this work was done, and that there is now greater consistency in the way it is provided.

4. **First hand accounts/experience of door staff**

Perkins (2009) carried out a survey among door staff, which achieved 266 responses, indicating that threats of violence were made against 97.5% of respondents during the previous year. He also identified a number of key issues as follows:

- Perception of hostile attitude from police: the survey identified that, aside from receiving a permanent injury, the issues of greatest concern to door staff were having their SIA license revoked, and being arrested by police for using too much force
- Follow-up comments revealed the perception that police could be 'anti door-steward', leading to door staff not taking the action they would like to, and sometimes getting injured as a result

- A perception that, since the introduction of SIA licensing, inappropriate door staff are now being employed. Many door staff cited experience and 'mental ability' as key attributes in handling the challenges of their position. There was a perception that a generation of door supervisors with the required experience are now not eligible to work due to SIA conditions, leading to inappropriate and unsuitable candidates working on the door

- Some saw an issue around the 'influx' of foreign nationals which has caused problems due to language barriers:

  "There appears to be a rise in foreign nationals in the industry who, even with good English language skills, may not be able to notice the subtle nuances in interpersonal communication that can be necessary to diffuse a potentially violent situation"

A number of calls for changes to the industry, or to the measures available to door staff, emerge from the Perkins study, including:

- The use of restraints, dependent on proper training to avoid further potential for litigation

- Body worn video cameras

- Greater pressure on venues via litigation and insurance costs to invest in door staff and in the issues of control and safety

- Greater cooperation between door staff and police, with the SIA doing more to promote perceptions of the professionalism of the industry

5. Potential value of introducing equipment to reduce violence

5.1.1 *Body cameras*

There are some indications that introducing equipment such as body cameras pay have a positive impact on incidents of violence involving security staff and the way in which they are handled.

FGH Security, based in Lancaster, is working in partnership with Lancashire Constabulary and this year dramatically increased the number of body cameras used by their staff following a highly

successful trial in the use of them to reduce alcohol related crime and disorder. The trial proved so successful that following a consultation process Lancashire Constabulary helped to secure additional funding from Lancaster's Community Alcohol Network. This means that now the majority of busy bars and nightclubs that FGH provides to use this technology (see http://www.fghsecurity.co.uk/police-hail-fgh-body-worn-cctv-initiative-a-success/).

A similarly positive impact is reported in Northamptonshire where a bar/club worked with the police to provide door supervisors with body-mounted video cameras (Morning Advertiser, 19 April 2012).

5.1.2 *Breathalysers*

There appear to have been a number of recent schemes across the country to introduce breathalysers for use by door supervisors, including in Liverpool, Norwich and Mansfield. However feedback on these has been difficult to find (Liverpool Echo, 23 October 2014; Morning Advertiser, 8 September 2014; Mansfield and Ashfield Chad, 23 July 2014).

L. PRACTICAL LEARNINGS AND INTERVENTIONS

- *A range of practical measures and tactics have been used to address the problems of violence at local level, particular in the night time economy*
- *The Health and Safety Executive Work-related Violence Toolkit is regarded as particularly useful for businesses, especially SMEs*
- *The Toolkit should be more actively promoted by local authorities*

1. Trials

A number of initiatives, campaigns and measures have been tried in different parts of the UK. Prominent among these have been the following.

Middlesbrough town centre: Dispersal orders were introduced for three months, over the May Bank Holiday period, to allow police to exclude proactively groups of drunkards from the town centre. This occurred alongside other enforcement and preventative measures including additional police patrols at on and off-licensed premises aimed at penalising those serving alcohol to those under the legal drinking age or in an inebriated state (Lister, 2009)

Westminster: West End 'Weed and Seed' policy. Weeding involved targeting enforcement activities on existing problematic premises. Seeding involved restricting the growth of alcohol-focused bars trading beyond midnight, with a preference to developing food-led restaurants (Wickham, 2012). Between 2005 – 2009 rise of 14% in number of restaurants, reduction of 5.7% in number of bars, café bars and pubs and 16% reduction in number of nightclubs, together with evidence of a reverse in area's trend of increasing crime, disorder and public nuisance

New South Wales, published a ranked list of the top 100 licensed premises for assaults. The top 48 were subject to the following restrictions:

- Mandatory 2 am lock outs (although evidence on effectiveness of lock-outs not conclusive as can cause problems with door-staff or move anti-social behaviour onto the street)
- Cessation of alcohol service 30 minutes before closing time
- Plastic/polycarbonate vessels for beer after midnight
- No 'shots' and drink purchase limits after midnight
- Ten minute alcohol sale time outs every hour after midnight

This led to a reduction in the incidence of assaults across all 100 of the listed premises (Wickham, 2012).

Glassware management: Swansea Council invested in 11,000 polycarbonate glasses, issued free to 12 premises located around a busy city centre street and trialled for 6 weeks over festival period. No glass related violence incidents in the pubs over that period. It is now a condition of new licenses that premises have to use safer glass on certain dates e.g. over Christmas period (Wickham, 2012).

Greater London Authority (2012): Newham has been taking a total enforcement approach with the key objective being the need to balance the rights of businesses to trade and residents to enjoy a reasonable quality of life. The licensing team achieves its objective by working closely with other partners such as the police, fire brigade, trading standards, and children's services. It targets priority areas, focusing on enforcement and achieving compliance with the help of dedicated police resources, and imaginative use of powers of seizure, closure and detention. As a result, Newham saw serious alcohol related crime down by 22 per cent, a 70 per cent decrease in assaults on licensed premises between 2009 and 2010 and 60 fewer cases of GBH in one year linked to pubs and clubs.

2. HSE Work-related violence toolkit

In 2008-9 the HSE developed the 'Managing violence in licensed and retail premises' toolkit. The toolkit was designed in response to Government policy and national statistics on crime, disorder and risk of violence, and was aimed at duty holders in licensed and retail premises and was also intended as a resource for Local Authority inspectors. It provides practical advice on how to conduct a risk assessment and take action to prevent or control work-related violence. This includes ways of assessing and evaluating the risk of violence, steps that can be taken to deal with the risks, training for staff, practices for recording and reporting violent incidents, providing support to staff after an incident, and preventative measures.

Preventative measures cover design and layout of premises, use of equipment such as CCTV, use of security staff, and working practices to deal with violent customers. The toolkit also offers guidance on working in partnership with the police, local authorities, trade unions and other businesses.

The HSE undertook an evaluation of the toolkit (Wilde & Beers, 2010), and some of the findings are relevant for how the SIA might best go about working with partners and promoting changes in practice. SMEs appeared to be a hard audience to reach with regards to violence prevention information and interventions. The evaluation recommended that the toolkit needed to be specifically promoted towards SMEs, by Local Authorities, and also via a more joined-up approach between LAs, police, HSE and other regulators. The HSE literature review (Gore et al, 2008) identifies reasons for why SMEs are a difficult audience to reach:

- Lack of time/resources
- Small, staggered workforce often with irregular hours and high turnover, making it more difficult to deliver advice and training or to get all staff together to discuss risks and possible solutions
- The cost of physical security and design may be prohibitive in small shops

- Channels for dissemination of information are problematic; mailed information, especially detailed guidelines, may not be read or trusted unless it is sent by an intermediary and there is a strong preference for face-to-face contact
- SMEs often have a fatalistic attitude to the problem of work-related violence and crime
- Small retailers may not think that health and safety regulations apply to them or that they need risk management. They tend to think that HSE information does not apply to them. Some SMEs may not have the skills and tools to carry out risk analyses
- Small retailers may know who is responsible for crime and are reluctant to challenge them for fear of recriminations

The toolkit was most enthusiastically received by Local Authority inspectors who reported having an increased awareness of work related violence issues, and were therefore prepared to spend more time discussing the issues with duty holders and providing useful and practical advice. Features that were liked/desired included:

- Case studies on measures people have taken, incidents that businesses have faced etc.
- A hierarchy/list of costs for various solutions/control measures
- HSE endorsement of measures to reduce the risk of violence
- Support on producing risk assessments
- Ideally, tailoring towards different industries, sizes of business and specific issues such as searching patrons or refusing underage alcohol sales etc.
- Ideally information sheets aimed at staff (i.e. pitching the information at the end user, not just managers)

It is worth noting that in this evaluation, the HSE found that Duty holders reported that the changes they had made had led to a number of outcomes including people wanting to work for them, rather than companies where changes had not been made.

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N. APPENDIX

1. Health and Social Care Information Centre

The 43 CCGs with the highest rates of violence (79-160 per 100,000 population) taken from Age and sex directly standardised admission rates (per 100,000 population) with a cause code of assault by CCG of residence, April 2013-March 2014.

Those with rates over 100 are underlined, with the exact rate given in brackets.

- Darlington
- Durham Dales, Easington and Sedgefield
- Newcastle West
- South Tees (104.6)
- South Tyneside
- Sunderland (102.5)
- Blackburn with Darwen (140.6)
- Blackpool (159.6)
- Bolton
- Central Manchester
- Oldham (121.3)
- East Lancashire (100.7)
- Heywood, Middleton & Rochdale (100.9)
- Halton (124.7)
- Salford
- Knowsley (126.9)
- North Manchester (121.3)
- Southport and Formby
- Stockport
- St Helens (151.4)
- Tameside and Glossop
- Warrington
- West Lancashire
- Wigan Borough
- Fylde and Wyre
- Barnsley (102.4)
- Bradford Districts
- Bradford City (131.7)
- Hull
- Leeds South and East (108.8)

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- North East Lincolnshire
- North Kirklees
- Wakefield (129.1)
- Coventry and Rugby
- Sandwell and West Birmingham
- Wolverhampton (111.1)
- Luton
- Hammersmith and Fulham
- Lambeth
- Waltham Forest
- Southampton
- Wirral (108.6)
- Liverpool (139)

The following list gives the actual numbers of admissions by CCG (rather than rate of admissions), showing the 26 CCGs which dealt with more than 250 admissions for assault during the period April 2013 – March 2014. This helps in giving an indication of the areas which are facing the highest volume of assaults. Those areas underlined in the list below also appear in the list above.

- Birmingham Cross City (531)
- Bradford Districts (316)
- Bristol (328)
- Cambridgeshire and Peterborough (365)
- Coventry and Rugby (427)
- Dorset (272)
- Ealing (270)
- East Lancashire (355)
- Lambeth (288)
- Leeds South and West (277)
- Leeds West (256)
- Liverpool (724)
- Newham (275)
- North, East, West Devon (407)
- Nottingham City (279)
- Oldham (268)
- Sandwell and West Birmingham (489)
- Sheffield (482)
- South Tees (277)

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- Southern Derbyshire (278)
- Sunderland (272)
- Wakefield (394)
- Waltham Forest (252)
- Wigan Borough (262)
- Wirral (312)
- Wolverhampton (288)

2. **Further data/evidence sources**

2.1 The Trauma and Injury Intelligence Group (TIIG), part of the Centre for Public Health at Liverpool John Moores University.

See: http://www.cph.org.uk/tiig/.

The TIIG was established to look at access to quality and reliable injury information. A major element of TIIG is the ongoing development of an Injury Surveillance System (ISS) across the North West of England. The TIIG ISS collects and reports on injury data from local emergency departments (EDs) across Merseyside, Cheshire, Cumbria, Lancashire and Greater Manchester. TIIG also warehouses data collected by the North West Ambulance Service.

The TIIG covers 5 areas: Cumbria, Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside.

It is able to provide a monthly breakdown of all injury and assault attendances to every individual hospital in each of those regions (as an example, see http://www.cph.org.uk/monitoringreports/tiig/lancashire/Royal%20Lancaster%20Infirmary%20ED%20Bulletin%20(Oct13-Sep14).pdf).

It also has produced a number of themed reports (e.g. Violence across Greater Manchester (2011/12 to 2013/14) http://www.cph.org.uk/monitoringreports/tiig/themed/Violence%20across%20Greater%20Manchester%20201112%20-%20201314.pdf) which collate and analyse the data available.

It also produces violence profiles for each area within the North West (e.g.

http://www.cph.org.uk/monitoringreports/tiig/other/Violence%20profiles/Allerdale.pdf)

2.2 Centre for Public Health, John Moores University

See: http://www.cph.org.uk/.

More generally the CPH has published a series of Violence Profiles for areas in the North West and London which uses NHS data to examine the extent of violence, trends, at-risk groups and communities, and circumstances of assault in order to demonstrate how health data sources can support local violence prevention initiatives. This is part of a 3 year project led by the Centre and funded by the Department of Health: *Optimising the Use of NHS data in local violence prevention and measuring its impact on violence*. The project aims to identify the optimum use of NHS data in local violence prevention, support local partners in its use and develop evidence around the impacts of data sharing on violence.

The list of publications can be accessed here: http://www.cph.org.uk/publications/expertise/violence/.

An example of one of the publications for the Wirral, is available here: http://www.cph.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Wirral-violence-profile.pdf.

2.3 Violence Indicator Profiles for England Resource

See: http://www.eviper.org.uk/.

Although this tool is no longer updated (since October 2014), it is possible to access information by Local Authority area on:

- Violence against the person offences
- Hospital admissions for violence
- A&E first attendances resulting from assault

The information given shows a measure for each indicator, as well as the regional and England averages and range of all local authority

values for comparison purposes (see http://www.eviper.org.uk/LAProfile.aspx?reg=d for an example).

2.4 Public Health Outcomes Framework

See: http://www.phoutcomes.info/.

Viper (see section above) redirects to this site for up to date information. Here it is possible to find figures by local authority for hospital admissions for violence and for violence offences per 1000 of the population (see 1.12i and 1.12ii on the following table: http://www.phoutcomes.info/public-health-outcomes-framework#gid/1000041/pat/6/ati/102/page/0/par/E12000004/are/E06000015).

2.5 Public Health England, Data and Knowledge Gateway

See: http://datagateway.phe.org.uk/?lk_sr=govphe.

This site is meant to provide a single point of access to data and analysis tools from across Public Health England. It is in development and will be added to over time. Currently it provides access to the sites listed above, but in time it may offer routes to more relevant data and is worth checking in the future.

2.6 Association of Convenience Stores: Crime Report

See: http://www.acs.org.uk/research/crime-report-2015/.

The Crime Report includes data from the ACS Crime Survey and Voice of Local Shops Survey which holds some relevance for this study. Retailers were asked:

- *Thinking about your experience of verbal of physical abuse in the last year, have you experienced...?*
  - No verbal or physical abuse (39% in the 2015 report)
  - Increase in incidence (15%)
  - Reduced incidence (8%)
  - Stayed the same (37%)

2.7 USDAW Freedom From Fear Survey

See: https://www.usdaw.org.uk/About-Us/News/2015/January/Violence,-threats-and-abuse-against-shopworkers-is.

USDAW conducted a telephone survey of over 5,000 retail staff in November 2014. The survey found that an average of 241 shopworkers are assaulted every day. 3.1% were assaulted, 33% threatened and 56.3% verbally abused.

Further details of this survey were not available online, although may possibly be accessed by contacting USDAW directly.

2.8 GMB Safeguard Campaign

See: http://www.gmb.org.uk/campaigns/gmb-safeguard-campaign/about.

GMB reports that in recent years 1,550 security staff working for just 35 companies out of 600+ companies have been injured on duty by violent attacks - some very seriously. However, there is no indication of where these figures derive from.

GMB describes itself as the main union for security staff and has launched the SafeGuard campaign to tackle the increasing number of attacks on security guards at work. There is no further information on this campaign available on the GMB web

III

THE QUALITATIVE STUDY AND ONLINE SURVEY

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O. METHOD AND SAMPLE

1. Qualitative research

The sample comprised 82 people. 11 of them took part in 3 focus groups and 71 took part in qualitative individual interviews. The sample was as follows:

- 8 security company owners and managers, of whom 7 operated in door supervision, 6 in event security, 2 in static security guarding, 2 in close protection and 1 in retail
- 29 security staff, most of whom worked across more than one security sector; 15 worked in door supervising, 9 in security guarding in public places, 6 in security staffing at music festivals and sports events, 6 in security guarding in commercial premises or private premises, 3 in retail and 1 close protection
- 22 owners and managers of licensed and retail premises (pubs, clubs, restaurants, take-aways, independent food stores, petrol stations), of whom 14 operated in the night time economy (open after 11.00pm) and 8 did not
- 3 senior police officers
- 3 front line police officers
- 3 local authority licensing staff
- 3 people involved in partnership activities
- 4 professional trainers working in the security industry
- 2 academic researchers working in the field
- 2 lawyers specialising in licensing matters
- 2 insurers specialising in insurance of licensed premises

The sample covered London and the South East, the Midlands, North West England, North East England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Of the 82 respondents, we spoke to 28 face to face and 54 by telephone.

Security companies and security staff were recruited both from the SIA Approved Contractor Scheme database and by free-finding methods – our interviewer/recruiters identify and recruiting them, largely at random. All the venue owners/managers were free-found by our interviewer/recruiters. The remainder of the sample were recruited using direct or indirect contacts provided by the SIA.

Interviewing was carried out by Tim Porter, Alice Bearn and Ali Percy during February and March 2012.

Interviews were audio recorded and recordings were transcribed for analysis.

Most of our fieldwork has been with people who work in the night time economy or who are involved in aspects of the night time economy. We have also interviewed people who work in other sectors – security in public places, guarding premises, cash in transit – and have gathered feedback from them, but most of the incidents of violence considered in the research related to the night time economy and involved door supervisors.

2. Quantitative research

The quantitative study comprised an online survey of people working in the security industry: security staff and those managing security companies. Respondents were all on SIA databases and were emailed a link to the questionnaire, which they completed online. The survey was open from March until 10th April.

A total of 891 people completed the survey. Not all respondents answered all the questions. Our tables make clear how many answered each question.

Key features of the online sample were:

- most respondents (87%) were male; 13% were female
- the proportion of females was greatest amongst those newest in the industry, comprising one in six (16%) of those with up to five years' experience compared with one in 12 (85) of those with 10 years or more experience

- the largest proportion of respondents came from London and the South East (28%) followed by East of England (14%), North West England (13%), Scotland (13%) and South West England (12%); all other regions each contributed less than 10% of the sample

- 44% worked as door supervisors; 21% worked in security guarding, 12% in event security and 11% in retail security; all other types of work each individually accounted for less than 5%

- 68% worked mainly in the evening or at night; 32% worked mainly in the day

- respondents in Scotland were more concentrated in two areas of work: door security (58%) and event security (20%); those in London and the South East were less likely to work in door security (35%), though this was still the most common type, with security guarding the next most prevalent type of work at 28%

- there was also some variation by length of experience, with the least experienced more likely to be employed on door security: 54% of those with 5 years or less worked in this area compared with 40% of those with 10 or more years' experience; newer entrants to the industry were less likely to be working as security guards (14%) compared with the most experienced (24%)

3. Caveats

3.1 The qualitative and online samples

An important caveat to the **qualitative** findings is that our sample comprised people who were willing to take part and talk frankly about the issue; in some sectors it may not have been typical of those who work in this field.

Among owners and managers of venues it may have been that their premises suffered less violence than others. In the security sector it seemed to us that company owners/directors we spoke to may have been unusually conscientious: they were in the ACS; they complied readily with legal requirements *and* went further in respect of training, they kept records of incidents, and owners/managers of security companies were hands-on in their work. Most of the door supervisors we interviewed said their approach to dealing with potentially violent incidents was based on communication, and

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that they used physical intervention as a last resort; this may not have been typical of door staff.

It may also have been that the police forces and licensing officers who agreed to take part were among the more engaged and interested in addressing the problems of violence. Those we spoke to were open and keen to let us know their policies and practices and to share their views.

As far as the **online survey** is concerned, it is also possible that the respondents were not typical. Most completed the survey within the first week of it being online, and so may have had a particularly keen desire to take part, perhaps motivated by unusually strong feelings. The majority had worked in the security industry for 5 years or more. It is possible that this sample features the more engaged security staff; and that more have experienced violence than is typical of security staff at large.

3.2 The nature of qualitative research

Qualitative research, by its nature, is intended to generate insights and ideas, based on participant's knowledge, experiences, attitudes and opinions. It does not seek to generate statistically valid findings but to generate insights into experiences, attitudes and behaviour, and to add flesh to the feedback from larger scale quantitative surveys.

P. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

1. The environment for violence

- *Violence was regarded as commonplace and difficult to prevent, as almost inevitable in the night time economy, and as a serious problem*
- *Door supervisors, especially in the quantitative sample, and some venue owners, believed the problem was getting worse; others, including the police and security staff in other sectors, believed it was improving*
- *Violence in the night time economy was associated with late-opening venues, perpetrators aged 18-24 and the effects of alcohol and occasionally drugs*
- *Other factors in violence in the night time economy were believed to be the number of venues within a given area, interior layout of venues, management of premises, and the need for venues to make a profit*
- *Outside the night time economy violence took place in retail premises, Jobcentre Plus offices, hospitals, hotels, other public places, music and sports events and in guarding settings*
- *The police saw venues as primarily responsible for dealing with violence and had a generally positive view of security staff; security staff felt police attitudes were sometimes negative; and there were concerns about lack of police resources*
- *Licensing decisions were seen as having a central role in dealing with violence; licensing officers balanced risks of violence against economic factors*

1.1 General points

The general perception was that violence, or a propensity for violence to take place, is commonplace and almost inevitable in modern society, for several

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reasons. Academic research conducted by one of our respondents suggested that between 10% and 15% of people participating in the night time economy reported having been involved in violent incidents, and nearly 75% had witnessed violent incidents.

Almost everyone regarded violence in the night time economy, and elsewhere, as a serious problem, for society at large and/or for themselves in their work. The exception was a minority in the qualitative sample who owned or managed retail premises that either did not operate late enough to experience violence (ie closed by 10.00pm or earlier), or said they did not experience violence.

The general picture that violence is a serious problem was reflected in the findings of the online survey. Respondents were asked to choose which one of the following statements they most agreed with:

Violence against security staff is not at all a serious problem
Violence against security staff is not a very serious problem
Violence against security staff is quite a serious problem
Violence against security staff is a very serious problem
I don't have an opinion on how serious the problem is

810 respondents answered this question. Over half (55%) thought it a 'very serious' problem and most of the remainder (35%) felt it to be 'quite a serious problem'. Only 8% felt it was either 'not a very serious' or 'not at all a serious'; while the remaining 2% didn't have an opinion about the issue.

Among those who believed that violence against security staff is a very serious problem, proportions were higher among people working in door security (60%), security guarding (52%) and other sectors (55%) than those working in event security (44%).



In the qualitative interviews, especially among those in the police, trainers, partner bodies and the security industry, there was a sense of violence in the night time economy being difficult to prevent. The pattern of attracting people (mainly young people) to central urban areas with a concentration of venues, all of which sell alcohol, was implicitly seen as highly likely to result in at least some violence. The assumption seemed to be that if a large number of people are gathered in a small area late at night, many of them having consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol, there will be violent incidents.

The fact the Licensing Act now allows venues to stay open significantly later was believed to have contributed to the likelihood of violence. In simple terms people believed that the later venues were open, the greater the consumption of alcohol and the higher the probability of violence.

> *"It has increased incredibly since the Licensing Act was relaxed and we had a lot more venues open later. As we have seen more and more venues stay open longer and longer it has increased."*
> Senior police officer

A significant aspect of this apparent inevitability of violence was the tension between the desire to support local economies and the need to limit the risk of violence: venue owners wanted to make money and local authorities wanted thriving economies, but not the problems that the behaviour associated with some venues and events brought.

> *"If there is a place which has had problems, we are looking at reasons to keep the premises open rather than close it… because it's an existing business."*
> Licensing officer

> *"I think it is a fine line and we have to make sure that in licensing we are doing everything we can to make it a viable night time economy and that we are encouraging a safe environment and that people can come here quite safely on a night out. At the moment I think we all try to balance that with the police with regards to their resources."*
> Licensing officer

In other sectors violence was prompted by other factors, but might be said to be linked to problems around access to services and State support, financial difficulty and social problems, including mental illness, unemployment and involvement in criminal activity. These features of the violence 'landscape' were more disparate than those afflicting the night time economy, and so more difficult to address with specific measures.

> *"You can have all the red cards and the zero tolerance approaches that you want but unfortunately it isn't going to stop somebody who has got a severe inclination to go and hit someone."*
> Security staff

Perceptions of current trends in relation to violence, across all sectors of society and the economy, were varied. Some, including police officers, and security staff, felt that it is now less serious than in the past, though they were not certain why.

> *"The number of very serious incidents in the city centre… the people being hit with glass or bottles or stabbed or shot or having their head stamped on, or a kick off to the point where you are getting twenty lads fighting for five minutes with the police and getting smashed up, are very very few and far between."*
> Police officer

Others, especially those in the security industry, felt the problem had become worse, as society and culture changed, respect for authority has diminished, and more people seemed to be prepared to commit violence. The recession was thought to have contributed to this: a few of those on low incomes and struggling to deal with authorities, particularly in relation to benefits and jobs, were inclined to turn violent if they could not get what they wanted. A few respondents, particularly door supervisors and those running venues, also believed that the type and severity of violence is worsening: there is now greater use of weapons than in the past, and greater willingness to use them.

"I think there's more of a worry that people are carrying weapons than maybe 20 or 30 years ago. Especially knives and stuff like that. People are very quick to use glasses and bottles, indiscriminately as well when they've just thrown bottles and glasses at each other."
Bar manager

"I think it has changed. I think the weapons that patrons bring in, particularly knives, and to some extent the readiness with firearms as well, makes it even more perilous."
Lawyer

Others believed the problem has been getting better as local authorities and police forces implement policies to make city centres and town centres safer. Irrespective of the trajectory of trends in violence, virtually everyone felt that the problem is serious and needs more work to deal with it.

Respondents to the online survey were asked if they believed violence is getting better or worse over time. 807 answered a question which invited respondents to choose one of the following five options concerning violence:

I believe it is getting much worse
I believe it is getting a bit worse
I believe it's not getting worse
I believe it is getting a bit better
I believe it is getting much better

Almost half of all respondents (45%) thought it was getting 'much' worse and 33% that thought it was getting a 'bit' worse. Of the remainder, most (12%) thought it was static and one in 10 (10%) felt it was getting better.



Cross analysis of these two questions shows that a third of all respondents (35%) thought violence towards security staff a 'very serious' problem and was getting 'much worse'. Broadening the definition of these groups reveals that (74%) of all respondents felt violence towards them is a serious problem ('very' or 'quite') and one that is getting worse ('much' or a 'bit').

Within those who believed that violence is getting much worse, proportions were considerably higher among door security staff (51% of whom thought it is getting much worse) than among those in event security (35%), security guarding (35%) and those in other sectors (44%).

One of the features of violence in any sector was its unpredictability. Though experienced security staff believed that they could spot likely trouble-makers before any incidents took place, it was still difficult to know what to expect. This feeling was no less evident among those who worked in public places such as Jobcentre Plus offices or hospitals than it was among people involved in the night time economy.

> *"I could go to work four or five times a week for a month and not really get any issues, then I could maybe go to work four or five nights and get violence every night. There's no real pattern to it."*
> Club manager

A few respondents believed that violence in the night time economy is more likely to occur in towns and smaller cities outside metropolitan areas, perhaps because there is a lower police presence, venues may be more spread out and harder to police, and there is a greater inclination to become violent.

"Any area has people that are a potential problem and just because you're in a county town with a cattle market or whatever you can have a problem… You can face these things anywhere."
Pub representative

"It is lawless in the provinces. I do not feel safe going into places like Rochdale. I hear tales all the time."
Security company owner

Within the night time economy different sorts of premises were thought to vary in the likelihood of violence occurring. The experiences of those working in venues, in security and among the police suggested that violence was more likely to occur later in the night than earlier, which effectively meant in clubs and some bars more than pubs. And in clubs and bars violence was committed against other customers or against door staff, whereas in pubs it was more likely to be against other customers than door staff.

"It is normally the customers who are most at risk I would say, the customer will go for another customer normally. Rarely go for the staff… It is normally a customer that is nothing to do with the argument who will get hit by a stray bottle or hit by mistake."
Pub manager

1.2 Types of violent incident

The general belief among security companies and staff, and venue owners and representatives, was that more violence is committed by customers against security staff and venue staff than the other way round, or against other customers. In simple terms the violence involved…

- customers attacking door supervisors or security guards at venues or at events after being refused entry
- customers attacking security staff in retail premises or other commercial premises in relation to theft of property
- customers at venues or events fighting each other, including fights between gangs
- customers at venues and in public places attacking other staff – shop staff, bar staff, benefits officers, NHS staff, hotel staff
- would-be burglars and thieves attacking security guards who were guarding premises or property

The phenomenon of violence committed by security staff, particularly door supervisors, against members of the public, was not raised by security staff themselves, but did come up in discussions with trainers and the police. Most commonly this took the form of unintentionally excessive force used in restraining customers who had become violent inside a venue or at the door if refused entry, often when being held on the ground. A much less frequent type of incident was intentional attack by security staff on customers in retaliation for violence.

Where excessive force was used in restraining customers this was believed to result primarily from lack of adequate training of security staff. They might over-react to a violent customer's actions, perhaps because they were more anxious than the situation warranted. Or they might be unnecessarily robust in their actions because they did not know what restraints were safe, or because they not know how to use restraining moves. Where there were proactive attacks on customers this seemed to be associated with unsuitable security staff being in the job, employed by security companies who did not use the right people, and venues which were not sufficiently discriminating.

Incidents involving customers at a venue, or guests at an event, attacking each other, were less common, though some security companies which did more event work had greater experience of this. In their view this sort of event generally involved individual men arguing and becoming violent or groups of people, often families, getting involved in disputes and assaulting other groups.

1.3 The role of alcohol and drugs

Almost everyone we interviewed had something to say about alcohol as an element in violence in the night time economy; virtually all regarded it as a major ingredient in violent incidents.

For many it was a key factor, not only in the night time economy but elsewhere, including at events, in retail and in security at public places. The availability of alcohol and low prices in retail outlets meant it is accessible to all and affordable to most. The experience of most police officers, venue owners and managers, security staff and others, was that most people participating in the night time economy – most customers of pubs, bars and clubs late at night, especially at weekends, will consume large volumes of

alcohol and probably end up drunk. While most will be able to stay in control of their behaviour, a small proportion will become violent in certain situations.

> *"If you stopped the sale of cheap alcohol and stopped pre-loading, things would be a lot easier. It's people getting drunk that is the problem."*
> Police officer

> *"Alcohol is at the root of just about everything that we deal with if there is a problem. It is the largest single contributory factor to violence in the city and in crime in general."*
> Police officer

> *"I would say it is probably over intoxication, excessive tolerance of intoxication and sort of signs that it is normal for you to be totally drunk and the consequences that that leads to."*
> Senior police officer

> *"I really do think that the crux of it is around our uses of and attitudes towards alcohol… I think it really is a matter of addressing the over service of alcohol and levels of intoxication that would potentially bring about the biggest change."*
> Academic

A significant feature of alcohol consumption was pre-loading: drinking before going out. This practice was almost universally known and believed to be widespread, especially among drinkers under about 25. It meant that not only did overall consumption of alcohol during an evening increase, but that people arriving at a venue were often already drunk, and in a few cases more inclined to become violent than they would otherwise have been.

> *"If you are open till midnight then you probably don't get much bother but a lot of people now will preload before they come out and they will land on the town centres at midnight, 1 am and 2 am and stay there until 6 am and it is just that high level of intoxication that they bring with them that causes a lot of bother."*
> Senior police officer

A few people we interviewed believed alcohol per se was not the problem but underlying attitudes to drinking, drunkenness and behaviour in public. They felt that while cheap alcohol was unquestionably available, not everyone was inclined to drink to excess. Those who did drink to excess and had no qualms about getting drunk were the problem, and dealing with drunkenness was a major part of managing the risk of violence effectively – inside venues, on the door and between venues.

> *"I don't believe alcohol is the issue. It's the individual and their responsibility how they behave."*
> Pub representative

Cragg Ross Dawson

"It largely comes down to the sort of culture I think we have around alcohol and people's expectations about how this environment is a different leisure environment to any other that they would experience. You know, this kind of permissive attitude almost."
Academic

"If you walk round a town centre on a Saturday afternoon at about 2 pm and someone falls on the street within 20-30 seconds there will be a helpful bystander looking after them. If however the same scenario took place at 2 am they would just trip over them as it is normal and you expect to see drunks in the gutter and it is a societal acceptance in that sub culture that takes place in the early hours of the weekend that accepts that drunkenness to this level is normal."
Senior police officer

The assumption appeared to be that there will always be alcohol available to participants in the night time economy, because the economic case for selling it is strong and because politicians will not embrace the idea of minimum pricing for fear of alienating voters and business interests.

A smaller number of respondents in the qualitative sample, mainly venue owners and managers, security company owners, door staff and academics, and one trainer, believed that drugs play a part, especially cocaine and amphetamines, and that the growing prevalence of drugs, along with legal highs, in the night time economy in the past few years was a contributory factor in violence. The concern was that these drugs significantly exacerbate the effects of alcohol and make people more unpredictable in their tendency to become violent.

1.4 Other factors that can trigger violence

While alcohol and to a lesser extent drugs were clearly underlying factors in many incidents of violence, other factors could play a part.

Disagreements between people of different ethnic backgrounds prompted occasional incidents of violence in areas of London which were particularly multi-cultural. People of different nationalities might argue about an unrelated matter, and others of the same nationalities would join in. A gay bar in Glasgow experienced attacks apparently prompted by homophobia: people who knew or realised the venue was a gay bar would try to get in and attack door supervisors because they did not like it being a gay venue, or get in and then assault customers for being gay.

"Sometimes it can be racist, or where they can't handle their drink. Sometimes it can be with the war that is going on and when there is

football. With this war you have some of the Romanians arguing with the Asians so there is a few things that can fuel it."
Bar manager

"Then you go to the Village and get the homophobic element and people being targeted because of sexuality or transgender and that type of thing so I think there are different types of crime or motivators for crime should I say."
Police officer

"When we first opened we had an awful lot of problems with homophobia."
Bar manager

As noted, clubs were believed to experience more violence than other venues, primarily because they stayed open later. Within the club environment, violence was associated with certain types of music. In particular R&B was believed to attract violence, or people who were likely to commit violence. Irrespective of this, all types of night time venue experienced violence, and certain factors seemed common to all.

Almost all the discussion of violence concerned non-sexual physical assaults, but one of the academic researchers working in the field was also exploring 'low level' sexual assault in the night time economy. This appeared to be a significant aspect of violence which appears to be quite widespread but not often reported.

1.5 The night time environment

The physical environment of the night time economy, both outside an inside venues, was believed by some to have an influence on the propensity for violence to occur.

Academic researchers suggested that the following features of venues were significant influences on the likelihood of violence occurring:

- the interior layout of premises – if there was limited space for people to move around inside easily when the venue was busy, and limited seating, the feeling of crowding and the sense of being hemmed in could increase the risk of violence
- the number of venues in a given area in a town or city centre – the more there were, the greater the likelihood of violence, simply because collectively they attracted large numbers of people at the same time, especially when the venues closed

- the congregation of large numbers of people outside premises, particularly where there were multiple venues, many of whom competed for transport and takeaway food

Management of venues was believed to be another contributing factor; academic research suggested this, and it was supported by some venue owners and security staff and security company owners. They believed that violence was more likely if the following factors were evident in venues:

- lack of cleanliness inside, creating an impression of lack of care about what happens
- tolerance of 'rowdy' behaviour
- unwelcoming or hostile attitude of door staff towards people arriving at venues

This finding was echoed by others, including police officers and security staff.

> *"That also extends to town centres so if you get a town centre where people go to a single venue then the likelihood of violence is low and if you go to a town centre where people are apt to change venue every ten minutes then you will get a lot more violence."*
> Senior police officer

> *"If you can control the environment and set acceptable standards as the norm you will have a lot less bother. If you have environments as drinking establishments you are likely to get more disorder because more people are coming into closer space and when people are drunk they need more personal space than what they do when they are sober and yet they go to crowded venues so they get less."*
> Senior police officer

> *"If people get the sense that you are not going to take control of that venue and not have it organised, they will run amok because they know they can get away with it."*
> Security staff

Financial matters also played a part: in less well-off areas licensed premises which needed security were often not keen to pay for it and only invested the minimum in it. The consequences of this were that they employed too few door supervisors to maintain order properly or used the cheapest security companies, which employed badly paid and possibly unsuitable staff, and instructed them to let in anyone.

> *"You've got places on the outskirts where the money is very tight and venues are very much competing against each other and they're trying to drive down the costs as much as they can… the competition*

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is very very tight and if they think they can't afford security they won't. Certainly they're not going to turn away people who should probably otherwise be turned away."
Senior police officer

"I think shoestring operations, you know the ones where the operating procedures are written on the back of a fag packet, tend to be the ones where we get issues."
Senior police officer

"Some [venue owners/managers] take the attitude that they would rather have a venue half full of better customers than full of undesirables. Some will take the opposite view, they just want as many people in as they can and to serve as much alcohol as they can."
Lawyer

"At this time of financial pressure they are wanting to get people through the door and they will relax things in other ways maybe to make ends meet."
Police officer

One of the reasons for venues struggling financially was itself a feature of the night time economy and alcohol-related problems: pre-loading. If a venue's customers were pre-loading to avoid spending too much when they were out, almost inevitably they were likely to be intoxicated when they arrived at venues.

Another occasional problem arose in relation to the financial issues involved in running a venue: security companies had some concerns that venue staff are not always sufficiently active in banning customers who been violent, because they did not want to turn away any business, even if it carried a risk; this could mean repeated violent incidents.

1.6 Perpetrators of violence

The general view among security staff, venues and police was that most perpetrators of violence in the night time economy are men aged 18-24; almost everyone believed that this is the typical profile. There were exceptions: some security staff, trainers and academics believed that women are quite often involved in violent incidents too, in both verbal abuse and physical assaults, on each other and/or on door supervisors.

"In terms of perpetrators it is quite clear from the people that are arrested within our night time economy it is generally blokes 18-24 years old and usually white and usually alcohol is a factor."
Senior police officer

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"It's mainly young men, but you do get the women having a go too, and they can be really hard to stop once they get going."
Security staff

There was also a belief among police officers and some security company owners and door supervisors that certain types of music, particularly current r'n'b, attracts customers who are more likely to be violent than other music does. If a music type was associated with violence, it tended to cut across other characteristics: in particular, perpetrators might be older than 24/25. One bar manager found that students were particularly likely to cause trouble, more so than other groups among his customers.

"There is a clear link between r'n'b and violence I believe anyway. Certainly in our experience in the city."
Police officer

"At the moment we've had some r'n'b clubs which attract a very different sort of audience and again not always well managed operations. They'll suddenly start fighting, you're getting stabbings or gang fights taking place."
Senior police officer

"If you look at the types of music you have lots of heavy loud thumping bass then it can make for a more aggressive venue, than one that plays country music for example."
Police officer

"The nights that I see trouble are when rich posh uni students come out and get out of hand and that is generally when I see the most trouble as they act like arseholes really."
Bar manager

Outside the night time economy there seemed to be no consistent type(s) of perpetrator. In public places such as Jobcentre Plus offices or hospitals, violent incidents occurred which might involve any service user. Anecdotally these seemed more often to be men than women, but women were occasionally perpetrators too. The age range seemed to be wider than in the night time economy, covered the spectrum of adults up to those in their 50s.

1.7 The police perspective

Views on violence in the night time economy varied between the three different police forces we spoke to and between those at senior level and frontline officers. However there were many consistencies in perceptions of the issues, particularly around who is responsible for managing violence.

Senior officers believed that ultimately the venues have main responsibility for dealing with the problem of violence, but that alcohol price and availability are

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major contributory factors. One noted that the night time environment and the fact of alcohol very often being involved meant that sometimes incidents which start as relatively minor can have serious outcomes.

> *"It's more about the drink than anything else. If the venues control that, so much the better."*
> Senior police officer

> *"One particular thing seems to be… where there's a fight outside a club or people have been ejected from a club and there's a fight and somebody falls over and crashes their head on the pavement and dies… or ends up on life support."*
> Senior policer officer

Police officers had a generally favourable view of the security industry and its value to the night time economy, particularly the licensed trade, though they were aware that the quality of service provided by security companies varied. They believed that a good security company, and a good door team, can be highly beneficial to the successful running of a venue. This view was not always reflected in security staff perceptions of how the police regard them and behave towards them (see 4.4 below)

> *"[The security industry is] Absolutely crucial. A good security team at a premises is worth its weight in gold."*
> Senior police officer

Most of the venue owners/managers, security staff and partners we interviewed believed that a visible police presence was an effective contributory factor in reducing violence. They felt that if members of the public could see police officers on the street, or in venues, this discouraged the minority from becoming violent and reassured others that they were safe.

> *"There's no doubt it helps to have the police around. If people see them they feel safer."*
> Security company owner

> *"The benefits you get of a cop walking through a bar are massive and I don't think cops appreciate that."*
> Senior police officer

Several respondents, including some police officers, venue owners/ managers and licensing officers, believed that the work of the police in addressing violent is becoming more difficult as a result of cuts in their numbers. The result of this was that there are fewer officers available to respond to incidents, particularly in the night time economy, slower response times and a lower presence. This apparent lack of police resources meant that for some, the role of door staff, organised and funded by venues, was increasingly

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significant: if there were few police available, door supervisors had to do more in dealing with violence in or immediately outside their premises.

> *"I understand that they are short staffed with regards to the night time economy and they do have problems at shift swap over so when one shift changes to another there can be problems with cover."*
> Licensing officer

> *"We have on a Saturday night an average of 5-6 officers supervising pretty much half the county! It is not enough, a visible and active presence would do an awful lot more to deter poor behaviour and I think ultimately there would be a significant economic benefit to that."*
> Security company owner

> *"I think the staffing of the police and the resources available to the police is insufficient to have enough of a presence if you like on the ground to have an effect so I think it is very much now falling to the licence premises themselves with regards to the door staff."*
> Licensing officer

1.8 Licensing premises in the night time economy

The three licensing officers we interviewed seemed to be at well aware of the more involved end of the spectrum and more proactive in addressing the problems of violence. They said they try to look at the bigger picture: balancing safety of the public using licensed venues against the need to make local economies successful, ie bringing business into the area. In addition to decisions on licensing, guided by police figures from the on numbers of incidents at venues, they considered other aspects of the night time economy.

Licensing officers used licensing reviews and decisions to impose conditions on premises. They received information from the police about violent incidents, and used this to instigate reviews of licences. One used a traffic light system to identify venues experiencing different levels of violence.

> *"You may adjust opening/closing times, insist CCTV is installed, that the staff are trained, that alcohol is kept in a certain place eg in an off-licence – that their alcohol is kept behind the bar, that alcohol is only served to a certain strength so it doesn't attract street drinkers."*
> Licensing officer

One had introduced a condition on numbers of door staff at venues: venues had to provide a minimum number of door staff to get or keep their licence. If a venue had experienced violence, the licensing officer would require evidence of a plan to deal with it in the future. As a matter of course, door staff had to be trained. They had also introduced other measures – taxi marshalling (done by a security company) and bus station marshalling.

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"They [venues] are flagged up to us by the police with regards to numbers of incidents and then we look obviously at the licence and how we can control it through licence controls."
Licensing officer

"I think we need to know that they have got suitable staff in place and we need to know that the number of staff is correct… Where we have had problems we would expect them to come up with an action plan of measures to reduce the violence."
Licensing officer

"We look for a recognized qualification and there would be a requirement on the licence for that."
Licensing officer

Licensing officers said they made efforts to be open and consultative – facilitating meetings between venue owners, police and door staff – and felt security companies should be more involved in communications between the different parties. They were also involved in decisions on funding taxi marshals. There was general agreement that taxi marshals are helpful in reducing violent incidents among people queuing for taxis.

"The taxi marshals have been very much welcomed and we have had quite a few incidences of people saying that they have stopped trouble or sorted people out or got people home safely and that sort of thing so the taxi marshal scheme has been very very useful. The only problem with that is finding the funding for it."
Licensing officer

"There is obviously the problem of people drunk and fighting in the queues and queue jumping… and the police were also having to police the taxi ranks and queues… we introduced the taxi marshals as a response to that… The taxi drivers are very happy with that because the queue is controlled… and they also watch out for people who are perhaps a bit the worse for wear and link in with the police if there is any violent incidents going on."
Licensing officer

"We always had a marshal on that [city centre] rank. It could get quite unruly eg fights breaking out. If we didn't have a marshal on there, the drivers wouldn't want to go on there."
Licensing officer

2. Violence outside the night time economy

- *Violence in sectors outside the night time economy covered a broader range of settings*
- *It was generally linked to specific factors, often to do with interactions with public services, but also theft and burglary*
- *In some settings there were parallels with violence in the night time economy in relation to types of violence committed*

Though, as noted, most of this work concerned violence in the night time economy, we spoke to some security staff who worked in other sectors: retail security, public premises such as Jobcentre Plus offices, hospitals, public offices and broadcasters, and security guarding of cash and valuables in transit. In these environments violent incidents seemed to be prompted by particular, location-specific, triggers. These included:

- in retail, shoplifters attempting to resist being restrained/detained if they were caught shoplifting, and assaulting security staff, or behaving in anti social manner and becoming violent
- in Jobcentre Plus offices clients getting angry at hearing they were being refused benefits and losing control, then attacking security staff, and perhaps repeating this behaviour the next time they were in the office
- in hospitals people who were drunk abusing staff because they were having to wait long periods to see medical staff, then assaulting security staff who were called to eject them
- hotel guests becoming drunk and rowdy late at night and reacting negatively, and sometimes violently, to being asked to be quiet for the sake of other guests, or to being refused more alcohol
- people at festivals and sports events committing violence against others attending the event or against security staff, often when drunk or after taking drugs

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- (rarely) political protests at public offices and broadcasting centres, involving people trying to force entry and assaulting security staff who stopped them

- attacks by criminals attempting to steal cash and valuables in transit, or entering guarded premises, private or commercial

> *"We get a number of serious incidents every week… resulting in having broken bones and fingers being dislocated or broken, attempted eye gouging, broken nose and that kind of level of violence. They seem to be happening in three or four areas primarily one of the job centre contracts and guarding in retail, primarily large supermarkets…"*
> Security staff

> *"If people are drink or drug dependent and have mental health problems… that is always a problem… all of it is a general frustration of being in a hospital and taking hours to be seen and potentially not getting very good information."*
> Security staff

> *"We've had shoplifters who tried to get away from us but we've detained them and they've tried to punch us and we've had to use our physical intervention skills to restrain them."*
> Security staff

Though these environments were of course different from venues in the night time economy, the role and task of security staff was broadly the same: to eject the person/people who had become violent, or to stop them entering the venue or the property, in order to protect other members of the public, other staff and the property. The skills they needed seemed to be little different from those of door supervisors at licensed premises.

There were other parallels between these sorts of incident and those that took place in the night time economy: a greater preparedness than in the past to use violence, and to attack authority figures; and the unpredictability of violence breaking out. The impression from those working in public places was that they had to be just as alert and ready to respond to violence as those working in the night time economy.

There were two additional factors in some of these incidents, particularly those which took place at Jobcentre Plus offices and hospitals. First, some of these incidents involved people who had (or were discovered to have) mental health problems. This could prompt unpredictability in their behaviour which made it especially difficult for security staff to deal with them.

Second, in Jobcentre Plus offices members of the public were often hearing the news that for a number of reasons their benefits were being stopped. If they were recently unemployed and in financial difficulty they might be highly stressed and liable to lash out. Again this meant that violence might happen without warning, and that the claimant picked on the security staff because they effectively represented the authority that had taken the decision about their benefit, even though he/she had nothing to do with it.

> *[In a Jobcentre Plus office] "The first time I would have known that you have been told that you are not going to get your benefit is when you get up and.. you start shouting and swearing and kicking off. That is the first time that I am going to know. So it is harder to spot."*
> Security staff

> *"You might have someone who is very emotionally charged and all of a sudden they are been told to stand in the queue and that is the last thing that they need to do is to stand in the queue and start filling in forms and they just lost it."*
> Security staff

One other difference vs the night time economy was apparent from some of the qualitative interviews: there was less of a feeling of being in a team in the working environment. It seemed to be more common for security staff to work on their own, and there was a sense that they felt more vulnerable because of this.

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3. Experience of violence among security staff

- *All security staff in the qualitative sample and most of those in the quantitative sample had experienced violence and almost all had witnessed it*
- *Experience and witnessing of violence was higher among door staff than among those in other sectors of the security industry*
- *In the night time economy violence typically involved customers attacking bar staff and door staff in disputes about entry to premises or being served drinks, and sometimes attacking other customers*
- *In other environments violence involved attacks on security staff triggered by responses to action taken by premises staff or security staff, or as part of attempted theft*
- *Responses to violence were generally to eject perpetrators quickly and detain them until police arrived, with the minimum of force*
- *Learned responses could easily be forgotten in the heat of the moment*
- *The general response to experiencing violence was to hope for better physical protection and more support from the industry, but there were also signs that it could prompt staff to leave*

3.1 Experience of violent incidents

All the security staff we interviewed in the qualitative research, both those who worked in the night time economy and others, had had to deal with violent incidents at some point: they had either experienced violence against them directly or they had witnessed violence and verbal abuse directed at a colleague. All security company owners said their staff had experienced violence and verbal abuse. Generally the longer they had worked in the industry the more likely security staff were to have experienced violence against themselves: almost invariably those who had been assaulted were in their 30s or over.

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Experience of violence was more frequent among door supervisors and security staff working in retail, public places and events than those in static guarding. On the basis of their anecdotes, violence in static guarding seemed relatively unusual.

In the online survey of security staff, 96% of the 811 respondents who answered had experienced one or more types of abuse during their time in the industry.



88% had experienced verbal abuse. 70% had experienced physical assault not involving a weapon but 45% had experienced physical assault involving a weapon. Almost half (46%) had experienced physical assault that had required first aid and a third (34%) had ever been hospitalised because of an assault.

Those working on door security experienced higher levels of abuse, across all categories: 59% had required first aid as a result of physical abuse and 44% had been hospitalised. These figures were lower elsewhere: 41% and 18% among those in event security; 29% and 24% among security guards; and 39% and 30% in other sectors.

A further measure of prevalence we examined in the online survey was the frequency of incidents in the past year. The same categories were used.

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85% had experienced verbal abuse and three quarters (74%) had experienced physical assault not involving a weapon and a third (34%) had been attacked with a weapon. Many (38%) had required first aid and one in five security staff (20%) had been hospitalised in the past year, and not only on one occasion.

	Never in last year	1 - 4 times	5 - 9 times	10 or more time	Total
Verbal abuse	**4.63%** 35	**17.33%** 131	**15.34%** 116	**62.70%** 474	756
Physical assault involving a weapon	**65.84%** 453	**29.65%** 204	**2.91%** 20	**1.60%** 11	688
Physical assault not involving a weapon	**26.22%** 188	**41.70%** 299	**18.55%** 133	**13.53%** 97	717
Physical assault requiring first aid	**62.32%** 430	**31.30%** 216	**3.62%** 25	**2.75%** 19	690
Physical assault requiring hospital treatment	**80.09%** 551	**17.30%** 119	**1.74%** 12	**0.87%** 6	688

Again, those working in door security were more likely to experience violence: a quarter (26%) had been hospitalised in the past year, compared with 12% in event security, 16% in security guarding and 13% in other sectors.

These figures were reflected in prevalence of violence among colleagues at work. Of the 786 who answered this question 91% had witnessed colleagues experiencing abuse and three quarters (74%) had seen their colleagues experience physical assault not involving a weapon and almost half (45%) had witnessed a colleague being assaulted with a weapon. 58% had seen colleagues assaulted and requiring first aid and 45% could recall an incident that required a colleague to be hospitalised.

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

Those working in door security were more likely to have witnessed colleagues experiencing aggression in their work: well over half (60%) had seen colleagues hospitalised as a result of a physical assault.

A similar picture emerged from figures for the last year. Virtually all respondents (96%) recalled seeing a colleague verbally abused. Almost two-thirds (63%) had seen such an incident 10 or more times in the past year. 82% had witnessed a colleague assaulted not involving a weapon while half (50%) had seen a colleagues attacked with a weapon. Two thirds (65%) could remember a colleague requiring first aid over the past year and almost half (45%) had seen a colleague hospitalised over the past year as a result of an assault at work and sometimes on a number of occasions. 9% had witnessed colleagues hospitalised on more than five occasions over the past year.

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	Never in last year	1 - 4 times	5 - 9 times	10 or more time	Total
Verbal abuse	**4.14%** 30	**20.14%** 146	**12.41%** 90	**63.31%** 459	725
Physical assault involving a weapon	**50.38%** 330	**38.63%** 253	**7.33%** 48	**3.66%** 24	655
Physical assault not involving a weapon	**18.81%** 130	**33.86%** 234	**24.31%** 168	**23.01%** 159	691
Physical assault requiring first aid	**34.64%** 229	**45.69%** 302	**11.80%** 78	**7.87%** 52	661
Physical assault requiring hospital treatment	**55.12%** 350	**36.22%** 230	**5.35%** 34	**3.31%** 21	635

Those in door security appeared to be at greater risk: 64% had seen colleagues attacked with a weapon and 57% had seen a colleague hospitalised over the past year, compared with 40% and 39% for those in event security, 27% and 29% for security guards and 43% and 37% for those in other sectors.

In the qualitative interviews, perceptions of the severity of the risk varied; many security company owners and staff seemed to play it down, but a few said they regarded it as significant. In most cases security staff said the incidents had not caused serious injury; but a few had been knocked unconscious, including two who had been attacked in Jobcentre Plus offices.

3.2 The nature of violence experienced

3.2.1 *In the night time economy*

From the qualitative interviewing it appeared that the most common scenarios in which violence occurred in the night time economy were:

- people being refused entry and attacking door supervisors at venue doors
- people being refused drinks and attacking bar staff, then door staff who came to eject them
- customers inside a venue or at an event (eg a festival) fighting each other, for a variety of reasons
- a gang attacking customers or members of another gang in a venue

3.3 Responses to violence

In most cases, in almost any environment and setting, types of attack experienced by security staff were similar. Typically they involved:

- punches, mainly to the head, sometimes to the body
- kicks, typically to the legs

Less often attacks involved…

- blows to the head or body with objects, including shoes, especially women's shoes, and occasionally bottles
- stabbings, mainly using knives; occasionally scalpels
- grabbing round the neck

When security staff experienced physical attacks of this type they said their initial response depended in part on how serious they judged it to be. If it was not too serious they would generally attempt to get the attacker away: eject them from the premises if the attack took place inside, or get them to move away from a door if it was outside. If they felt that an attack was more serious they would try to restrain and detain the attacker until the police arrived. Typically this meant getting the assailant on the ground.

> *"If they do become violent and start to throw punches you have one person directly in front with both hands raised right in front of you keeping that personal space and one person behind or to the side… Then we are going to grab hold of their arms and put them in an arm lock or restrain them and then it is get them off the premises or take them down and restrain them on the floor."*
> Security staff

The typical response to violence by door supervisors was believed to have changed in the last 10-15 years. In the past it had been about acting quickly and firmly, with strong physical intervention to stop the problem and to deter others. Now it is more about dealing with the problem with the minimum of physical intervention, to avoid the situation escalating. Some had clear tactics in mind, and tried to implement these.

But it was clear that in the heat of the moment techniques learned in training could easily be forgotten, especially by the less experienced. The need to act quickly, the adrenaline generated by an incident and the concern about

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defending themselves all meant that responses were rarely pondered or considered at any length. A consequence of this was that restraint holds used by some security staff seemed to be almost anything that worked, rather than what they might have learned in training. Restraints could cause harm, especially when used by inexperienced security staff.

> *"You can follow it to a tee and the outcome might not work out. You can't treat every aggressive customer with the same method that they teach."*
> Security staff

3.4 The effects of experiencing violence

Typically security staff in the qualitative sample played down the violent incidents they had experienced, and characterised them as 'part of the job'. This was especially the case among door supervisors, though there may have been an element of bravado in their responses on this issue. Those working in retail and in security in public places appeared to be less tolerant and more concerned by their experiences of violence. Security company owners/directors appeared to take violent incidents more seriously; a few made the point that no other civilian job apart from the police service involve the risk of violence.

Few mentioned becoming disillusioned with security work, or feeling prompted to leave the industry and find other work. Most seemed still to feel motivated to do the work, not least because it was a fairly reliable source of income. Some said they had sought different types of security work, away from door supervision and in sectors they regarded as safer, such as working in public places.

Responses on this issue from those who took part in the online survey were more negative. Respondents were asked which of the following options they agreed with to describe how violence affects security staff that experience violence:

It makes no difference – it's what the job is about
It makes them want to do different sorts of security work
It makes them want better physical protection
It makes them want more support from the industry
It makes some people want to leave the industry

Respondents could choose more than one of the impact statement and, as can be seen from the chart, many did. 733 of the security staff answered this question.

16% said that violence makes no difference, that it's what the job is about. 34% thought that violence makes security staff think about different sorts of security work, remaining within the industry but switching to less dangerous environments. 65% believed that violence makes security staff want to leave the industry. Many felt there was a role for better physical protection (63%) and that violence makes them want more support from the industry (75%).



The only substantial difference in response to this question between security sectors was that more of those working in door security (68%) believed that the impact of violence made them want better physical protection than those in event security (62%), security guarding (60%) and other sectors (61%).

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4. Preventing violence

- *The main factors in preventing violence were believed to be managing people, managing drinking, dealing with dispersal of people at night, and protecting potential victims of violence*
- *Venue/premises owners and managers were seen as having a significant role in preventing violence through management of premises; Pubwatch was considered important in this*
- *There were some concerns among other stakeholders that venues did not always invest time, money and attention in taking steps to prevent violence*
- *As in the desk research there was a broad consensus that a joined-up approach is important in dealing with violence*

4.1 General points

Almost everyone we spoke to had a stake in trying to prevent violence and/or in trying to reduce its severity and its impact. The police, security staff, venue owners/managers, and licensing officers were directly involved. Other partners contributed in different ways to efforts to managing and minimising the risk of violence.

As far as responsibility for dealing with violence was concerned, opinion varied, but in the night time economy the general view was that if it is for any single party to handle, it is for venue owners and managers, but that ideally all those with any involvement should work together to address it. As was clear from the desk research, most people we spoke to said there needed to be a multi-agency approach to dealing with violence.

In the night time economy there appeared to be four main strands to managing the problem:

- encouraging a more responsible attitude to drinking
- planning and managing the gathering and dispersal of large numbers of people late at night

- preventing unwanted people entering venues and ejecting unwanted people from venues
- dealing with people affected by violence in or outside venues

4.2 Managing alcohol consumption

Across the sample there were a number of suggestions for reducing alcohol consumption by using legislation to raise prices. This seemed more a hope than an expectation, and there was little faith in politicians being prepared to bring this about. Using publicity to encourage responsible drinking was seen as laudable, though likely to have limited impact at the margins, where a minority seem to embrace intoxication. Given this, important lines of defence against excessive drinking and drunkenness in venues were door staff and bar staff in venues.

Door staff needed to be able to determine who among those trying to get into a venue are so intoxicated that they are likely to cause trouble once inside. A central part of the DS approach is that it is much easier to stop unwanted people entering a venue than to eject them once they are inside. Currently they work almost entirely on the basis of judgement, informed by experience. Many seemed confident that they could do this, but clearly there was no rigorous test for it.

> *"If the right people get in and the wrong people don't then you are 90% of the way there."*
> Security company owner

Controlling the sale of alcohol in venues to people who were already intoxicated was the responsibility of bar staff. Their willingness to do this was determined by the policy and approach of the venue owner/manager. The impression from owners/managers and from security staff was that if bar staff were given clear direction on this, if they felt it was acceptable to refuse to serve drunk customers, and that they would be given support in doing this if a customer complained, they would do so.

> *"We have a lot of regular customers and if some stranger comes in and they have one too many then we have to ask them to leave. We have to look after our regular customers."*
> Bar manager

> *"We have a social responsibility policy where drinking is concerned so we stop serving people alcohol if we feel they've had too much."*
> Club manager

> *"If people are starting to get drunk we will stop serving them. That way we can cut out most violence problems before they happen."*
> Pub manager

> *"It is how you manage that situation. Sometimes they will serve that person and say 'You can have one more but I'm not going to serve you any more.'... Or if you say, 'I'm sorry you have had enough.' Or to be able to say 'I'm just going to check with my manager.' Then come back and say 'I'm sorry you've had enough, we can't serve you.' Sometimes that is enough to defuse it."*
> Drinks industry representative

However there appeared to be some ambiguity in the stance of venue owners/managers. Some said they knew of other owners/managers who were lax about refusing drinks to drunk people, primarily because they wanted to maximise their take; a few door supervisors and security company owners said the same. If bar staff did not feel empowered to control alcohol sales to drunk people, the risk of violence grew.

4.3 Managing the night time environment to reduce the risk of violence

Discussions with police officers, licensing officers and others suggested that measures can be taken at a high level in any one area to manage the risk of violence. Several elements were involved in this.

First, there was believed to be a benefit in configuring the physical environment in certain ways. This included pedestrianising parts of city and town centres to reduce the risk of road accidents; moving bus stops so they were not placed near venue exits; trying to avoid too high a concentration of venues in one area. Overall the aim was to reduce the number of flashpoints, where violence might occur.

> *"That is what you find in the night-time economy – flashpoints, taxi ranks, take away food places. If you identify a flashpoint, you can manage it. It is about infrastructure."*
> Licensed industry representative

It was clearly possible to use licensing decisions to stagger venue closing times and reduce the likelihood of large crowds gathering in small areas. As we found in the desk research, the police and licensing officers were aware that risks increase if there are large numbers of people leaving venues at the same time, particularly given that many will have been drinking alcohol over a long period, and that they will be effectively competing for scarce resources, especially fast food and transport.

Second, licensing officers could use licensing reviews and new licence decisions to impose conditions on licences. They could use this power directly to help manage the risk of violence, by requiring a venue to use a minimum number of door supervisors at specified times, limit its capacity, or carry out risk assessments. Licensing officers we spoke to did this, but the impression from some police officers was that more could be done.

Third, CCTV in public places and in venues was seen as valuable in several respects: it helped police track incidents and intervene in real time; it could provide evidence at a later date if a violent incident at a venue resulted in a court case; in venues it worked as a deterrent to customers who became aggressive – they might back down if they realised they were being filmed.

> *"I think CCTV cameras play a big part because obviously the police are monitoring what is happening with town centres and we have those covering a lot of the town centre now and obviously we have someone in the control centre who can spot trouble going off and relay that information back and obviously they have the cameras now for identification of people and taking potential prosecutions against people so I think that has been helped as well."*
> Licensing officer

> *"…they see themselves getting aggressive and see themselves on the little screen facing towards them and that will calm them down a bit. If they see themselves as getting aggressive on camera, they are less likely to – they'll walk away."*
> Security staff

There were also measures that could be taken to manage and control demand for transport services after customers leave venues. Taxi marshalling was the most widely used, and appeared to be in place in a number of towns and cities. Bus marshalling and bus guardians were used in two places (Swansea and Cardiff). Both were thought helpful in managing the potential for conflict, though the availability of any transport marshalling and management depended on local authorities being willing to fund it.

> *"The pubs and clubs close and all they are interested is in getting them out so they are then on the streets. It is the private hire and hackneys who clear the streets… The thing to stop any violence is to get people in and out of town centres as safely and quickly as possible… If people are hanging around and can't get a taxi or can't get out that is what creates problems."*
> Licensing officer

> *"Taxi marshalling has made a big difference. Making sure there's someone there to control the queues, stop people pushing in, stop arguments and fights breaking out."*
> Licensing officer

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4.4 Planning around the nature of events and venues

For those in the security industry the type and nature of a venue and, where relevant, an event had a major part to play in how they managed the risk of violence, and their planning for security. Carrying out a risk assessment was an important element in planning.

In relation to the night time economy the main considerations were:

- the size of the venue/event and the numbers or capacity
- the type of venue and the music involved, which would to a large extent determine the clientele
- if it was a one-off event whether it was a public or private event, the age range of people attending and whether those attending would know each other
- whether there was an entry fee – if people pay to get in, they may be less likely to risk getting ejected; this is especially true of festivals, where ticket prices can be in three figures

> *"We always have a pre-deployment meeting with them and we take all our folders in with all our assessments, all our certificates of insurance and things. That all stays on site. We have a pre-deployment for two reasons. One, to kind of find out from them why they think they need staff. Do they want security to filter out the scum that shouldn't be getting in or because legislation dictates that there has to be a doorman on? We also do a pre-deployment check to make sure that the number of staff they're requesting is OK."*
> Security company manager

> *"We apply the same rules and regulations to some extent but it does differ a little bit. Every venue is very specific."*
> Security company manager

> *"It could be anything from looking at layout, the architectural layout or layout of a site plan for an event. Opening hours, serving schedules, timings, limit of people, travel arrangements, guest demographic, music arrangements, timings volume etc. Any different factors that you can use to mitigate against poor behaviour to restrict entry to anti social elements."*
> Security company owner

Risk management was also considered important, but it was believed to be done only rarely, and only by bigger venues and bigger and/or more compliant security companies. Risk management meant planning at the higher level, in

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terms of venue layout, entries and exits and their locations, the numbers of security staff in different roles and in different places inside the venue.

> *"If there was better risk management in advance around the entry and exits and how people were going to be escorted off the premises, it would help."*
> Insurer

> *"The individual managers should follow local risk assessments to decide how many door staff are needed. So the type of venue, the types of incidents they'd expect, the number of people and any other information together would form a risk assessment. The number of exits and entrances. All of that together will inform people how many staff they should have on."*
> Lawyer

In sectors outside the night time economy, preparing for violence was largely a matter of being familiar with the layout of premises and knowing how to respond if violence broke out. Planning around types of customer or user was less relevant because the profile of customers was wider and less consistent.

4.5 The attitude and approach of venue owners and managers

The attitude of venue owners and managers towards the risk of violence varied, but many seemed to want to play it down.

Those running licensed premises focused on keeping incidents outside, primarily through the use of door supervisors. There were several considerations in this strategy. Generally incidents that happened inside premises were more difficult to deal with and more disruptive than those that took place outside.

They tended to see bar staff as more at risk than door supervisors, because a key flashpoint is when someone who was drunk and/or troublesome was refused a drink and because bar staff were not trained specifically to deal with violent customers. Some said they gave bar staff informal training in dealing with difficult customers, but none appeared to have formalised this.

In contrast they regarded door staff as more at risk, but better able to defend themselves because they have had training in dealing with violent or abusive customers. Perhaps with this in mind, owners and managers of licensed premises which operated in the night time economy tended to be hands-off with their door staff. The impression was that they employed the security company to provide the service and left it to them to manage problems effectively. Others involved in security, including trainers and an individual

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involved in insurance, reinforced this view; they believed that venues can try to distance themselves from security matters.

> *"There is a conflict between the venues and the door companies as to who is actually in control of the situation. What we find is the venues are often deciding who comes in and who doesn't, then expecting the door companies to operate policy. As soon as something goes wrong they turn round and blame the door company. That is quite a big problem. Contractually they are putting all the responsibility on the door companies."*
> Insurer

> *"It is all done on cost and they will go for the cheapest door supervisors invariably, and they will pay rates that won't attract the best companies and so it will very much rely on costs and you pay what you get… They just see it (violence) as not their problem."*
> Trainer

Whatever the truth of what happened, it was quite widely known that legally venue owners are responsible for any violence that occurs within their venues, and for directing and controlling policy around security.

> *"The ultimate responsibility is with the venue, the premise license holder. Generally speaking they will contract out a private security company to come in and do their security for them but it is no defence for them to turn round and say it is my door team and it wasn't us."*
> Senior police officer

> *"We have seen examples where quite clearly the door team have too much responsibility and power and almost they are the ones running the premise rather than the actual manager of the premises inside which shouldn't happen."*
> Senior police officer

Pub and club owners/managers said their priority was a safe and well run venue. Other feedback, especially from security staff and security company owners/directors, suggested that some venues prioritise income over safety. They believed that venues are not prepared to invest significantly in door staff, and squeeze security companies on price, with the result that the door service is provided by people on low pay and is not always adequate.

> *"The venue doesn't want to pay any money. They want the cheapest door men they can possibly get and not pay for a better quality service backed up with more comprehensive camera coverage, body cameras, microphones etc."*
> Insurer

> *"They need to pay them more money, they would do a better job, not cut down on numbers of door staff. They want the minimum number there which, if something happens, immediately there is a problem."*
> Insurer

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> *"You have [venue] managers that don't want to pay the full cost for five door staff needed, who don't want to make changes. It is a battle. To keep that contract you have kind of got to go along with the venue manager. That can be a problem."*
> Security staff

> *"A number of times we have sat down with operators who are having problems and said look have you considered an extra member of staff here doing this or doing that or even a glass collector and they won't do it because it will cost them an extra £6.50 an hour to do that and they can't afford to do it."*
> Senior police officer

A few security company owners said they had dealt with venues and event organisers who were not willing to accept their recommendations for ways of dealing with potential problems or for having certain numbers of door supervisors. When this happened it caused the security companies difficulties. They might decide not to take on the work, on the grounds that it would be too risky for their staff and others at the event. In some instances they would take the work but knew they ran risks in doing so.

> *"We have engaged with event organisers in the past who haven't demonstrated an interest in fully addressing the risks to staff and suppliers and visitors and on both occasions we have declined the business."*
> Security company owner

> *"If a manager doesn't want it handled in a certain way and is happy to have a certain crowd in there that you know will cause problems, there isn't a lot the door staff can do. It needs to come from the manager of the venue."*
> Security staff

Related to this, some security companies had encountered venues or event organisers failing, in their view, to manage events properly, with risks to everyone. They might allow in more customers/guests than they had said they would, hire too few security staff, or have too few bar staff. All these could increase the risk of violence, or reduce the ability to deal with any violent incidents.

Elsewhere there was some feeling that venue managers are not always sufficiently hands-on in relation to incidents inside their venues – they put emphasis of security on the door.

This impression of wide variations in how venues approach the problem was reflected in other ways. Some were believed to be responsible and considerate in their approach; others apparently encouraged a more robust response to problems.

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> *"We know from the reports that some venue managers instil on the door supervisors that they've got to be aggressive and that's how they manage the premises. Others take a more proactive approach in trying to calm situations. So the venue managers can be critical."*
> Lawyer

A number of people with informed views on the issues felt there should be more effort made to educate venue owners and managers on the business benefits of managing their premises better. This included taking a more positive view of security staff, and seeing them as a benefit rather than a cost to the business.

> *"The better and more professional they are, the better it is for their business. It is not in their interest to have lots of under age people or drunk people in there. The vast majority of punters won't want to go there. That isn't a great business model for them."*
> Drinks industry representative

> *"If I create an environment where people come in and enjoy their night out and feel safe and have good processes around it then they are the ones that tend to last but of course there is that bigger financial outlay to begin with."*
> Senior police officer

> *"We need to be providing good, professional, polite, well mannered door staff… start to raise the bar a little bit and [make] the venue owners, managers, realise why they need to have security and recognise them as a valuable extension of their business, so that we can start paying more, start providing better pay, better conditions."*
> Security company manager

Some venue owners and managers ran businesses that closed relatively early in the evening, or said they had not experienced problems of violence because they were in areas that did not experience problems. Generally they did not use third party door supervisors. Their view was that the risk was low and there was no reason to pay for additional staff provide a service that was rarely required. A few in this position had occasional encountered violence, but so rarely that they did not regard it as likely to be repeated.

A few venues, particularly shops and restaurants, closed before 12 midnight and said they experienced no violence, though they had experienced verbal abuse. They tended to be located in residential areas rather than city/town centres, and were not close to concentrations of pubs and clubs. A few used closing times to minimise the risk of violence. They knew they could increase their takings if they stayed open later, but they chose not to on the grounds that they would then attract late night customer who were more likely to be drunk and so more likely to cause trouble.

> *"At the weekends we are open till 5 – 10.30 pm. We don't allow people to come in and eat late as that is when the trouble starts… I don't want people coming in full of drink and being abusive."*
> Restaurant owner

A consideration here was the expense of paying door staff. Venue owners would weigh up the additional takings they would get from staying open later against the cost of having door supervisors, as well as additional staff costs to cover longer hours. Alongside this, some felt that having to employ door staff was an acknowledgement that they expected violence, and did not want to operate in this sort of environment.

> *"I don't think I would want to have someone employed standing at the door… I mean it is another wage and more money… I think if it got as bad as that then I would have to think that well it is time to close the doors."*
> Restaurant owner

4.6 Pubwatch

Most of the pub managers we interviewed were members of their local Pubwatch scheme, and were enthusiastic about it. It seemed to have several benefits. First, it allowed exchange of information about customers who were troublesome and warranted barring. Sharing this between members was a significant help in preventing trouble.

> *"You also have Pubwatch and if someone is being troublesome and it goes round all the places and they get caught then I think that is a eat idea, the fact that they are being watched and if they do start causing trouble then they don't get served."*
> Restaurant owner

Second, it helped bring pub managers and landlords together, and made them feel they were not alone in having to deal with troublesome customers. If the police were also present at meetings this reinforced the sense of local bodies working in concert to tackle problems.

Pubwatch was also a forum for venue owners and managers to talk to the authorities, particularly licensing officers and the police. They could have informal discussions with them about what was going on in the area or they could address general issues concerning the law, local policy,

> *"If there are any general issues that are of concern or if they have any general issues then they can raise it with us there so we have that presence at the Pubwatch meetings."*
> Licensing officer

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There were some signs of more informal communications between venues to help prevent violence: even if they were not in a Pubwatch scheme they might have made contact with other local venues and agreed to work together to keep each other informed about customers who seemed likely to cause trouble.

> *"We help each other like the pubs round here, we will help each other out and essentially if we get someone come in and we will make a note we will call the pub down the road and say did you know that they are coming in and take notes."*
> Pub manager

4.7 Street pastors

Street pastors were believed to be a valuable addition to the efforts of the police and security staff: the feeling was that they provide tangible help to vulnerable people in the night time economy, of a type not offered by others. In particular the support they offer to women, and to people who have had too much to drink, was thought to fill a gap in the provision of help to members of the public in the night time environment.

> *"I think the role of street pastors is fantastic within the night time economy. They provide a really really valuable resource that alleviates some of the pressure from the police, in some cases from the ambulance service and things like that."*
> Academic

> *"They do a really good job…. They are just dealing with people who have had too much to drink and people that have had to take their shoes off!"*
> Restaurant owner

> *"If anyone is in need of some care we have the street pastors and obviously they will call an ambulance. We also actually had an incident whereby a pastors gave CPR to someone who collapsed in the queue."*
> Licensing officer

It was suggested that this sort of service could usefully be offered inside venues as well as outside, to help people who are vulnerable to receiving unwanted attention, especially women.

4.8 A joined up approach

As was clear from the desk research, the benefits of stakeholders in efforts to reduce violence getting together to address the issue were recognised quite widely. In particular those who had an overview of the problem – senior

police officers, licensing officers, some trainers, security company staff, lawyers – believed that partnership working was essential.

There were two aspects of this. One was cooperation and communication between all the parties involved, so that everyone – the police, the venues, licensing officers, security companies and door staff – all felt they were working to the same end, and knew what each other's role was. The other aspect was ensuring a consistent approach on the ground, so that members of the public understood that they would be treated in the same way by different bodies.

> *"I think it does come down to requiring that sort of multi agency approach."*
> Academic

> *[There is] "Greater cooperation between door staff, venues and the police and vice versa. More of a collegiate approach."*
> Lawyer

> *[You need] "Everyone working together as a team. To have co-ordinated meetings where every element of the night time economy meets and works towards making people's night out as comfortable as possible and as violent free as possible."*
> Licensing officer

> *"It is very important to have those communication links between the owners of premises, licensees, door staff, taxi marshals, street pastors, PCSO's. Everyone in that network."*
> Licensed trade representative

> *"The environment in the street needs to be consistent with the environment on the door and the environment in the bar. So it is essential that the police, the doors, the bar staff are all understanding of the consistent standards so that if you do something in the street the cop will pick you up on it and if you do it on the door the door staff will and if you do it in the bar then the bar staff will."*
> Senior police officer

4.9 A public health model for security

One training organisation believed firmly that the way security in the night time economy is bought, run and managed is unhelpful, and that it does not take account of the whole picture of need and consequences. Its view was that security needs to be planned and provided with a before, during and after approach: looking at the context in which violence might take place, the way incidents are handled, and using experience of incidents to learn for the future.

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5. Dealing with violence

- *Key steps in dealing with violence and the risk of violence were: setting a welcoming tone at the door; managing security staff effectively; and responding to incidents appropriately*
- *There were some concerns about support from venues and the police for security staff when they had to respond to violent incidents, especially those working in the night time economy*
- *Security staff also believed that courts can seem negative towards them, and that in general they are not held in high regard*

5.1 Setting a welcoming tone at doors

Door supervisors and others believed that early intervention was important in tackling incidents at doors: if door supervisors are welcoming and friendly when people arrive at a venue, and set a positive tone this had a major impact on the way customers behaved at doors and inside venues. The general wisdom was that the more polite, friendly and welcoming door staff are, the lower the likelihood of violence occurring, inside or outside venues. This was particularly true in the night time economy but also applied in other settings.

> *"If you are greeted on the door with a nice positive interaction and it's friendly, people think it is good. If you have got somebody there who is not interested or chewing gum or smoking on the door or more interested in talking to the ladies then forget it, it is usually a very good indicator that that premise is not really on the ball."*
> Senior police officer

> *"If you have got a friendly welcome on the door that is 'welcome and have a good night out' you will have a different atmosphere inside than in a venue that says 'what is in your pockets and let's search you and pass through this arch' etc, and if that continues through the venue with the bar staff who are collecting glasses and the DJs then you get a different tone in the venue."*
> Senior police officer

Alongside this, there was a belief that if door supervisors are firm but friendly when turning away customers who are drunk or are in some way seen as presenting a risk, this can help defuse situations. This meant talking to them rather than shouting, avoiding touching them unless absolutely necessary,

and advising them to come back the following night rather than simply stopping them coming in.

> *"If you can avoid putting hands on then you've got a safer outcome for all concerned."*
> Lawyer

> *"I do find that those that are generally welcoming and defuse things with a joke and a smile are far better than those that rely on their size or force or authority. You can turn people away from your door with a laugh and a joke and a not tonight mate or you can shove them out. You get a different outcome."*
> Senior police officer

Security staff, venue managers, the police and trainers all stressed the value of security staff taking a friendly, hands-off approach. They believed that this could help customers see door supervisors in a different and more favourable light, and less likely to become aggressive with them.

> *"We've always instilled in the guys that our job is meet and greet. You are there to represent that company and us and you are standing on a door which is technically our customer."*
> Security company manager

Early intervention also meant spotting potential problems before they began, by observing behaviour and interactions between different customers and groups of customers. Alongside this it involved identifying likely trouble-makers at the door and not letting anyone in who might cause problems. Security staff felt strongly that it is much easier to stop someone undesirable entering a venue than to eject them once they are inside.

> *"If we believe somebody is potentially violent or a troublemaker we won't let them in in the first place. So that we don't antagonise or make them think we're having a personal pop at them, we might come up with reasons - that the club is full or that we're closing in five minutes."*
> Security staff

> *"It's so much more difficult to remove somebody from a venue than it is to stop them getting in, in the first place."*
> Security company manager

> *"I think it's always better to stop them at the door than having to fight to get them out."*
> Club manager

> *"There comes a point when violence probably is the only option, when it's gone too far, but way before that often talking to people is much the better solution and sometimes you can defuse the situation that way."*
> Club manager

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"Was it as well planned as it should have been? Did the staff step in at the right moment? Could they have done something beforehand to stop that from escalating? I think the shift is actually going from, 'Are they dealing with an incident in the correct way?' to, 'What are they doing to stop this incident getting to a situation where they have to start throwing people out?'."
Senior police officer

Another element of this was door supervisors being receptive to customers making complaints about other customers being aggressive or abusive, or threatening violence. This could be useful information for door staff and could mean that violent incidents were prevented or reduced in severity.

"Often we can lessen the threat of violence if a customer comes up to us before it happens and says 'Look, just to let you know this guy was quite aggressive when I was having a smoke…' and we start monitoring a certain person when we get a few complaints from other customers."
Club manager

5.2 Managing door staff

Choosing the right door staff for an event or a venue was also a factor that the more conscientious security companies considered. They would pick people with the right training and experience and put together an appropriate team, with a range of skills and personalities. Many felt that for door supervisors work it is important to have a team who know each other. Female door supervisors believed their presence in confrontations can help calm men down; the general feeling was that it is good to have female door staff. A part of this was keeping the same team together consistently, and having them work at the same venue on a regular basis, so they were familiar with the premises and with the customers.

"I need to work out are they missing a wee bit of training, do they need to do a bit extra? I like to put new guys with regular guys and get them confident and stuff."
Security company manager

[The trainer] "He said 'I have one that would be very strong, someone that can handle himself if he had to in a fight, who wasn't frightened of doing it. I have one that is very good talking to people and another one who is older and can calm the younger people down and I have a female. I am not going to throw her in a fight but it does work'.'
Security staff

"At more established venues… you tend to see the same door teams working there week on week on week as they know the premises and they know the customer and they know how the processes work and they are pretty slick and they deal with it."
Senior police officers

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If a confrontation loomed at the door, door supervisors might instigate 'the switch': the door supervisor who had refused a member of the public entry and prompted an aggressive reaction would go inside the venue and their place was taken by a colleague. This was believed to be effective.

> *"If you are dealing with someone and they aren't de-escalating from you. You do a switch, where you switch with a colleague and you go in the venue out of sight and a colleague will take over and try and de-escalate it. They call it the switch."*
> Security staff

In sectors outside the night time economy security staff were generally present, except in smaller retailers, but they tended to be fewer in number in venues. The impression was that there was less of a feeling of being in a team than there appeared to be among door supervisors working in the night time economy. Responses to violent incidents in these other sectors were not dissimilar to responses in the night time economy, and focused on ejecting and restraining violent customers as quickly as possible, but because there were generally fewer security staff there was greater reliance on the police to attend and provide help.

5.3 Seeking help from the police

If violence broke out, the general approach of door staff and other security staff (eg those working in public places) in dealing with it was to keep the violence away from the venue. Effectively this meant ejecting those being violent if they were inside, or keeping them away from the door if they were outside. If the trouble persisted, or if an incident was serious enough to warrant security staff restraining and detaining an assailant, one of the team, or a member of staff at the premises, would call the police security staff and/or the venue manager would call the police.

> *"We have a particularly good relationship with the PCSOs in our local areas where we work and we have found that we can very often instigate the process of calming the situation down or asking people responsible for the incidents to leave and then very often the PCSO will escort or walk with those people off the premises… We would rather deal with police officers but there aren't any!"*
> Security company owner

> *"You try to sort it out with your colleagues but if you can't or there are too many, you call the police."*
> Security staff

The assumption was that the police would intervene, establish broadly what had happened and arrest the attacker. In some cases this happened, and

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security staff were happy to hand over the person, and responsibility, to the police. In other cases they felt the police were slow to arrive, which meant they had to spend time continuing to restrain the attacker, to divert resources from elsewhere, and they ran the risk of further incidents.

Security staff and some trainers believed that police officers sometimes assumed that security staff themselves, particularly door staff, are likely to have been the guilty party in any violent incident, and will take the side of the attacker. This seemed especially the case if door supervisors were restraining the person when the police arrived: police officers' first impressions were that door supervisors were the aggressors. This had led some security staff to fear getting into trouble with the police if they intervene in an incident, and allowing incidents to break out and continue rather than step in.

> *"There are situations with floor supervisors who are not getting involved in incidents specifically because they're frightened of losing their licences. They're stepping back not stepping forward."*
> Trainer

5.4 Lack of support for security staff

Feelings about the police among security staff varied, largely by location. In some areas security staff and company owners felt that relations with the local police were good: police officers were present in the night time environment, quick to respond to calls, respected security staff for their work, and broadly supportive of them. However others complained of lack of support from the police: they believed police officers were slow to attend incidents, inclined to blame door supervisors for violence having broken out and reluctant to acknowledge the risks they take.

> *"Unfortunately the police tend to take the view that the door men work on the opposite side to them and want nothing to do with it. It is not uncommon that as soon as an incident happens the first step is to arrest the doormen and blame him without knowing very much about it."*
> Insurer

> *"In London you don't really get police turning up and being helpful. They always seem abrupt and have a moan at you."*
> Security staff

> *"When there is a problem we feel the police aren't as supportive as they could be."*
> Security company owner

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Some venue owners agreed that the police can be slow to arrive at incidents, and complained about this, especially if they did not use door supervisors. A few had experienced police attending incidents at their premises only after repeated calls, and believed that this had put them and their staff in jeopardy.

> *"I mean they [the police] were five minutes away and it took them over an hour and a half. I had to come by and I phoned them about three times I was so angry, but I made sure they still came but it was ridiculous."*
> Restaurant owner

Security staff's unease at lack of police support extended to legal issues. They were aware that if they reacted to violence in a way which prompted a complaint from a member of the public, their licence and their job were at risk. One security company owner complained that the police sometimes try to persuade door supervisors who have been involved in an incident in which a customer was hurt to take the blame and accept a caution rather than dispute what was said to have happened. If the security staff did this they could lose their SIA licence.

> *"Door staff have to justify themselves. If they get one complaint, one arrest, they can lose their badge and that is their jobs."*
> Security staff

> *"If there is an issue at the door or an allegation… it is very easy for a cop to turn round to the staff and go 'Listen, take a warning, a caution...' 'I have a licence.' 'No, no, no it is only a caution.' You get the caution, the lad comes up for renewal and they are refused their licence."*
> Security company owner

More generally security staff, venue managers and their representatives tended to feel that courts sometimes take against security staff. Specifically their impression was that courts take the side of members of the public in cases of violent incidents in or outside venues; and that sentences for violent behaviour are not tough enough to properly reflect the severity of incidents, and do not act as a deterrent to customers who are inclined to become violent. Some of those in other fields supported these perceptions, and believed that security staff, especially door supervisors, warrant more support from the legal system.

> *"It would help if the courts could turn round and protect the doormen instead of blaming them. They just look at the incident when the doorman punched him, they don't look at the events that led up to it."*
> Insurer

"There's been some disquiet from the staff about being let down by the criminal justice system because although the police may deal with it they may give the person a caution and the pub population feel let down, they don't feel the offender has been given the full weight of the law against them."
Pub representative

"What we've found is the judge tends to always side on the injured party, if you are over 6ft 4inches… and there is a person injured – they just kind of blame the door man every time."
Insurer

This point linked to a feeling among some security staff that their role does not have high status in the wider world. Some seemed to feel that among the public there are lingering associations with 'bouncers' of old, who were not regarded with respect or warmth, and that this perception can colour current views of them. Any publicity given to incidents in which a member of the public is injured by security staff, in the night time environment or a public place was believed to reinforce negative impressions of the industry.

6. Recording incidents

- *As had been suggested in the desk research, recording of violent incidents was not done on a consistent or systematic basis*
- *Some security companies logged all incidents; they used the information for future learning and kept it for possible use in court cases*
- *Few others were active in this way, for a variety of reasons, often to do with fear of jeopardising business or jobs*

Recording of violent incidents seemed patchy at best, and there was a strong impression of under-reporting among those most actively involved in the night time economy: the police, venues, and security companies.

Large and compliant (in our view) security companies were assiduous in recording and keeping logs of incidents, for two reasons: to learn how they can reduce the risk to their staff, and to use as evidence if incidents of violence in which a member of the public was hurt went to court. One large security company kept logs of incidents and used them to plan security for future events, based on type of music and audience; and to profile customers to help identify possible perpetrators.

> *"We record everything, all types of incident. We have incident reporting procedures in place, forms they have to fill in. Or if need be just drop a little email at the end of your shift or drop a text and I'll transfer it onto paper. Or some into the office and I'll write it with you. As soon as any physical restraint is done as well I expect them to write a use of force form."*
> Security company owner

> *"It's all an arse covering technique nowadays with all the legislation. If we can prove that what you did was reasonable, necessary, we can appeal as a company or you can as an individual appeal against any allegations made against you."*
> Security company manager

The three police forces we spoke to did not seem to have a consistent, formalised system for recording incidents of violence. All three said they kept some records, but they did not appear to do this on a consistent basis, and

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did not appear to record details of incidents. Information would be kept on whether the incident was one of violence, sexual violence or drunkenness, and figures were broken down by location, for each year.

Among the venue managers and owners we interviewed only a few appeared to keep records of violent incidents. There were a few references to the value of recording the time and place where a violent customer had had their last drink; they thought this would help in policing of venues and possibly in court cases. Otherwise they mentioned some incidents, especially the exceptional, serious events in which someone was injured but did not log all events. This may have been out of fear of jeopardising their licence: the more incidents that happened at a venue or immediately outside, the more likely it was to have its licence reviewed, or at least to attract the attention of the police.

> *"Of course pubs don't like reporting things unless they have to because it's seen as a black mark against them when it comes to possible licensing reviews."*
> Pub representative

> *"We have never ever had to call the police. We have… I mean you often get a wee argy bargy up the stairs but it is always rightly resolved and there has never been anything happened…"*
> [Same respondent, 10 minutes later in the conversation]
> *"You see that hatch there? A guy was just standing there and he had a glass and smashed it into his [barman's] face."*
> Pub manager

Many of those among trainers, academic researchers, the police and security companies noted the absence of data on violent incidents, and regarded this as a significant problem.

> *"There is currently no central repository for recording violent incidents against security officers. No data, no reliable data on frequency or severity."*
> Trainer

Some security staff said they did not report all incidents to their company, or to the police; there seemed to be a number of reasons for this. They feared that reporting incidents could create problems with their employer, who might feel they could not handle the work, and would find someone else to do it. A few said that if they reported incidents this might prompt their colleagues to see them as weak. Some gave the impression that dealing with violence and threats of violence was part of the job, and not worth reporting unless it resulted in injury. On this point there was also a belief among security staff

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that some security companies endorse a culture of putting up with violence and not reporting it.

> *"Door staff get abused, spat at, assaulted. A lot of it doesn't get reported, there's no point, it isn't going to go away… You can go down the route of getting someone arrested. It isn't going anywhere. You are still going to get someone next week who does the same thing. You can't be pressing charges every time"*
> Security staff

> *"One of the blokes came in… and had a bruise under his eye and they said what happened and he said some bloke just wacked me and they said have you reported it and he said oh no it is not worth the report. Friday night I did that and on Saturday I played rugby so it is no big deal."*
> Security staff

> *"A lot of employers in this sector still have a quite macho approach to all this which is in part your role to step in and therefore you should expect to get punched in the face occasionally or kicked."*
> Security staff

Licensing officers received information from their local police force on numbers of violent incidents at different venues, which they used in decisions on reviewing licences. They found this information useful, but acknowledged that it was not always possible to link an incident which took place in the street or an open space to a specific venue: people fighting outside a club might not have been inside, and the venue could not be regarded as responsible.

Among those working in security guarding and retail security an obstacle to reporting incidents was getting the time to do it. The client company did not want time spent on producing reports and this discouraged security staff from reporting incidents unless they regarded them as particularly serious. Linked to this, there was a belief that some of those working in retail and security guarding found it difficult to complete long incident reporting forms; this could inhibit them from recording and reporting incidents.

> *"Most employers when you are dealing with a third party situation so you are providing the guarding services for someone else's premises and they are not going to necessarily going to give you somewhere to sit down and do that. They are not going to give you paper or a laptop to do the reporting with."*
> Security staff

> *"We have members who are not very literate and… they are not necessarily able to go through a large document and give detailed responses."*
> Security staff

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7. Training

- *Attitudes to training among security staff were generally positive*
- *SIA licence training was well regarded in principal, but there were concerns that restraint training is not always adequate, and that some providers are not properly qualified*
- *Most security staff had had training in addition to the minimum required to obtain a SIA licence*
- *Training was more likely among those in the SE and South of England, and those with 10+ years' experience*

7.1 Training generally

Training was regarded as a vital component of security operatives' preparation for working in the industry, and as crucial in raising standards and increasing public confidence in security staff. Though in broad terms training was welcomed, there were a number of reservations about how it is provided.

Trainers and those working in security were well aware that violent incidents can result in members of the public being hurt. If this happened, the reasons tended to be seen as closely linked to a lack of adequate training of security staff. The trainers we interviewed, and some of the security companies and security staff, had several concerns about training in the industry, particularly about the breadth and quality of training.

7.2 SIA licence training

In principal the requirement for security staff to have training in order to get their SIA licence was well regarded: the perception was that it should mean a minimum level of competence among licensed staff. Most of those in our sample with a direct interest in addressing violence believed that the obligation to acquire training in order to get a SIA licence had helped raise standards.

In practice there were a number of qualifications to this generally positive view, especially among trainers and some security companies. They felt that

the requirement to get training to obtain a licence is misused: some security staff and companies assume that getting SIA training means they are now fully trained. Their view was that this is not the case, and that experience is an essential component of acquiring the skills and knowledge to work effectively in security. One of the academics we interviewed believed that the minimum level of training required could lower standards.

> *"I don't believe anybody walks out of an SIA training centre prepared to be complete members of the security industry. A lot of it you pick up on the job."*
> Security staff

> *"If you are training a door supervisor to a certain level and then the licensing criteria come in setting the minimum standards which is below the level that you were training at previously, then what a lot of companies have done is lower their standards to the SIA minimum."*
> Academic researcher

A particular concern about the quality of SIA licence training was physical intervention and restraint training. This was important because it was the area which was most prone to negative consequences: if a violent or troublesome customer was restrained by someone who did not know what they were doing, there was a real risk of injury to the customer, or worse. There seemed to be a tension between trying to defuse violent or potentially violent situations and trying to deal with them as quickly as possible.

> *"You don't want to let it get to that point where you are having to restrain someone. The last thing any door staff will do is put their hands on anyone. If you put your hand on someone you have to justify it. They need to be taught and shown how to de-escalate. You can't just deal with everyone in one way."*
> Security staff

> *"The longer a violent situation goes on the greater the chance there is of harm… Yet we're promoting methods of dealing with, in some cases, extremely violent people, in a softly softly, gentle approach."*
> Trainer

These problems inevitably undermined confidence in training and prompted calls for better regulation of trainers and training. This concern was occasionally echoed by security staff themselves.

> *"I sometimes worry that the [training] companies just provide the training and licensing and they are independent companies and they can just book you out and go and get a licence without you even knowing English."*
> Security staff

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One trainer believed that the SIA allows companies to provide training for accreditation that are not properly qualified and do not train people in the right procedures. They were concerned that the SIA does not monitor training companies, but leaves this to the awarding bodies. Another said that there is no consistency across different training models licensed by the SIA, and that this means security staff learn different methods depending on where they trained. This was especially the case in restraint training.

> *"The SIA licensed a whole range of training models, including different methods of restraint… Ten security staff could be trained in ten different methods… The SIA need to introduce a single system of restraint."*
> Trainer

Several trainers believed that some training providers do not do a proper job, and make money from training that they know is sub-standard. A significant part of this is a lack of quality assurance in training: this is not done, and consequently the quality of training varies widely. Trainers knew of episodes, past and recent, of trainers issuing training certificates to people without providing proper training, and to people who were not suited to the work. Though these had come to light, their view was that there are many other instances of this sort of thing happening.

7.3 Experience of training in addition to SIA licence training among security staff

Most of the security staff we interviewed had received some training over and above the minimum to get their SIA licence. Typically this was in self defence, sometimes martial arts, but in some cases it also covered other topics such as physical restraint, conflict management, first aid, and more specialist topics such as drugs and close protection.

Among security companies and trainers, training in addition to SIA licence training was seen as a key aspect of addressing the problem of violence. Trainers, unsurprisingly, believed that training in the industry was a crucial element in improving standards and in reducing the risk and severity of violence.

Security companies said they provided training for their staff well beyond the legal minimum, and they offered continuing training across a range of topics to keep staff up to date and to broaden their knowledge. One security company gave its staff martial arts training. Another avoided staff with martial

arts skills because it believed this was more likely to provoke or exacerbate trouble than stifle it.

> *"I would love to invest full time and have a training academy and get my own staff through that academy and upskilling them."*
> Security company owner

> *"We have our own internal training about current legislation and requirements, how to hold and restrain people."*
> Security company owner

> *"Professional skills we will largely teach them when they are on the job, whether that be through their mandatory licensing training, bar specific training or vocational training and continual professional development if they are with us longer term."*
> Security company owner

Among security staff who took part in the online survey, 731 answered the question about whether they had received training over and above their SIA licence training. Almost two-thirds (64%) had.



Experience of training in addition to SIA licence-linked training was more prevalent in the South (76%) and London/South East (71%) while those in the Midlands and Scotland were less likely to have had training (56% in both regions). The incidence of training increased with experience: 73% of those with 10 or more years' experience reported getting trained, compared with 55% of those with up to five years' experience.

62% of those in door security had received additional training, 72% of those in event security, 62% of security guards and 66% of those in other sectors.

The 465 respondents in the online survey who had received training were asked to write in brief details of the training. 381 did so and their answers were coded to broad categories which are shown in the table below. The %

figures are based on all respondents answering the question (the 731 who answered the question about training).

There was a wide range of training courses mentioned at this question, some of which were very specific and/or with incomplete details which made coding their category problematic: hence the 23% of 'other' courses. Where we were confident of the type we coded it to one of the generic categories, of which the most common was physical training which one in five respondents had received (18%). Slightly fewer (15%) had received training in medical procedures and fewer again had been trained in interpersonal skills (9%), events training (5%) or drugs (1%).

Type of training	Number	% age
Physical training	130	18%
Medical training	107	15%
Interpersonal training	68	9%
Events training	35	5%
Drugs training	9	1%
Other training	166	23%

7.4 The need for more training

The general view among trainers and security staff was that most security staff do not receive sufficient training beyond their licence training, and that they do not get the scope of training that is really needed to do security work well, especially door supervision but also other types of security work.

Trainers believed that for security staff, especially door staff, the minimum training to get a SIA licence is not enough, and that they need a wider range of skills than the current training gives them. Physical intervention, conflict management training, and knowledge of the law were useful, but there were other types of training that were also important and that trainers believed should be given more emphasis in SIA licence training. Some security companies echoed this view.

Skills they felt should be covered in greater depth were:

- awareness of the likelihood of an incident starting, based on reading of attitude, body language, numbers – the entire situation and setting

- communication skills specifically designed to de-escalate difficult and potentially violent situations
- ways of restraining a violent customer with minimal risk to their (customer's) safety
- first aid, including defibrillation training
- violence risk assessment, so door supervisors and venues are prepared in advance for the possibility of violence

> *"We do that kind of training where we'll put the guys in a situation and do role play stuff and basically get de-escalation training."*
> Security company manager

> *"We don't actively recruit a certain skill set, we recruit a certain sort of person who is personable, well spoken, good communication skills, calm, flexible, friendly and that are nice people."*
> Security company owner

> *"Communication is the most central part of security really. Communications skills are the most central tool. So more needs to be done to improve that area."*
> Security staff

There was also a belief that training is not renewed often enough and is easily forgotten, especially by young and inexperienced security staff. Trainers and older security staff felt that if a violent incident takes place it is easy for young door supervisors to react instinctively and forget what they have learned.

Linked to this, trainers and security companies both believed that security staff were liable to forget what they had learned in their training within a few months if they had not had to put it to use. The fact that there is no requirement for training to be continued apart from at the point of licence renewal was queried: there was no obligation for security staff to develop their abilities and skills.

> *"The PI programme has been around for four and a half years and it's a good programme, it's better than nothing, but because it's down to the companies to continue the development of their staff physically it's almost a token gesture."*
> Security company owner

> *"I think they need to start from the bottom up and make the exams more difficult. I think it needs to be longer."*
> Security company manager

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Two security staff we interviewed in Manchester had taken part in Project Griffin training, on counter-terrorism measures. Both worked in security guarding of public places.

7.5 Quality of non-licence linked training

Perceptions of the quality of training for security staff that was done in addition to SAI licence training were mixed. Generally security staff in the qualitative sample believed that their training had been helpful. This was echoed in the online survey findings. Of the 462 who had received non-licence linked training, 68% felt their training had been helpful or very helpful, and 17% believed it had not been unhelpful or very unhelpful.



7.6 Training for bar staff

Some venue owners offered training for their bar staff. This appeared to be fairly basic, but gave some instructions on how to respond to the threat of trouble.

> *"Everyone gets to complete a training thing on line before they start which does cover some stuff to do with safety at work. The main thing we cover is if you feel unsafe then just call the police straightaway. If you are ever uncomfortable even talking to a customer then just walk away and get the manager."*
> Pub manager

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A few trainers wanted this extended and felt bar staff should be trained better in how to deal with intoxicated customers. They believed bar staff needed training in…

- identifying people at risky levels of intoxication
- knowing the right sort of language to use in response to them
- knowing when to ask for help from door staff

> *"It's just about finding the right approach that provides that suitable awareness, but also training around service refusal and giving staff the tools to feel that they are safe in doing so."*
> Trainer

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8. The role of the SIA

- *Overall perceptions of the SIA were positive*
- *The general feeling was that it has professionalised the security industry and improved its standing*
- *There was applause for the ACS among those who knew of it*
- *SIA licensing was largely welcomed, though there were some concerns that it is a blunt instrument and does not address all the problems of the industry*

8.1 Awareness and perceptions of the SIA

Knowledge of the SIA was universal among security companies and staff, the police, partners and representative bodies, and trainers and academics in the field. Many venue owners and managers knew of the SIA, but it was not known among some venues that did not use security staff, particularly those that did not run licensed premises.

Overall impressions of the SIA were largely positive: most saw it as a force for good, and as having played a part in improving standards in the security industry. The single best known aspect of the SIA's work was its licensing of security staff; this was believed to have played a major part in improving the quality and standing of security staff, particularly door supervisors. Alongside this the SIA was believed to have a degree of expertise in security matters which made it well qualified to offer advice and guidance to interested parties.

> *"I think that they're doing a very difficult job very well. They regulate it well. They run the schemes well. They remove licences from people, investigate issues and incidents well."*
> Lawyer

> *"[The SIA could] work together [with local authorities] and think of improvements and training that they think may be valuable and then we could make it a condition that we employ that particular training. So… they could perhaps… look at working with local authorities more closely on what our requirements are."*
> Licensing officer

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The Approved Contractor Scheme was less well known than licensing, but was believed by some in the industry and among the police and trainers to have helped raise standards. Several trainers and others noted that it is a voluntary scheme, and that it is most effective among security companies who are already conscientious and convinced of the need to manage their work with integrity. Given this, they were not sure that it addressed problems at the other end of the spectrum – the security companies which did not have high standards.

The police view of the SIA was generally positive. The police officers we spoke to believed that it has a significant role in increasing perceptions of the professionalism of the industry, by promoting the value of good quality training, circulating good practice, and mentoring security staff.

Less positively one senior police officer felt that the SIA is not sufficiently proactive in its work. He believed that it does not take action to revoke licences of door staff who appear to be acting unprofessionally. A police force might recommend that a door supervisor loses his licence and let the SIA know, but the SIA would not take the action required. Similarly he believed the SIA does not do much in terms of inspections and enforcement around licences, and wanted it to do more.

> *"I would like them to come out and do more proactive inspections and enforcements around licenses. I would like them to go round and look at companies and provide feedback to us as we get very very little. We put an awful lot into the SIA in terms of disclosures and information exchange and we get nothing back really."*
> *"You have officers who are titled Head of Investigation and Enforcement and I am like well ok do some investigation and enforcement then."*
> Senior police officer

This concern was reflected in the views of some of those who worked in security and in venues, who felt that the SIA does not have a strong presence in the industry, probably because it lacks the resources. They wanted the SIA to be more proactive in informing venue owners/managers and event organisers about the value and benefits of high quality security, provided by professional companies.

> *"They would say that they are very interested in what goes on but in all likelihood they do not have the resources to lead and they have very little resource to inspect and to intervene when the laws have been broken… I think that the SIA if they wanted to make a real change would be better to address their resources in informing the client base of the value of proper well regulated, efficient and*

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reputable security firms rather than simply going for whatever the cheapest option is."
Security company owner

8.2 Licensing of door staff

In the qualitative sample there was a general feeling among those who were familiar with it that the SIA's licensing of door staff has been a good thing. Security company owners and staff, the police, trainers and some venue owners believed that the industry is more professional and works to higher standards than in the past, and attributed this largely to the requirement for staff to be SIA licensed.

Specifically they felt that SIA licensing has...

- raised standards by requiring licensed staff to train
- weeded out many unsuitable people among door staff
- reduced the prevalence and influence of organised crime in the industry
- helped to reduce violence by including conflict management in training

"The regulator has made things better, no argument there."
Trainer

"It's been fantastic and it has got rid of a lot of the scum."
Security company manager

"The SIA have had a very positive impact on the market in making it more professional and safer and getting a better calibre of door staff, and door staff that realise that if they put a foot out of place they'll lose the badge and if they lose the badge they can't work."
Lawyer

"There was a big problem with door staff actually running the premises for their own ends. Drug dealing and money laundering and stuff. It was very difficult for managers to try and control their own premises because they were subverting it. I don't think that's such a big issue these days."
Pub representative

"The SIA are particularly good in requiring, as part of the licence qualification, a certain amount of training in communication skills."
Lawyer

"I think [what has happened is] it's the role of the door supervisor getting more professional. Getting out of the old bouncer type mentality."
Lawyer

"The attitude is incredibly changed. In the old language of the bouncer it was fists first and mouths probably never. Now you see some very good examples of taking it very seriously."
Lawyer

"I think over the years it has and especially now we have got the SIA and the fact that door staff are regulated."
Police officer

"Door staff have got a lot better than they used to be. They are more switched on and modern professionals as opposed to people employed for bulk and size which has been good to see."
Police officer

Security company owners, as might have been expected, believed that the industry now has greater integrity and that they and others offer an organised and well planned service. Part of this was security staff, particularly door supervisors working in the night time economy, becoming more customer-service orientated, to the extent that their role has shifted and broadened: their role now is not simply security but one of welcoming customers. This fitted with the approach they took of trying to set a positive tone at the door.

"I won't stand for us being the baddies. We have to be very restrained and very professional in what we do."
Security company owner

"We've got our approved contractor scheme as well. That's a massive thing for a small company like us… I don't think there's enough pressure put on companies to get it."
Security company manager

"The doormen have changed and they are not bouncers any more are they? They have taken on a customer service role basically."
Police officer

Police officers working in the night time economy felt that door staff are generally more professional and conscientious than they used to be, but there is some way to go. One believed that the SIA has a role in enhancing professionalism in the industry, and in sharing best practice in this area.

"I think the role of door staff has definitely changed in that they are much more professional and more likely to get involved in stopping incidents from escalating, whereas previously quite often the scenario used to be for your entire bar staff, bouncers, piling in."
Senior police officer

"Quality of door staff I would say generally have improved there are some really really good professional operators out there and they do a damn good job in difficult circumstances. Those at the bottom end of the market are probably fewer and fewer."
Senior police officer

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> *"I think the SIA have a role around the ongoing professionalism of the door staff and I think they have a responsibility to share and promote good practice in being a door person and I think it is more than just a licensing regulatory role I think it is more of a professionalism. If they were to be a professional body of door staff that would be a different place to be."*
> Senior police officer

Less positively it was also said that licensing did not guarantee good quality, well trained security staff; attention focused on whether door supervisors have SIA badges, not on how well trained they are. Linked to this one trainer believed that people with criminal records could still run security businesses, even they did not do security work directly; this meant a criminal element could stay in the industry.

> *"We have people who are licence holders but they've either gained their licence illegitimately, by cheating on their exams or they didn't do a full course or whatever, or they're not following the code of conduct when they do hold a licence."*
> Security company owner

> *"Because the SIA provides a badge, all people are interested in is checking that people have got a badge."*
> Trainer

> *"I've had a few occasions when I've had new doormen start and they've never been a doorman anywhere and they've really not been that capable and I've had to do my own training with them. So I don't know how thorough the [SIA] training is. I don't know how well it prepares them in reality when you are on your own on a door."*
> Club manager

A few security staff believed that SIA badges could provoke customers and prompt them to try to get door supervisors into trouble, in the knowledge that if door supervisors reacted badly they might lose their licence.

One trainer believed that licensing criteria were too much of a blunt instrument. Since the criteria apparently meant that anyone with a criminal record was unable to get a licence, effectively excluded some good, experienced staff from the industry because they had criminal records. He felt this was a loss to the industry which was hard to mitigate.

A few security staff felt that SIA licence training tends to be done by trainers with little or no experience of working in the industry and who do not really understand the reality of dealing with someone who is aggressive and becoming violent. They wanted more trainers with hands-on experience.

> *[Training is done by] people who have a teaching degree or whatever but they have never actually worked in security. You need to have it*

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done by people who are telling you what it is really like on the door. Not just a little sugar coated version."
Security staff

There were occasional complaints from some security company owners and staff about the cost of getting an SIA licence, but these were not strongly expressed. It may be that the price helps to discourage those who would not be suited to working in security, though it may also be that some of these find security work anyway, licence or no licence.

In the online survey respondents were asked for their views of the effects of SIA licensing on the industry. 719 answered this question. They were offered a list of options was presented of which more than one could be selected:

It has made no difference in any way
It has helped weed out those offering a poor service
It has helped reduce violence
It has given security staff more confidence
It has improved quality in the industry

47% felt that SIA licensing had made no difference in any way. Over half felt licensing has had a positive impact, primarily in improving quality in the industry. 42% agreed that licensing had helped weed out those offering a poor service and a 33% agreed it had improved quality generally. 13% agreed that licensing had helped reduce violence towards security staff.



Those working in door security were less positive about the impact of regulation: 54% of those doing door supervisor work thought it had had no impact, compared with 37% of those in event security, 41% of those in other types of security work.

8.2.1 *Lingering concerns about standards in the industry*

Though the overall view was that SIA licensing has raised standards in the industry, there was also a perception among those in the qualitative sample that it still has less professional elements, particularly in smaller security companies.

Specific concerns were that some security businesses…

- operate without written agreements with venue owners/managers
- pay staff in cash, often at low rates
- use staff without SIA licences
- provide no training
- offer no support if staff get hurt in their work
- close down and re-open under a different name at short notice
- employ people from other countries who will work for low rates of pay but who have poor English

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"There are problems around language. A lot of the people working in the industry now are Eastern European and I don't know if that is causing a problem, the language, different attitudes."
Insurer

"We have loads of foreign people working for us and all our guys are able to read, write, talk etc, but we have had guys come through that can't actually speak English. I'm like "How did you do your licence? How are you going to communicate with people on a door?"
Security company manager Scotland

"The other problem we have in the door industry, companies go bust and get set up the next day with another name. There is no continuity across the whole security industry it is a big problem."
Insurer

"At the moment anyone can run a security firm. There is nothing that can be done about it."
Security company owner

Underlying this was the fact that door work is not an appealing option for many people. Some will do it because they are attracted by the nature of the work, or by the option to do it on a casual basis when it suits, but most people will not consider it. This meant that it attracts a population who are transient in relation to work, and possibly in other respects. A few security staff made clear that they did not enjoy the work and were looking to leave it for something less risky.

"It is not a career. They have to work long, unsociable hours to earn a decent wage. The sort of person who gets attracted into it has to be transient workers."
Insurer

"I think 'do I really need this?'… You start to get fed up of the abuse. The longer you are in it then you start to think 'is this what I really want to do?'."
Security staff

"I think the difficulty is you don't get too many professional doormen, door supervisors and by that I mean it is not their main career they sort of have day jobs and they come in at the weekend and do a bit of door supervision."
Senior police officer

More seriously most security staff and managers believed that there are unlawful elements still operating in the industry, especially in door supervising: companies that have links to organised crime and operate protection businesses or drugs; and individual door supervisors who join the industry and get a licence so they can get into fights.

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Q. POSSIBLE MEASURES TO REDUCE VIOLENCE

- *Security staff and to a lesser extent other sectors of the sample felt that more measures could be made available to them to help deal with violence*

- *The main measures suggested by security staff were:*
  - *better training for security staff*
  - *more security staff at venues*
  - *better communication between venues and security staff*
  - *breathalysers*
  - *ID scanning*
  - *headcams*

We asked respondents in the qualitative sample and those responding to the online survey for ideas on how violence could be addressed and reduced.

In the qualitative research many suggestions were made by security staff themselves but also by others, including police officers, for hardware and clothing of various types to be made available to venues and door staff.

The use of **breathalysers** by door staff at venues was quite widely known, though few had experience of it. The idea was generally well regarded, and was believed to have the potential to mitigate the effects of pre-loading. If door supervisors could identify someone who was already intoxicated and prevent them coming in, they could reduce the risk of violence. This had been trialled by Norfolk Police, one of the areas where we interviewed a senior officer. His view on it was largely positive: it worked well to get across to people in a non-confrontational way that they had had too much to drink, and had apparently been well received by door supervisors.

> *"That has been universally fed back by door supervisors and premises as something that works really well in just reducing conflict and then people think well actually I have had too much to drink and now it is time to go home and so I always think having access to something like that is really good."*
> Senior police officer

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Against this, there were some concerns among security staff who had not used breathalysers that they would need guidance on how to use them and how to persuade customers to be compliant with them. Some also felt breathalysers were a blunt instrument, given that alcohol affects people in different ways; and that they might not effectively deter pre-loading.

ID scanning had been introduced in a few venues and was apparently successful in identifying people known for causing problems in the past or elsewhere. Against this there were some concerns about data protection if customer details were being kept and used by venues.

> *"It seems to be something which people seem to accept - hand over their ID and it is scanned and checked and verified and you can see whether that person has been problematic elsewhere. When you give door supervisors an extra tool to help them and it is not done as an enforcement tool then they are keen to do it. "*
> Senior police officer

> *"The issue is the data and who is responsible for that data. The data protection act – you have to put notices around machines and say you won't get in if you don't let us scan your ID but be aware that this information can be retained on the system. Whether people are really aware of that when they go into nightclubs at midnight and then what happens to that data and who controls it?"*
> Drinks industry representative

There was one suggestion from a police officer for door staff to wear **hi-viz jackets**, to bring them closer to the police in appearance, and get away from the traditional door supervisor look of all black.

> *"I am a big fan of yellow jackets for door supervisors… I think the traditional look of dressed all in black… comes across as being quite aggressive and surly whereas a high viz jacket makes a door supervisor appear more part of that extended police family and a person of responsibility."*
> Senior police officer

A number of ideas were put forward by security staff, especially door supervisors, as means of reducing violence, but were rejected by the police and some venues and others, largely because they were expected to worsen violent incidents. These were as follows.

The use of **dye sprays** as a way of identifying violent customers after the event was largely rejected. In principle it was seen as likely to help in tracing perpetrators, but this benefit was undermined by probable difficulties caused by spraying people; there could be a health and safety problem with it, or claims against door supervisors for damage to clothes.

> *"If you are dealing with somebody and you get out and spray them they are not going to be particularly happy about that and that might escalate the situation."*
> Senior police officer

The idea of **hand cuffs** was widely liked by door staff as an effective means of restraining violent customers. They also perhaps offered door staff a feeling of greater power in violent situations. Elsewhere, particularly among police officers, they were not thought appropriate, because there was a risk that they would be used too readily and too roughly, and might be abused.

> *"If you ask the door industry what they think of handcuffs, they think they are a great idea. They instantly enable you to restrain someone, particularly where you've got a situation where you have ten unruly people and three door men. It does help immobilise people quickly. Problem is the insurance industry doesn't like them because it is said to be assault the moment you use them."*
> Insurer

> *"I think that presents all the wrong image."*
> Senior police officer

Door supervisors said they would like **batons** and **pepper spray** to help defend themselves against the more aggressive customers. These ideas were strongly rejected by others, particularly the police, as likely to be dangerous, and almost certain to exacerbate problems. Weapons might be misused, and would conflict with aims to project door staff as friendly, welcoming, and keen to avoid physical confrontation.

> *"No! I wouldn't trust most police officers with pepper spray [let alone door staff]!"*
> Senior police officer

> *"I think you would have to be very careful with that. As I say I think their role is more a preventative role rather than actually getting involved. You are looking at a police role there I think."*
> Licensing officer

A few door supervisors suggested that they should be provided with **stab vests** worn by door supervisors. There was little enthusiasm for this, mainly on the grounds that they were not needed and that if they were visible they would be off-putting to customers.

Security staff in sectors outside the night time economy did not pick out measures that would be especially relevant to them. It seemed likely that certain pieces of equipment such as breathalysers would probably be of less use. The impression was that they were less concerned about kit and more interested in training and support: more support from the premises where they

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worked (especially in retail, public places, static guarding) in using their physical intervention skills and learning to deal with violence; and more training and guidance in self defence to improve their skills in this area. There were also requests for more support following an incident, especially in static guarding and guarding of cash and valuables in transit, where violence could be particularly severe.

In the online survey, respondents were given a list of possible answers to this question, and were also invited to write in other suggestions, responses which we subsequently categorised (in brackets). 709 respondents answered.

Type of measure	Number	% age
Better training for security staff	496	70%
More security staff team at venues	465	66%
Better communication from venues to security staff	416	59%
Headcams for security staff	384	54%
Better guidance for security staff	347	49%
ID scanning for security staff to use on customers	321	45%
Breathalysers for security staff to use on customers	206	29%
Changes to layout of venues	141	20%
More support from police	39	6%
Self defence equipment for door staff	32	5%
Protection gear for door staff	23	3%
More legal rights for door staff	22	3%
Better vetting/selection of security staff	22	3%
Tougher sentences for violent attacks	15	2%
Body cams	14	2%
Ban one man doors	10	1%
Radios for all door staff	4	1%
Other	50	7%

Of the answers given, better training was thought worthwhile by 70%, followed by more security staff (66%), better communication between venues and security staff (59%) and headcams (54%). Almost half (49%) thought better guidance for security staff would help and a similar proportion (45%) were in favour of ID scanning that security staff could use on customers. 29% suggested the provision of breathalysers and 20% changes to the layout of venues.

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These responses varied by sector:

- among those working in door security there was strongest support for better training for security staff (62%), better communication from venue to security staff (56%), more security staff at venues (77%), headcams (52%) and ID scanning (55%)
- those working in event security most strongly supported better training (76%), better communication from venues to staff (73%), more security staff at venues (67%), better guidance for security staff (54%) and headcams (61%)
- people working in security guarding most wanted better training (71%), better communication from venue to security staff (58%), more security staff at venues (52%), better guidance for security staff (56%) and headcams (56%)
- in other sectors there was strongest support for better training (79%), better communication from venues to security staff (57%), more security staff at venues (55%), better guidance for security staff (56%), and headcams (54%)

IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

R. CONCLUSIONS

1. The landscape

The background to violence in the night time economy, and in the wider economy, is multi-faceted. There are a number of factors which converge to generate it, based on the relationships between the key parties: members of the public, those who run the venues, security staff and the police. In the night time economy alone, it is also based on the way people approach leisure and recreation.

There is much talk of changing attitudes and behaviour among the general public, especially in relation to alcohol consumption and alcohol pricing, and social culture, but there are a number of constant factors which will make this difficult to achieve:

- venues want customers spending money and up to a point want customers drinking; they need to make a profit
- security companies want to be needed: they want the business
- local authorities want customers bringing money into their town centres and city centres
- there appears to be a diminished deference to authority, more willingness to commit violence, and a greater tolerance of extreme drunkenness than in the past

Barring a sea-change in attitudes and behaviour among the general public or in government policy, there will always be a propensity for alcohol-driven violence among a minority. The existence of these constants means that efforts by the SIA and all the stakeholders involved to address the problems of violence are constrained, and have to be made within certain parameters.

Money is an important feature of the landscape. Venues do not want to pay more than they have to for door staff, so security companies quote low figures to get their business; this means many of them pay door staff low wages – often minimum wage level; and they do not offer staff any training on an ongoing basis. Funding for measures and tools to address the problems of violence is not always easy to find for local authorities and police forces.

A number of issues need to be considered in identifying steps that would help to reduce or prevent violence come forward from the literature. Some of these involve tactical measures or steps that the SIA could implement around the way in which security staff work. Others are more strategic and lay the ground for future learning and partnerships.

2. Issues to consider

2.1 Taking account of the broader context in which violence occurs

There are calls in the literature and among some of the partner bodies, trainers and police for a consideration of the entire context in which violence occurs, so that interventions take place, not just in terms of how individual staff members respond but at an organisational level. This is to ensure that the *potential* for violence to occur is minimised, and that staff feel supported by management in their response to any incident. Such an approach is supported by evidence from healthcare where a whole systems approach has helped to manage and reduce violent incidents.

Using the legislation available effectively and consistently is a key element in this approach.

2.2 Training

There is evidence to suggest that the SIA endorsed training for security staff has some weaknesses. It is clear from the literature and from trainers and some in the industry that more needs to be done to ensure that any training is fit for purpose. In order to achieve this, evidence of the incidents that security staff are facing and the response measures that are most effective is required (see further discussion below about the importance of gathering better data in this area).

2.3 Technology

There is some initial evidence to suggest that introducing equipment such as body cameras for security staff can have a positive impact on incidents of violence. Trials have been conducted in Lancashire and Northamptonshire and further feedback from these sources may be worth pursuing in order to understand in detail the effect of this technology.

Similarly, reports of the introduction of breathalysers for use by door supervisors, and experience of this where it has been trialled, suggest that there may be value in this technology being available for door staff. Again this appears to be early days, and this may be an area where the SIA would benefit from gathering more detailed evidence-based feedback.

2.4 Multi-agency working

Across the literature – including policy/practical-based reports, as well as theoretical papers – and in the interviews we did with many stakeholders, the benefits of multi-agency working are strongly put forward. Ensuring the various stakeholders work together effectively is seen as the best way of achieving joined up thinking around the management of town centres at night – both in terms of tackling problems and in thinking about how the environment is developed in the future.

Part of this is getting all stakeholders to accept the need to act. In particular there appears to be a need to encourage venue owners, particularly those operating in the night time economy, to acknowledge the gravity of the problem: a common tendency seems to be minimise the risk.

There is a possible opportunity for the SIA to be seen to be taking the lead in encouraging the formation of such partnerships in any area where violence in licensed and retail premises appears to be problematic, and in ensuring that the security industry has a presence in these groups.

Potentially there is an enhanced role for security staff in seeing themselves as part of a broader team which is committed to ensuring the safety of the public. If they were received training in directing people to the right bus stop, deterring cab touts and in ensuring minicab operators are working legally, this would be beneficial. Anecdotal evidence from the qualitative interviews supports this. In some areas a radio communications network has been introduced between the key players, and again it would make sense for door staff to be part of any such network.

Pubwatch is seen as a valuable initiative in providing venue owners with a channel through which they can air their concerns and in giving them the opportunity to be part of this multi-agency approach. Supporting and working closely with Pubwatch representatives would help in keeping channels of communication open between stakeholders.

It is worth pointing out that the literature in this area tends to focus on the night time economy. Partnerships for retail environments are less frequently mentioned, and this may be worth further consideration on the part of the SIA.

ShopWatch is mentioned as a potentially effective initiative and, given that Pubwatch is deemed a success, ensuring a strong voice is available for retail premises may be something that the SIA wants to explore and give further support to.

2.5 Representing the security industry to other key stakeholders

There is evidence that security staff feel sidelined in strategies to deal with violence, mis-represented and as though, at times, the odds are stacked against them.

Potentially there is a need for the SIA to do even more to represent the industry positively as a whole. If it were able to put forward the perspective of security staff to other key stakeholders and to work with those stakeholders in establishing open and productive channels of communication between security staff and others working in retail and licensed premises, this would be valuable.

It would be beneficial for the SIA to continue to work closely with police partners at a local level to ensure a high level of co-operation between security staff and police, so that their actions are co-ordinated and mutually supportive. Encouragingly, the literature suggests that, from a policing perspective, the value of fostering close relationships with security companies is recognised.

2.6 Working with businesses and venues

The literature, in particular the learning coming forward from the HSE, and the qualitative interviewing with members of the security industry and partners, suggests that the SIA could have a stronger role in helping retail premises and licensed venues work successfully with any security staff they employ.

It may also be valuable for the SIA to set out some basic guidelines for licensed premises in particular, about steps that venues can take themselves to reduce violence. It may also be worth highlighting to venues that crime figures indicate that more incidents of violence occur after 11pm, and to encourage them to plan for this in terms of resources and personnel.

It is worth bearing in mind that, according to the HSE, SMEs can be a particularly hard audience to reach with regards to violence prevention information and interventions, not only because of their lack of time and resources, but also because channels for dissemination of information are problematic, and because, attitudinally, SMEs may have a fatalistic attitude to the problem of work-related violence and crime.

The research has also indicated that the unions do have an interest in this area. GMB in particular is mounting a Safeguard Campaign which is intended to highlight the violence faced by security staff. Indications are that it would be worth consulting with, and including, the unions in any work going forward.

2.7 Need for reliable evidence/data

It is clear both from the literature and from the qualitative research that evidence and data are important in understanding violence and its impact on security staff, and on designing both effective interventions and appropriate training. Currently, as this study has discovered, there is a paucity of data around this issue. There is also a lack of available evidence around the effectiveness of interventions and their impact on reducing violence.

There is no means of recording the experiences of security staff except by gathering data piecemeal from the security companies which capture it for their own purposes. Building up a nationwide picture of the types and frequency of violence experienced, the range of responses and the effectiveness of interventions would be a significant step in greater understanding of this issue.

A comprehensive, longitudinal study of experiences is really necessary and would provide an evidence base for:

- measuring the impact of any interventions
- devising training tailored to the actual needs of security staff in terms of the types of violence they experience
- providing learning/case studies that can be shared across the industry.

If the Health and Safety at Work legislation were to be applied more consistently (see below), then this could help to build a national database of experiences and interventions.

However, in the shorter term, it may be more effective to ensure that other sources of evidence are accessed in an ongoing way to help build a picture of the experiences and incidences of violence across the country. In particular, the data that is meant to be collected from A&E departments as part of the Information Sharing to Tackle Violence initiative seems likely to be valuable, given the experience of this kind of information sharing in Cardiff.

There has been slow progress on this initiative so far, but with a fresh impetus by the HSCIC from September 2014, progress may now be more encouraging. This may be an area where the SIA could focus attention, both in pressing for greater effectiveness of this initiative, and in working with Community Safety Partnerships who receive this information, to work through the implications for licensed and retail premises in general and for security staff in particular.

Additionally, the new definition of business crime agreed between ACPO and NCBF to ensure that police forces can accurately record business crime may provide a useful source of information on violence in licensed and retail premises and is certainly worth investigating further once this change in police recording comes into effect.

2.8 Consistent application of the Health and Safety at Work legislation

The literature suggests that Health and Safety at Work legislation (the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) could be working harder to encourage venues, retail premises and security companies themselves to take the threat of violence against staff, including security staff, more seriously. Under the Act an employer has an obligation to ensure that any potential risk of violence is eliminated or controlled, which involves carrying out a 5 step risk assessment.

It may be that there is a role here for the SIA to work with partners such as the HSE to press for this legislation to be applied more consistently and effectively and to ensure that security staff are included in risk assessments and in any resulting steps taken to reduce violence.

It is worth noting that focusing on the legal responsibilities of managers under health and safety legislation moves the focus away from violence being a crime and security issue to it being a health and safety issue. Thinking about workplace violence in terms of it being a preventable hazard allows employers to develop practical and effective strategies to protect their employees.

Any steps in this direction need to bear in mind the learning from the HSE around why violence in workplace settings is under-reported, including:

- acceptance of a culture of aggression: there is a need to challenge what is acceptable in the workplace, and to ensure that staff understand that no level of violence is acceptable; in order to be effective, any violence reduction strategy needs to be supported by workplace management so that a blame free approach can be guaranteed
- fear of being perceived as incompetent and unable to deal with the job
- lack of reporting procedures or time-consuming reporting procedures

2.9 Violence in other sectors

This research focused much less on violence in other sectors than the night time economy, and cannot be as conclusive about them. However there are similarities in the sorts violent incidents experienced in other sectors, particularly in public places such as Jobcentre Plus offices, in hospitals, hotels and retail.

These environments are of course different from the night time environment in a number of ways, and perpetrators tend to be from a wider range of the population, but there are some parallels:

- perpetrators need to be restrained and prevented from committing further violence
- in some cases perpetrators have to be detained until police officers arrive
- alcohol is sometimes a causal factor
- security staff need to be careful in how they go about detaining and restraining people who become violent.

Given this, some of the measures that work to address violence in the night time economy can be relevant in these other sectors, and are worth considering on a wider basis.

In some settings, particularly public places such as hospitals and Jobcentre Plus offices, management of members of the public who are using services is an important element in reducing violence. If service users feel better informed about their situation and about decisions taken about them, they are likely to feel less resentful and less inclined to become angry and violent.

Experience of violence among security staff guarding premises and property appears to be less frequent than in other sectors, but potentially more serious, and more likely to result in injury. This may be because it is more often planned and there is a secondary intent – an attempt to steal from or damage a property.

3. Monitoring the situation in the future

It is worth flagging up sources of data on violence that the SIA might want to reference in the future to keep track of how the situation is changing:

- Crime Survey for England and Wales: annual survey
  - incidents of violence, including time of day/day of the week, and location (in or around a pub or club)
  - incidents of violence where alcohol has been a factor
  - incidents of violence at work
- Police Recorded Offences
  - incidents can be flagged as alcohol-related, although this may be inconsistently applied across police forces
  - meant to be available for each force (not able to access here)
- Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC)
  - inpatient admissions to hospital in England for a cause code of assault available by CCG area, including numbers occurring at the weekend, and age group of the patient
- Information Sharing to Tackle Violence (ISTV)
  - intended to collect data from major NHS A&E departments in England about attendances involving violent crime (see above)

S. RECOMMENDATIONS: ACTION POINTS

1. Disseminating and encouraging best practice

There is clearly good practice going on in some areas and in some sectors, but there is much scope to spread it. There needs to be…

- a system for consistent recording of violent incidents, ideally bringing together information from police forces, A&E departments, venues and security companies
- a best practice guide for security companies, encompassing training, risk management, event/venue planning and recording of incidents
- more involvement in local forums, as spelled out below

2. Involvement of all parties

To a large extent this seems to happen, but there should be more joined up working, including communication and meetings involving…

- local authority representatives in:
  - licensing
  - planning (with reference to optimal numbers of licensed premises, temporary pedestrianisation and adaptations to the street layout)
  - street maintenance and public realm design (including lighting and CCTV)
- other public stakeholders: the police; health authorities; probation service; youth offending teams; drug and alcohol teams; local residents; transport authorities
- Pubwatch representatives; street pastors, street marshals/wardens
- venue owners and managers
- security company owners/managers and security staff, including door supervisors
- local/regional SIA representatives

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3. **Better relationships between security staff and other parties**

Currently relationships between security staff and venue owners/managers and the police are variable in quality. There should be…

- greater recognition of the value of door staff from venue and property owners
- better and more consistent support for security staff from the police when called to an incident, particularly in the night time economy
- stronger discouragement of one-man doors on premises in the night time economy

4. **The physical environment and infrastructure**

There appears to be less to do in this field than others, but the following should be considered…

- auditing of city and town centres to assess the effectiveness and reach of CCTV
- extending the scope of CCTV in public places and inside venues
- making unseen areas near venues more visible to CCTV, to reduce the risk of hidden incidents involving those ejected or refused entrance
- extending transport management initiatives:
  - more taxi marshalling
  - bus marshals and escorts

5. **Planning and risk assessment**

Venue and property owners/managers need to be prompted to…

- carry out proper risk assessment for their premises, both for ongoing use and for one-off events
- take the advice of security companies on numbers of security staff required, and their deployment in and around the venue
- plan their staffing of venues on a routine, systematic basis

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6. Management of premises and security staff

Improving standards of management in licensed premises in the night time economy is important. Owners/managers need to ensure that they…

- keep premises clean and tidy all the time
- limit crowding, by capping numbers at peak times and by creating sufficient space inside
- deal quickly with any abusive or threatening behaviour which might lead to violence
- minimise customer frustration by allowing customers to move around easily, exit quickly and order drinks easily
- minimise drinks promotions, or plan adequately for when there are promotions
- use alternatives to glass
- manage and control outside smoking space and entry/exit points, including use of CCTV

If it is not done already, employers should…

- clarify security staff's roles
- provide support and feedback for security officers
- carry out risk assessments (as above) and measures to protect security staff from violence
- foster communication and co-operation between security staff and other employees

Managers and owners of premises need to be encouraged to be better informed about health and safety at work laws, to pay more attention to them, and to enforce these firmly and consistently.

7. **Management of retail premises**

In retail premises, steps to reduce violence need to be taken:

- ensure good visibility, including into and out of premises, as well as around the store itself
- locate cash tills near entrances so that staff can see customers entering and leaving
- create good customer flow inside the premises

8. **Management of public places**

The SIA should communicate to the bodies responsible for public places, such as DWP, NHS, local authorities, the value of better security management, and specifically…

- better communication to service users about what they can expect, to reduce the risk of people becoming resentful and angry at point of use of services
- better communication to security staff about the risks presented by certain types of service user, if this is feasible
- clarification to security staff of exactly what they are expected and permitted to do when dealing with violent service users

9. **Equipment**

More equipment needs to be available:

- body cameras for door supervisors – to record exactly what happened and what was said during an incident, provide evidence in court, and deter and calm would-be perpetrators
- breathalysers for use by door supervisors
- ID scanning at doors, using fingerprints or ID documents was welcomed in principal by some, particularly door staff
- radios linking door supervisors with other venues and the police

This sort of equipment will need funding. Venues will need encouraging to pay for breathalysers and ID scanning kit, but if any initial funding can be made available by local authorities that would be valuable. Body cameras are more the responsibility of security companies.

10. **Recording and reporting incidents**

All parties directly involved in dealing with violence need to take a more consistent approach to recording and reporting violent incidents – venues/premises, security companies and the police. Recording of incidents should cover, for each incident:

- date, time and place of the incident
- brief account of what happened – what prompted it, how security staff responded, number of people involved
- any injuries suffered by any party and whether any medical treatment was needed
- whether the police were called and if so, what action they took
- what the outcome was, eg arrests, ejections

Incidents need to be reported to those at higher level: security company managers/owners, venue/premises owners, police forces.

11. **Training**

Training of security staff needs to improve and the following measures should be implemented:

- greater consistency of training across providers, in content of courses and measures taught to security staff
- evaluation of training, ideally by the SIA, or a SIA-appointed body
- more time spent on teaching physical intervention methods, particularly around restraint techniques
- the requirement to do, and provision of, refresher training

- more rigorous training and vetting at the outset, when people are doing the training needed to get their SIA licence, to weed out the unsuitable
- leadership training for head door supervisors
- higher level physical intervention training over and above SIA licence training
- more conflict management training, especially in verbal techniques to de-escalate potentially violent situations
- English language tests
- more training for bar staff in relation to refusing to serve customers who are drunk

12. **Recording and reporting of incidents**

Recording and reporting of incidents clearly needs to improve to help understand more about the incidence of violence. Specifically…

- reporting needs to happen on a consistent, systematic basis, by all interested parties: venues, police, security companies, security staff
- the information generated by reporting needs to be collected on a nationwide basis and to be made available to all concerned as national, regional and local data: it should be able to be aggregated and disaggregated as necessary
- the information gathered needs to be used in planning security, and planning use of security measures, both strategically and tactically

APPENDICES

Qualitative topic guides

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Violence reduction: discussion guide security sector

Background

- Nature of business and type of work
- Role and responsibilities; length of time in the industry

Overall views of violence

- Overall views on violence in the night time economy and more widely; what do they see as the most significant issues
- Beliefs about how violence varies between different locations and parts of the country: where and in what sorts of situations and settings do they believe it is most evident
- Perceptions of trends in relation to violence: what is changing, what has changed in recent years and what do they expect in the next few years
- Who do they believe is most at risk of violence (eg them/their staff, members of the public, operatives in other sectors)

Experience of violence

- Perceptions of nature of violent incidents: what sorts of things do they/their staff experience most often
- In the last year what examples of incidents can they think of
- How serious do they believe these were; did they/their staff report them to the police, the venue, the company
- Perceived cause and contributing factors; locations; type of perpetrators

Measures used and known

- What steps do they/their staff take to deal with violence
- What overall strategies do they use – what is their aim in managing the risk of violence and dealing with people who might cause it

- What specific measures do they use to stop people becoming violent or deal with them when they become violent
- How effective are these strategies and measures
- Have they/their staff had any training in using these

Role of different bodies and individuals

- What do they believe is their/their staff's role in managing violence – what are they there for and what do they get hired to do
- In managing and addressing violence, what do they see as the role of…
  - venue managers and operators
  - the police
  - the local council
- How do they/their staff work with these bodies
- Who is most important in this – which organisations or individuals do they believe have…
  - the greatest responsibility for addressing violence
  - the greatest ability or power to deal with it
- What sort of interaction is there between themselves, the venues and the police and how helpful is this
- Who else, if anyone, plays a part in tackling violence and how helpful are they

Information and guidance on managing violence

- What training have they had in this area, if not already mentioned
- Where do they get information about it – from colleagues, from their company, from the police, elsewhere
- What information and guidance is most useful to them and why

- Do they feel they need more training or information and if so in what areas

Ways of reducing violence

- Suggestions for ways of reducing violence – what do they believe should be…
  - the general approach
  - the specific tactics
- How do they think these should vary between sectors, ie licensed venues, retail venues, public locations, other
- What three things would be the most useful and effective in tackling violence, and who should be involved in instigating them

Role of the SIA

- What do they know of the SIA and what it does in helping manage violence
- Are they aware of work done by the SIA in putting forward ways of reducing violence; if so, what do they feel about these
- What else do they feel the SIA could do to help security operatives and companies in dealing with violence

Summing up

- What do they see as the most important steps in this area
- Are there any other aspects of it that have not been discussed

Violence reduction: discussion guide venue owners

Background

- Nature of business and type of work
- Role and responsibilities; length of time in their industry

Overall views of violence

- Overall views on violence in the night time economy and more widely; what do they see as the most significant issues
- Beliefs about how violence varies between different locations and parts of the country: where and in what sorts of situations and settings do they believe it is most evident
- Perceptions of trends in relation to violence: what is changing, what has changed in recent years and what do they expect in the next few years
- Who do they believe is most at risk of violence (eg them/their staff, members of the public, operatives in other sectors)

Experience of violence

- Perceptions of nature of violent incidents: what sorts of things do they/their staff experience most often
- In the last year what examples of incidents can they think of
- How serious do they believe these were; did they/their staff report them to the police, the venue, the company
- Perceived cause and contributing factors; locations; type of perpetrators

Measures used and known

- What steps do they/their staff take to deal with violence
- What overall strategies do they use – what is their aim in managing the risk of violence and dealing with people who might cause it

- Do they use door staff or any kind of security staff; why/why not
- If they use door staff or any security staff, how long have they used them for and what prompted them to
- Apart from door/security staff, what specific measures do they use to stop people becoming violent or deal with them when they become violent
- How effective are these strategies and measures
- Have they/their staff had any training in using these

Role of different bodies and individuals

- What do they believe is their/their staff's role in dealing with and managing violence – what are they there for and what do they get hired to do
- In managing and addressing violence, what do they see as the role of…
  - door staff and security staff
  - the police
  - the local council
- How do they/their staff work with these bodies
- Who is most important in this – which organisations or individuals do they believe have…
  - the greatest responsibility for addressing violence
  - the greatest ability or power to deal with it
- What sort of interaction is there between themselves, the door staff and their companies and the police, and how helpful is this
- Who else, if anyone, plays a part in tackling violence and how helpful are they
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Information and guidance on managing violence

- Do they get any information about dealing with – from colleagues, from their company, from the police, elsewhere
- What information and guidance is most useful to them and why
- Do they feel they need more training or information and if so in what areas

Ways of reducing violence

- Suggestions for ways of reducing violence – what do they believe should be…
  - the general approach
  - the specific tactics
- How do they think these should vary between sectors, ie licensed venues, retail venues, public locations, other
- What three things would be the most useful and effective in tackling violence, and who should be involved in instigating them

Role of the SIA

- What do they know of the SIA and what it does in helping manage violence
- Are they aware of work done by the SIA in putting forward ways of reducing violence; if so, what do they feel about these
- What else do they feel the SIA could do to help security operatives and companies in dealing with violence

Summing up

- What do they see as the most important steps in this area
- Are there any other aspects of it that have not been discussed

Violence reduction: discussion guide: Police

Background

- Role and responsibilities; length of time in the police service
- Nature of policing work they do

Overall views of violence

- Overall views on violence in the night time economy and more widely; what do they see as the most significant issues
- Beliefs about how violence varies between different locations and parts of the country: where and in what sorts of situations and settings do they believe it is most evident
- Perceptions of trends in relation to violence: what is changing, what has changed in recent years and what do they expect in the next few years
- Who do they believe is most at risk of violence (eg venue owners and staff, security staff, members of the public, the police)

Experience of violence

- Perceptions of nature of violent incidents: what sorts of things do they experience most often
- In the last year what examples of incidents can they think of
- How serious do they believe these were; did the venues, security staff or members of the public (whichever is relevant) report them to the police)
- Did these incidents get recorded as crimes and if so, under what heading or category
- Perceived cause and contributing factors in the incidents; what were they about, who and what was most to blame; what sorts of people were perpetrators

Measures used and known

- What steps do they take to deal with violence
- What overall strategies do they use – what is their aim in managing the risk of violence and dealing with people who might cause it
- What specific measures do they use to stop people becoming violent or deal with them when they become violent
- How effective are these strategies and measures
- Have they had any training in using these

Role of different bodies and individuals

- What do they believe is their role in managing violence – what are they there for
- In managing and addressing violence, what do they see as the role of…
  - venue managers and operators
  - security staff, ie door supervisors and others
  - the local council
- How do they/their staff work with these bodies
- Who is most important in this – which organisations or individuals do they believe have…
  - the greatest responsibility for addressing violence
  - the greatest ability or power to deal with it
- What sort of interaction is there between themselves, the venues and the police and how helpful is this
- Who else, if anyone, plays a part in tackling violence and how helpful are they

- What is their view of security staff (particularly door supervisors) these days: how effective are they, how easy to work with are they
- how have they changed in recent years; has their role changed in recent years and if so how

Role of the SIA

- What do they know of the SIA and what it does in helping manage violence
- Are they aware of work done by the SIA in putting forward ways of reducing violence; if so, what do they feel about these
- What else do they feel the SIA could do to help security operatives and companies in dealing with violence

Ways of reducing violence

- Suggestions for ways of reducing violence – what do they believe should be…
  - the general approach
  - the specific tactics
- How do they think these should vary between sectors, ie licensed venues, retail venues, public locations, other
- What three things would be the most useful and effective in tackling violence, and who should be involved in instigating them

Summing up

- What do they see as the most important steps in this area
- Are there any other aspects of it that have not been discussed